'The Most Unfortunate Incident': The Theri Massacre and Fifty years of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan

Summary: On 3 June 1963, Pakistan saw its first cases of mass anti-Shia violence, with the killing of over one hundred in the village of Theri, as well as attacks in Lahore and Narowal. On the fiftieth anniversary of these events, described by Sharaabtoon research, far from being seen as isolated, they can sadly be identified as the opening act of the fratricidal killings between Sunnis and Shias in Pakistan which still continue after fifty years.


Sectarian Violence in Pakistan

In a piece of original research, Sharaabtoon is proud to bring you the first collation of the evidence, most of it not available on the internet, on the opening salvo of Pakistan's ongoing sectarian conflict: the Theri massacre of June 1963, and the accompanying violence in Lahore and Narowal. In spite of the widespread attention these events received in their immediate aftermath, since then they have become largely forgotten or ignored outside of the communal memories passed down within the Shia community of Pakistan.

Adding to the tragedy of these events is the fact that, despite the many condemnations the killings received at the time from all corners of Pakistan, sectarian violence, particularly against Shias (but also against Christians, Hindus and Ahmadis) has continued to plague the country. Thousands of Shias have been killed since 1963, with their murderers citing religious reasons as 'justification'.

Strange as it may sound to unfamiliar observes, within the minds of the perpetrators such killings of Shias falls as much under the banner of jihad as the killing of unbelievers does. After one massacre in February 2012 this year, a commander of the Jundulluh faction of the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack with these words: "They were Shiite infidels and our mujahedeen shot them dead one by one after bringing them down from a bus."

This conception of Shias as "infidels" (كفّار) is at the root of most anti-Shia violence, and springs usually from an accusation that Shias have "deviated" from "true Islam" by their reverence for Mohammed's son-in-law Ali (as Mohammed's supposed true successor) and other members of his family, as well as differences in practices such as prayer. This particularly comes to a head during the public displays of the differences between Shia and Sunni religious views, such as during the processions of the Day of Ashura, which was the case in 1963.

Shia processions remain a main target, frequently being targeted with bombings by organisations such as the Pakistani Taliban, as well as a vast network of smaller violent jihadi groups. Many of these groups have received the patronage or tacit cooperation of various arms of the Pakistani government and armed forces, who often see them as useful proxies against India, or a "last line of defence" in case of a future invasion.

Although the violence in Pakistan is largely directed against Shias by Sunni jihadis, reverse attacks do occur: a wave of sectarian violence between the two communities (with attacks on both sides) flared up in Gilgit (northern Pakistan) last year after a hand grenade was thrown at a gathering of a Sunni organisation (purportedly by Shia militants).


The Day of Ashura

Like so much of the Sunni-Shia violence seen since, these events centred around the Day of Ashura. This is the tenth day of the month of Muhharam in the Islamic calendar, on which Shia Muslims mourn the death of Hussein ibn Ali at the Battle of Karbala. This battle was the climax of the struggle over who should lead the followers of Islam after the death of the Prophet Mohammed, with the Umayyad Caliph Yazid I defeating Hussein (Mohammed's grandson). Shias mark this day with processions and displays of public mourning, and have often consequently clashed with Sunnis, as the diverging points of their sects are brought out into the streets.

One consequence of the great forgetting surrounding the events of 1963 is that even the date on which they occurred has become obscured, with many Shia sources now identifying the date as 6 June 1963. However, the Day of Ashura in 1963 fell on 3 June, and the contemporary newspapers began covering the killings on 4 June, noting the date they were perpetrated as 3 June (and the night of 2 June in Lahore).


The Riots in Lahore

Throughout Pakistan on the Day of Ashura in 1963, there were a great many peaceful processions and commemorations, including in Karachi, Peshawar and Multan. However, Lahore proved to be far more turbulent. The origin of riots seems to be found in events of the night before, when Sunni-Shia scuffles broke out, and bottles and broken bricks ("brick-bats") were thrown at a Shia procession that had halted outside a Sunni mosque (Dawn: 5 June: p.11; The Pakistan Times: 4 June: p.1). Members of Sunnat-Jama'at (a traditionalist Barelvi Sunni organisation) tried to rush the procession and had to be prevented from doing so by a police baton charge (The Pakistan Times: 11 June: p.9 ; Dawn: 12 June: p.6).

