The general character of Sunni-Shia violence will be observed through a discussion of recent instances in Pakistan, Yemen, and Iraq, and the potential for similar sectarian bloodshed in Syria (incorporating Lebanon) will then be discussed. This isn't an exhaustive account of Sunni-Shia violence across the world, but it should hopefully provide some context and insight into such conflicts.
Pakistan
Sectarian killings of Shias in Pakistan often follow a tragically regular pattern: a bus (usually travelling in the north of the country) is stopped by gunmen, the Shias are ordered off the bus, they are shot at the roadside, and a Sunni jihadi organisation (usually the Pakistani Taliban, تحریک طالبان پاکستان) claims responsibility through its website. Strange as it may sound to unfamiliar observes, within the minds of the perpetrators such killings of Shias falls as much under the banner of jihad as the killing of unbelievers does. After one such bus massacre in late February this year, a commander of the Jundulluh (جند اللہ) faction of the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack with these words: "They were Shiite infidels and our mujahedeen shot them dead one by one after bringing them down from a bus".
This conception of Shias as "infidels" (كفّار) is at the root of most anti-Shia violence, and springs usually from an accusation that Shias have "deviated" from "true Islam" by their reverence for Mohammed's son-in-law Ali (as Mohammed's supposed true successor) and other members of his family, as well as differences in practices such as prayer. Thus the aforementioned justification by the Pakistani Taliban for murdering Shia civilians would be familiar to Sunni jihadis across the Islamic world, to whom attacks on Shias are as much the business of the mujahadin ("those engaged in jihad", مجاهد) as attacks on American troops are.
Although the violence in Pakistan is largely directed against Shias by Sunni jihadis, reverse attacks do occur: a wave of sectarian violence between the two communities (with attacks on both sides) flared up in Gilgit (northern Pakistan) after a hand grenade was thrown at a gathering of a Sunni organisation (purportedly by Shia militants).
Yemen
The Yemeni uprising may be the least-covered of the Arab Spring rebellions in the Western Media, but the Shia Houthi insurgency in Yemen is even less covered still, and is practically unknown outside the region. Since 2004, Shia insurgents in northern Yemen have waged what they claim is a war of self defence to protect their community against government discrimination and aggression, and which the Yemeni Government characterizes as a Iran-backed attempt to seize control and impose Shia religious law on the country.
Where the jihadi angle appears in this conflict, however, again surrounds Yemen's Arab Spring uprising. In the increasingly anarchic situation in Yemen, violent jihadi groups have begun to perpetrate attacks against Shias here also. In January 2011 al Qaeda declared a jihad against the Houthis, and followed this up with a car bombing in August that killed 14 Shias. In early March this year, a bomb at a Houthi anti-US protest in northern Yemen killed 22. With Yemen's al Qaeda branch in control of territory and already perpetrating an increasing number of attacks against government and military targets, more and more sectarian attacks similar to those mentioned can be expected.
Iraq
Although no longer in the throes of the sectarian bloodletting which characterized the civil war between 2006 and 2008, in which both Sunni and Shia groups perpetrated massacres and attacks on places of worship, religiously motivated attacks continue. These now primarily take the form of coordinated bombings by the Islamic State of Iraq (دولة العراق الإسلامية) organisation, which includes al Qaeda in Iraq under its umbrella. Such attacks targeting Shias have occurred already in January, February and March this year, killing dozens. Though the body count of the Iraqi insurgency has been in heavy decline in recent months (with February being the least violent month in years), Iraq's violent jihadis (along with those in Lebanon, to be discussed below) may well come to play a resurgent role due to the conflict in Syria.
(It should be noted that the inter-communal conflict in Iraq is not simply one directed against Shias by Sunnis. Especially since the US withdrawal earlier this year, the Shia-dominated government of Iraq seems to be trying to entrench the domination of its community. Sunnis complain of being shut out of government jobs, the most senior Sunni in the Government, Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, is in hiding in Iraqi Kurdistan from state prosecutors who want him tried on terror charges, and there appears to be an increasing attempt by Shias to control the public space of mixed Iraqi cities; Baghdad has lately appeared to be covered by Shia banners. This sort of exclusion of Sunnis from public and political life can only entrench the sectarian divides which the violent jihadis use to recruit new fighters.)
Syria
The circumstances surrounding the current Syrian uprising are of course very complicated, with a large number of groups operating towards various ends. However, there is the distinct potential for a sectarian edge to the conflict to emerge, and to an extent it already has.