By the morning of 3 June, rumours were spreading that Shias had killed two Sunnis near the mosque where the procession had halted (The Pakistan Times: 12 June: p.3 ; Dawn: 12 June: p.6). Stone-throwing against the Shia processions ensued, and, despite assurances from Sunni leaders that they would be allowed to pass freely, when a large procession passed the Bhati Gate, what was described as a "free fight" broke out between the two groups, and the police opened fire to restore order. As broken brick-throwing started against processions in other areas, Army units were called in, and the police repeatedly opened fire throughout the city (Dawn: 5 June: p.11 ; Dawn: 27 June: p.1). Witnesses later reported seeing two Shias being beaten by a crowd which the police had just dispersed from the Bhati Gate (The Pakistan Times: 27 June: p.11). A curfew was imposed and maintained for several proceeding nights.

More than eighty people were injured in these riots, and four people (including one policeman) eventually died of injuries they sustained on 2 and 3 June (Dawn: 5 June: p.11 ; Sawn: 6 June: p.9). Police registered incidents of "stabbing, arson and loot" throughout the two days (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.5). In the following days, six hundred and thirty people were arrested in association with the riots, though over seventy of these were for violating the ensuring curfew (The Pakistan Times: 7 June: p.11 ; The Pakistan Times: 8 June: p.1).

This kind of violence was new to Lahore. It was reported that “elder citizens of the town… could not recall such a violence in Lahore on Ashura during the last 150 years” (The Pakistan Times: 5 June: p.1). An inquiry into the violence was ordered by the Governor of West Pakistan, but this was (to quote one news report) “not so much for fixing the blame of the incident, but for assessing the causes for the tension between the two sects, and for remedies to prevent such recurrence in the future” (The Pakistan Times: 5 June: p.1). Not surprisingly, Pakistan's Shias were left with a sense that little was done to bring the instigators of the riots to justice, and by July the kind of "future remedies" being suggested to prevent such riots included the pre-publication censorship of all Shia religious literature to remove content Sunnis found "objectionable" (The Civil & Military Gazette: 2 July: p.4). Quickly, those who had largely been the victims of the riots were blamed for causing them in the first place.


The Massacre in Theri

Far more bloody than the riots in Lahore were the killings in Theri (or "Therhi"), a village in Khairpur district. The incident began with a single stone-throwing against a Shia tazia (processional model of Hussein's mausoleum), and when news of this reached Khairpur city, a large number of armed men descended on the town and set both the tazia and the house where the Shias were meeting on fire (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.5 ; Dawn: 5 June: p.1). What followed was described as a "pitched battle" by the time the police arrived and used tear gas to disperse the mob, with re-enforcements from nearby towns and even the Indus Rangers being called in (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.5 ; Dawn: 5 June: p.1 & p.11). A dawn-to dusk curfew was imposed for several subsequent nights.

Over one hundred people were killed and at least thirty injured in this massacre (CGI: 18 April 2005: p.9 ; Dawn: 9 June: p.13). The characterization of the incident as a "battle" seems to be contradicted by the fact that almost every victim was identified as a Shia. In the following weeks, ninety-eight people were arrested from all over Khairpur district on charges of arson, murder and riot in Theri (Dawn: 27 June, p.1 & P.7). As with Lahore, a government inquiry was ordered, but later suspended and seems not to have reached any real conclusions (The Civil and Military Gazette: July 3: p.3).

The accounts passed on by victims and witnesses of the killings in Theri present a lurid picture. Knives, axes, and stones are said to have been used to murder the processionists. The perpetrators reportedly walked through the area of the attack shouting Shia slogans and offering water, only to murder any of the wounded who replied (Shaheed Foundation Pakistan). The dead bodies were then thrown into a well in an attempt to conceal the scale of the killings (with some sources saying the next planned step was to burn them in the well) before the police arrived to take custody of them. (CGI: 18 April 2005: p.9 ; Shaheed Foundation Pakistan).  The Shaheed Foundation of Pakistan has preserved a number of (graphic) photographs showing the state of the bodies recovered and the site of the massacre. Many of these accounts describe the perpetrators as "Wahhabis", but the tiny size of the Wahhabi population of Pakistan at this time suggests that they were likely more mainstream Sunnis.