Often neglected in analysis of the Syrian conflict is precedent for an anti-regime rebellion taking on a sectarian dimension: during the 1976-1982 uprising of Sunni Islamists (linked to the Muslim Brotherhood) against the then-regime of Hafez al-Assad (father of the current dictator Bashar al-Assad), rebel assassinations and massacres were often targeted specifically against the Alawi (a form of Shia Islam) community, which was seen as a cadre for the government as many of its members featured prominently in the regime (including the President himself and his family). The demographics of Syria's recent uprising ere highly similar: the rebels are overwhelming Sunni and enjoy the support of most of Syia's Sunni majority, whereas the government prominently features Alawis and draws its main support from this community and the other religious minorities (mostly other kinds of Shias and Christians), who fear their rights may be eroded if the Sunni majority comes to power.
There are also signs of expanding jihadi elements among the rebels. New rebel brigades with names such as the "God is Great" Bridade or the "Supporters of God" Brigade are springing up and couching their statements on the struggle in the language of jihad. This occurs alongside an increasing number of suicide and car bombings perpetrated by rebel groups, many of which are causing significant civilian casualties. However more worrying is the nature and sophistication of the attacks, which may point to links with violent jihadi groups in Iraq (who continue to perpetrate similar attacks in their own country). Many of these bombings have been claimed by the newly-formed Al-Nusra Front to Protect the Levant (جبهة النصرة لأهل الشام), which (if not simply a front organisation) definitely has links to al Qaeda in Iraq, which means it brings, along with bombing expertise, the kind of hardline anti-Shia ideology has been behind so many past (and present) attacks in Iraq. In addition to the large-scale bombings in major cities, however, there have also been a string of smaller suicide and car bombings in smaller cities and towns (with much lower death tolls), which points to a proliferation of this sort of tactic, and perhaps the violent jihadi ideology which usually accompanies suicide bombings. In February this year Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's successor as head of al Qaeda, declared the rebellion a jihad and called for all Muslims to help in the struggle. The flow of Iraqi fighters and arms into Syria has become significant enough that the (Shia-dominated) government of Iraq has announced increased measures to try to prevent it, at the same time as Sunni Gulf Arab states are announcing that they will bankroll and arm the rebellion.
In terms of explicitly sectarian violence, the details remain somewhat uncertain at present but do coincide with the conclusion of an increasingly sectarian conflict. The Syrian government has certainly tried to characterize the rebellion as a sectarian one, describing them as "terrorists" in the media and possibly having gone so far as to pay government workers to shout anti-Alawi slogans (for the media's observance) at anti-government rallies and write anti-Alawi graffiti in public places. Thus not all reported instances of sectarian rhetoric by rebels should be considered as genuine, however an increasing number of anti-Alawi statements have emerged from rebel leaders and sympathisers in Syria and abroad. A voice purported to belong to Mamoun al-Homsy, one of the opposition leaders, warned in a recorded message in December 2011 that Alawites should abandon Assad, or else "Syria will become the graveyard of the Alawites". Amateur video posted online appears to show Abdul Baset Sarut, a leader of the opposition in Homs, calling for the extermination of the Alawites during a demonstration. This has been mirrored in some instances of actual violence: reports have emerged that in the villages of the Syrian countryside Alawis are being murdered, sometimes in large numbers, by Sunni rebels. In mid-2011, Christians were reportedly attacked by anti-government protesters for their community's (perceived) failure to join the protests. The government itself may also have directly fomented sectarian violence by using largely Alawi militias (known as "shahiba" -"thugs", الشبيحة) to attack (largely Sunni) protesters.
Perhaps the clearest instance of sectarian violence surrounding the Syrian conflict, however, has actually occurred in Lebanon. In February, supporters and opponents of Assad's regime took to the streets of Tripoli armed with guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Although only a few injuries resulted, the clash was clearly between inhabitants of the Sunni district of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the Alawite district of Jebel Mohsen. Like their co-religionists in Syria, the inhabitants of these districts have a history of clashes with each other. and Lebanon has no shortage of its own violent groups that may be drawn into a sectarian conflict in Syria; the Shia terrorist organisation Hezbollah, which currently sits in Lebanon's governing coalition and whose militias control much of the country, especially springs to mind. Hezbollah is notably already supporting the Assad regime, as is the Shia government of Iran. There is also a significant Alawi community in Turkey which is growing increasingly worried about the fate of its brethren in Syria. The recipe for a sectarian conflict fed by other regional players seems to be in place.
Conclusion
Overall, especially with the new funding from Gulf Arab states, it seems increasingly likely that sectarian conflict and terrorism will emerge in Syria, as native Syrian jihadi brigades form links with Iraqi jihadi fighters and as both the government and certain rebel leaders portray the conflict as one between sects of Islam. Syria may well become yet another country, like those discussed above, with a serious problem of sectarian jihadism.
The circumstances surrounding the current Syrian uprising are of course very complicated, with a large number of groups operating towards various ends. However, there is the distinct potential for a sectarian edge to the conflict to emerge, and to an extent it already has.