Under the protection of the Pakistani police the Shia ceremonies that had been interrupted by the killings and the ensuing curfews were completed on 7 June, without violence violence (Dawn: 7 June: p.7 ; The Pakistan Times: 8 June: p.10). In subsequent years, however, there was repeated anti-Shia violence in this and nearby villages on the Day of Ashura.


Narowal's Violence among Neighbours

In Narowal, before the Ashura procession went ahead, an agreement was struck between the Sunni and Shia communities that the march would be made up of only ten Shias. On the day, only nine went, but they were escorted by four prominent Sunnis walking alongside them. The Pakistan Times reported that, as the procession passed through the town, some Sunnis began “abusing the Shias and also instigating the Sunnis to attack them as they had not carried out the agreement made earlier. The situation took an ugly turn when the rival groups started exchanging brickbats on the mourners. At this point the police intervened and the furious mob started throwing brickbats on the police as well” (The Pakistan Tunes: 6 June: p.8). The mob was ordered to disperse, and the police made an unsuccessful attempt to disperse it with a baton charge. When this failed, the police then fired “to scare away the crowd” (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.8) Later, about five hundred persons gathered armed with improvised batons and axes and attached the processionists. The Police fired for a second time, injuring “several persons” and killing two (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.8).

In this case, many of the leaders of this attack were not only arrested and charged, but also named in Pakistani newspaper stories (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.8). All involved seem to have been locals, well-known to their victims.


Conclusion

The events in Theri, Lahore and Narowal acted as a bloody opening to the ongoing dark chapter in Pakistani history, and the nation as a whole has yet to come to terms with the ongoing violence. At the time, one newspaper correspondent described it as "the most unfortunate incident in the history of the country" (The Pakistan Times: 5 June: p.9), but many more tragic atrocities have since been committed. Pakistan's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, one said that "There is no power on earth that can undo Pakistan." We have yet to see if Pakistan can undo the ongoing spiral of sectarian strife which still plagues it after fifty years.



Bibliography: 

• The Civil & Military Gazette; Lahore; 1963 (British Library Newspaper collection)
• Dawn; Karachi; 1963; (British Library Newspaper collection)
• International Crisis Group, “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan”, Asia Report, N°95 – 18 April 2005 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/095_the_state_of_sectarianism_in_pakistan
• The Pakistan Times; Lahore; 1963 (British Library Newspaper collection)
• Shaheed Foundation Pakistan, "Tragic Event" http://www.shaheedfoundation.org/tragic.asp?Id=13

Other Resources:

• http://criticalppp.com/archives/266633
• http://worldshiaforum.wordpress.com/2012/12/26/therhikhaipur-massacre-49th-anniversary-of-the-first-large-scale-sectarian-attack-in-pakistan/

"Sheikh of the Arab Spring" now calls for jihad in Syria

Radical Egyptian cleric Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi is one of the world's most renowned Sunni clerics, chairman of the International Federation of Muslim Scholars, and has been dubbed the "Sheikh of the Arab Spring" for lending his support and legitimacy to many of the recent anti-government protests and revolutions in Arab countries. In May, he called for "jihad to death" against Israel -and now he has added Syria to the list of countries in need of jihad.

Specifically, al-Qaradawi's official website stated that he has called for "those able to undertake jihad and fighting to head to Syria to stand by the Syrian people who are being killed at the hands of the regime and are now being killed at the hands of what he called the party of Satan" -referring to the al-Assad regime in Syria and Lebanon's Hezbollah ("Party of God"), respectively. Regarding the latter, many Sunni clerics and laymen alike have taken to renaming Hezbollah after the devil due to its full-scale intervention on behalf of al-Assad.

Regarding al-Assad's regime, al-Qaradawi's motivations here are not hard to deduce. Firstly, al-Qaradawi not only has a record of supporting recent popular ('democratic') uprisings against Arab dictators, but also has a history of describing Shia Muslims as "heretics", and of accusing Shias of "invading" Sunni countries. This has led him to be criticized even by a fellow Sunni member of the International Federation of Muslim Scholars for fomenting sectarian tensions. All of this has great relevance to why he would call for a jihad against an Alawite (Shia) regime in a majority-Sunni country, in a conflict already riven with religious and communal violence. But secondly, the clue is in al-Qaradawi's current base of operations: Qatar. Qatar has been staunchly backing Islamist rebels against al-Assad's regime -and probably (tacitly, indirectly, or even consciously) the most radical jihadis like the al-Nusra Front and their allies.

In its better days, Sheikh al-Qaradawi could be said to symbolize the Arab Spring's democratic aspirations and popular appeal. Now, the Sheikh also embodies the uprisings' darker side of sectarianism, trans-national proxies, and violent jihad.

Al Qaeda allies had Sarin Gas in Turkey -were they targeting Alawites Abroad?

Summary: Al Qaeda's ally the al-Nusra Front was caught with sarin gas in Turkey, allegedly planning an attack on a Turkish city known for its Alawite community. With al Qaeda in Iraq simultaneously striking Shia targets there, are these jihadi groups now trying to export Syria (and Iraq)'s Sunni-Shia violence across the region?


A 2kg cylinder of sarin gas was found yesterday by Turkish authorities after they searched the homes of militants belonging to the Syrian al-Nusra Front. This jihadi organisation is either a close ally or a full-blown branch of Al Qaeda (depending on who you talk to), as well as being the most aggressive and successful rebel fighting group in the Syrian civil war.

That al-Nusra possesses sarin gas is not in itself surprising. The rebels have already captured significant amounts of chemical weapons formerly belonging to Syria's al-Assad regime, and are believed to have used sarin in an attack that killed twenty-six people, including government forces, in March this year. As the leaders of the opposition's armed struggle, it was only a matter of time before al-Nusra was able to get its hands on some of these captured stockpiles. Al-Assad has even claimed that militants linked to al Qaeda (most likely al-Nusra) were behind the sarin attack in March -though al-Assad's regime attributes almost all rebel actions to al Qaeda lately.

However, the fact that al-Nusra was caught with Sarin in a foreign country (even one next door) is more significant. According to the authorities, the gas intended for use in an attack in the Turkish city of Adana. If so, this would be the first clear attack by Syrian rebels on a foreign target. A car bombing in the Turkish city of Reyhanlı earlier in May is believed to have been carried out by the al-Assad regime or its proxies. No immediate explanation has been offered for why al-Nusra would want to strike a Turkish city with Sarin Gas -Turkey's government and population are broadly pro-rebel, if not pro-jihadi (though this distinction could have been enough to motivate al-Nusra to strike). One extremely worrying explanation is that the target was to be Adana's significant population of Alawites, the Shia offshoot which forms the core of the al-Assad regime and its supporters. The Alawite community is well-established and was in place long before the current civil war, making it a visible and accessible target if al-Nusra desired to strike against Alawites abroad.

If al-Nusra really is trying to extend its sectarian campaign against Alawites abroad, this would be a significant escalation of the conflict. Turkey has over seven hundred thousand Alawites, and Lebanon has over a hundred thousand. The fact that al Qaeda in Iraq is also currently trying to foment sectarian blood-letting there by striking at Shia targets makes it hard not to see al-Nusra's actions here as part of a wider Sunni jihadi plan to spread their "war on Shi'ism" across the Middle East.

As previously related in Sharaabtoon, to truly put it to devastating use significant quantities of sarin gas, as well as an advanced delivery system, are required. More primitive attempts to use it tactically are likely to fail, as Iraqi insurgents found out in May 2004. However, it can be used very effectively in smaller strikes on concentrated civilians targets, as was seen in the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1994. If the al-Nusra/al Qaeda alliance is planning to use chemical weapons against Shia civilians across the region, the inhabitants of Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran may have even more to fear from these jihadis gaining such armaments than even Israel's people do.

Alawite Distribution in the Levant

Syria’s coming Jihadi Ascendancy? Part Three: the Jihadis and the Wider World

Summary: if jihadis come to dominate the armed opposition in Syria, it will only cause al-Assad’s foreign allies to increase their support for his regime, greater tacit support for the jihadis by the Gulf Arab states, and a West that is increasingly left out in the cold. This may force al-Assad, his allies, the West, and the non-jihadi rebels into an alliance of necessity to stem the jihadi tide. The only alternative, a direct Western intervention, would likely just make the conflict even bloodier.


The interested parties abroad

The ascension of jihadi groups to leadership in the interior military struggle, as described in the last two Sharaabtoon posts on Syria, would have considerable consequences for the increasing number of other countries and bodies are  invested in the outcome of the civil war. 

Al-Assad’s allies

Some responses seem predictable: Russia and Iran, both staunch allies of the al-Assad regime, would react with alarm and are likely to be driven to support the government to even greater degrees -and to grow ever more hostile to international diplomatic efforts to weaken al-Assad, or recognise the Syrian National Council (SNC). It will become easier for them to join Bashir al-Assad in decrying the Syrian opposition (whom they will likely continue to portray as a singular body) as "terrorists" seeking a "military solution", who need to stop fighting or be defeated so that a "political solution" can be effected. Any future attacks akin to the aforementioned targeting of a Russian passenger jet will make Russia's "terrorist" characterization of the Syrian rebels even more compelling. Already, Iran has extended the Syrian government a $1 billion line of credit, and Russia is believed to be selling a new sophisticated missile system to Syria, one that could even be used against a Western intervention force. Russia and Iran would only invest more if al-Assad seems to be in danger of losing control of Syria altogether.

Hezbollah, with Iran's blessing, would likely be even more robust in its response to a (Sunni) jihadi ascendancy. Hezbollah has no choice but to back al-Assad to the hilt: his regime has been (along with Iran) their most important sponsor and is an irreplaceable supply route for weapons. Al-Assad’s fall would leave Hezbollah isolated and lacking in the weapons and funds it needs to confront its domestic enemies inside Lebanon, and its existential foe in neighbouring Israel. Through the support it has given to the al-Assad regime already, Hezbollah has isolated itself from most of the region, changing its perception in the Arab world from a lionized leader of the “resistance” against Israel to a bloody-handed accomplice to al-Assad’s slaughter. Without al-Assad, Hezbollah would be almost without friends, and surrounded by bitter enemies. Therefore, it should not be dismissed as mere bluster that in April Hezbollah’s leader declared that his organization would not allow the al-Assad regime to fall, and that is possible that his “forces of resistance” might have to intervene.

Although it denies having taken an official side in the conflict, in recent weeks Hezbollah has acknowledged that several of its members, including a notable commander, have died while “performing their jihadi duties” in Syria. Significantly, on May 19th this year Hezbollah militants openly fought alongside Syrian government troops in an offensive to retake the town of Qusair (near the Lebanese border) from rebels. Hezbollah is also much more adept at the kind of sectarian and guerrilla-style conflict now characterizing the Syrian civil war than the Syrian government itself is. Hezbollah has announced that it is supporting the Shia fighters in Syria who are calling themselves “Popular Committees”, and who claim to be protecting Syria’s Shias against sectarian attacks. These are non-Alawite Shias, and many of them already hold Lebanese passports, making their appeals to self-defence an emotive one in Hezbollah’s base of Lebanon. 

The other main mission of Hezbollah in Syria (along with other foreign Shia fighters) is the defence of the Sayyida Zaynab shrine near Damascus, which contains the grave of Zaynab, a granddaughter of the Prophet Mohammed and wife of Caliph Ali. The shrine, its neighbourhood and visiting pilgrims have been the target of sectarian attacks since before the Syrian civil war, and Syria’s Sunni jihadis have already demonstrated a willingness to attack what they see as “Shia” shrines. If strategic interests weren’t enough, these religious links would be a strong enough draw to ensure that Hezbollah, the region’s leading Shia jihadi group, would be ever more drawn into a conflict if Syria’s Sunni jihadis seemed to be winning it.

The jihadis and their sponsors

Conversely, a jihadi ascendancy inside Syria would be welcomed by Hamas. The Syrian civil war has driven a wedge between Hamas and its former patron Iran, forcing the former to seek out new partners and sponsors in the region. Already, Hamas has been fostering its links with deep-pocketed Gulf Arab states, and is allegedly helping train Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters Damascus, focusing on aiding them in developing better rockets and making better use of tunnels in combat. The great hope of the jihadis, and the fear of the West, is that the Syrian jihadis may find themselves also receiving at least the tacit or indirect support of the rising regional player now likely acting the shadowy role of Hamas' new patron: Qatar. Qatar appears to be taking the place of Iran (which heavily supports the al-Assad regime) as Hamas’ patron; the Emir of Qatar notably visited Gaza in late 2012, and pledged $400 million to the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.

Qatar seems to be competing with Saudi Arabia for influence among Syrian rebel forces. Both are backing the entire rebel spectrum from mainstream Islamists in the FSA to violent jihadi groups with money and arms. However Qatar’s chosen militants seem to be enjoying the upper hand thus far. Qatar is the site of the only SNC “embassy” abroad –as well as Hamas’ only “embassy”. The candidate favoured by the Qatari government, Ghassan Hitto, has even been elected Prime Minister of the Syrian National Coalition. Qatar and Hamas share the same motivation for their involvement: to build up their own influence and connections with jihadis and Islamists alike in a post-al-Assad Syria –although Hamas may also specifically have Syria in mind as a future launching pad for attacks on Israel. Qatar is unlikely to be funding the al Nusra Front directly, its funding of Islamist groups that share its outlook and desire al Nusra’s support on the battle field means that Qatari money and arms will certainly bleed through to the most radical jihadis. Qatar’s specific favouring of Islamist and jihadi groups is actually producing resentment among other rebel groups which it deems insufficiently “Islamic” and therefore doesn’t fund. This resentment, however, is a sign of the strength that Qatar’s backing is bringing to the Islamist and jihadi rebels.

Saudi Arabia’s motives are similar to Qatar’s: it wants to break Iran’s “arc of influence” from Iran to Lebanon (Hezbollah), and to shore up its own influence in the Sunni world by being seen as defending Syrian Sunnis from the “Alawite” al-Assad regime. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has its own large supply of unemployed and restless young radicals, which the Saudi regime believes are less likely to become a source of trouble at home if they can be sent to fight (and die) in Syria’s “jihad”. This has been Saudi Arabia’s approach to past conflicts such as Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan. There have even been reports that the Saudi government is equipping and transporting Yemeni jihadis to Syria, however this may be a sign of weakness as much as strength. The fact that Saudi Arabia is going to such lengths to bring in fighters loyal to itself may be an indication that it is struggling to find allies amongst Syria’s indigenous jihadis.

For their part, the al-Nusra front seems to be ever more dominated by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of the Islamic State of Iraq (formerly “al Qaeda in Iraq”) who has moved into northern Syria and is now directing much of al-Nusra’s struggle. His leadership will only make al-Nusra progressively more radical, violent and focused on sectarian killings.

The wallflower West

The Western powers (including Israel) would likely be put in the most difficult position by a jihadi takeover of the interior military struggle. Each of these nations would find itself having to choose between doubling down its support of the political leaders in exile (who would seem increasingly unable to affect the situation on the ground in Syria), or seeking a new means to end the conflict in the West's (and their own) favour, which most essentially means excluding violent jihadis from power. However, the rebels controlling northern Syria have already splintered into hundreds of separate armed groups, and in the face of growing jihadi power would all have a much greater incentive to make a deal with the jihadis and their allies than they would with the West.

Israel would face the most troubling situation right on its doorstep: Hezbollah empowered by its alliance with al-Assad, and the rest of Syria now a safe haven for jihadis. Israel might even find itself nostalgic for the days of its old, but predictable, enemy Bashir al-Assad.

The ‘odd couple’

The West’s need to banish the jihadis from a post-war Syria may cause the most unlikely-seeming alliance to come about: an accord between the Western democracies (including Israel), Russia, the non-jihadi Syrian opposition (especially its political exterior), and the al-Assad regime. This deal would allow them all to lessen or cease attacks on each other in order to focus on the military defeat of the jihadi groups, in exchange for a "political solution" to the conflict whereby exiled opposition politicians receive a share of power and Bashir al-Assad (likely) remains President. Iran and Hezbollah would likely be silent, if not official, partners in such an accord. Such an arrangement will become ever more likely the more the jihadi groups gain in military strength for two reasons: jihadi clashes with the non-jihadi Syrian opposition fighters would weaken the latter more and more, and the latter are the wing of the opposition most likely to oppose a "political solution" (which would almost certainly favour the political exiles over the military leaders). 

Secondly, if the jihadis emerge as the pre-eminent threat to the al-Assad regime on the battlefield, it increases the perception that a "military solution" (toppling al-Assad) would really mean a jihadi solution, thus encouraging the non-jihadi opposition to turn increasingly away from military means. It would be impossible to exclude the al-Assad regime from such an accord, if not Bashir himself, as such a jihadi ascendancy would leave the government as the only non-jihadi party still possessing true military power in the interior. There is some limited evidence that suggests an accord between the non-jihadi rebels and the al-Assad regime is possible. Smokescreen it may be, but the government has set up a “ministry of reconciliation” led by Ali Haidar, who himself has lost a son in the civil war. The prospect of peace talks reared its head in February, when SNC offers to meet with regime officials in Rome and to visit Moscow were both made and subsequently rescinded. There has been no real progress so far, but the pressure to reach a settlement increases every day as the jihadi rebels grow stronger.

However, even if such an "odd couple" alliance occurred and succeeded in both implementing the political integration of much of the opposition and driving back the jihadis on the conventional battlefield, it would by no means mean the end of jihadi violence in Syria. Still flush with their links to the Islamic State of Iraq, the Syrian jihadi groups would almost certainly follow the path the former has laid out in Iraq: revert to large-scale, often sectarian bombings against civilian and government targets. This would serve their twin aims of destabilizing the new regime and harming the internal populations they see as their enemies.

By this point, these jihadi groups in Syria would likely have outlived their usefulness to Qatar and the other Gulf Arab states (no longer having any real chance of toppling al-Assad from power), and so their supplies of money and weapons from these sources would likely dry up. However this would be unlikely to prevent the jihadis from continuing their fight, as they would now be involved in a far less monetarily costly "war" (terrorist bombings being less expensive than fielding fighting units and controlling territory) which could sustain itself in much the same the fashion as its counterparts in Iraq: kidnapping for ransom, "protection money", and other profit-making crimes. The Syrian jihadis would also retain their network of non-state friends abroad, especially Hamas, who would continue to enjoy deep pockets if it retained its Qatari backers (which seems probable, the Qataris being unlikely to want to jettison its other new agent of influence if they abandon Syria's jihadis). Horrific jihadi bombings and violence would remain a sad fact of life in Syria for years to come.

Intervention -the Alternative?

Growing consensus that the al-Assad regime has already used chemical weapons against insurgents has increased the chances that Western democracies, possibly in concert with Israel, will begin intervening more directly against the government in the civil war, as the use of such weapons was set out as the "redline" for intervention by President Obama. It is possible that if Western nations commenced lethal support, especially in the form of heavy and high-tech weaponry, for the non-jihadi opposition, that they would be able to reverse the rising jihadi tide on the battlefield and also topple the Assad regime. Direct Western military intervention (however unlikely) would certainly achieve the same aim, and indeed do so more directly. However, at best these paths would still result in the same post-war jihadi terrorism that is described above and still seen in Iraq years after the end of true military conflict there, and run the significant risk of adding to this bloody mix pro-al-Assad/anti-opposition insurgencies and terrorism. 

The most likely source of such violence in an a post-war Syria ruled by a pro-Western opposition would be the on-going alliance of Iran and Hezbollah with the Shia (and possibly other religious) minorities in Syria. There have already been indications that the al-Assad regime has been attempting to cement its control of the Alawite-majority coast region of Syria. The logic is that, should Damascus fall, al-Assad and his forces can withdraw to this rump state, retaining access to the sea and to their ally Hezbollah in Lebanon. This balkanization of Syria would likely mean the continuation and escalation of the kind of military involvement Hezbollah has already engaged in in Syria. After Israeli airstrikes on Syrian government sites earlier in May, al-Assad promised to provide “game-changing” weapons to Hezbollah, which has historically been in the market for exactly the kind of long-range missiles that the Syrian government possesses. Hezbollah desires these weapons so they can be used (or threatened) against Israel, and the al-Assad regime would need a safe place to base these missile systems if it lost control of most of Syria –thus a pact between them would serve both their interests. 

The rump al-Assad regime would likely continue to draw support from other non-Alawite minorities in Syria, such as the Christian population, which also has many reasons to fear a Syria where jihadis enjoy significant power. Hezbollah itself already has Christian allies in