Often neglected in analysis of the Syrian conflict is precedent for an anti-regime rebellion taking on a sectarian dimension: during the 1976-1982 uprising of Sunni Islamists (linked to the Muslim Brotherhood) against the then-regime of Hafez al-Assad (father of the current dictator Bashar al-Assad), rebel assassinations and massacres were often targeted specifically against the Alawi (a form of Shia Islam) community, which was seen as a cadre for the government as many of its members featured prominently in the regime (including the President himself and his family). The demographics of Syria's recent uprising ere highly similar: the rebels are overwhelming Sunni and enjoy the support of most of Syia's Sunni majority, whereas the government prominently features Alawis and draws its main support from this community and the other religious minorities (mostly other kinds of Shias and Christians), who fear their rights may be eroded if the Sunni majority comes to power.
There are also signs of expanding jihadi elements among the rebels. New rebel brigades with names such as the "God is Great" Bridade or the "Supporters of God" Brigade are springing up and couching their statements on the struggle in the language of jihad. This occurs alongside an increasing number of suicide and car bombings perpetrated by rebel groups, many of which are causing significant civilian casualties. However more worrying is the nature and sophistication of the attacks, which may point to links with violent jihadi groups in Iraq (who continue to perpetrate similar attacks in their own country). Many of these bombings have been claimed by the newly-formed Al-Nusra Front to Protect the Levant (جبهة النصرة لأهل الشام), which (if not simply a front organisation) definitely has links to al Qaeda in Iraq, which means it brings, along with bombing expertise, the kind of hardline anti-Shia ideology has been behind so many past (and present) attacks in Iraq. In addition to the large-scale bombings in major cities, however, there have also been a string of smaller suicide and car bombings in smaller cities and towns (with much lower death tolls), which points to a proliferation of this sort of tactic, and perhaps the violent jihadi ideology which usually accompanies suicide bombings. In February this year Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's successor as head of al Qaeda, declared the rebellion a jihad and called for all Muslims to help in the struggle. The flow of Iraqi fighters and arms into Syria has become significant enough that the (Shia-dominated) government of Iraq has announced increased measures to try to prevent it, at the same time as Sunni Gulf Arab states are announcing that they will bankroll and arm the rebellion.
In terms of explicitly sectarian violence, the details remain somewhat uncertain at present but do coincide with the conclusion of an increasingly sectarian conflict. The Syrian government has certainly tried to characterize the rebellion as a sectarian one, describing them as "terrorists" in the media and possibly having gone so far as to pay government workers to shout anti-Alawi slogans (for the media's observance) at anti-government rallies and write anti-Alawi graffiti in public places. Thus not all reported instances of sectarian rhetoric by rebels should be considered as genuine, however an increasing number of anti-Alawi statements have emerged from rebel leaders and sympathisers in Syria and abroad. A voice purported to belong to Mamoun al-Homsy, one of the opposition leaders, warned in a recorded message in December 2011 that Alawites should abandon Assad, or else "Syria will become the graveyard of the Alawites". Amateur video posted online appears to show Abdul Baset Sarut, a leader of the opposition in Homs, calling for the extermination of the Alawites during a demonstration. This has been mirrored in some instances of actual violence: reports have emerged that in the villages of the Syrian countryside Alawis are being murdered, sometimes in large numbers, by Sunni rebels. In mid-2011, Christians were reportedly attacked by anti-government protesters for their community's (perceived) failure to join the protests. The government itself may also have directly fomented sectarian violence by using largely Alawi militias (known as "shahiba" -"thugs", الشبيحة) to attack (largely Sunni) protesters.
Perhaps the clearest instance of sectarian violence surrounding the Syrian conflict, however, has actually occurred in Lebanon. In February, supporters and opponents of Assad's regime took to the streets of Tripoli armed with guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Although only a few injuries resulted, the clash was clearly between inhabitants of the Sunni district of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the Alawite district of Jebel Mohsen. Like their co-religionists in Syria, the inhabitants of these districts have a history of clashes with each other. and Lebanon has no shortage of its own violent groups that may be drawn into a sectarian conflict in Syria; the Shia terrorist organisation Hezbollah, which currently sits in Lebanon's governing coalition and whose militias control much of the country, especially springs to mind. Hezbollah is notably already supporting the Assad regime, as is the Shia government of Iran. There is also a significant Alawi community in Turkey which is growing increasingly worried about the fate of its brethren in Syria. The recipe for a sectarian conflict fed by other regional players seems to be in place.
Conclusion
Overall, especially with the new funding from Gulf Arab states, it seems increasingly likely that sectarian conflict and terrorism will emerge in Syria, as native Syrian jihadi brigades form links with Iraqi jihadi fighters and as both the government and certain rebel leaders portray the conflict as one between sects of Islam. Syria may well become yet another country, like those discussed above, with a serious problem of sectarian jihadism.
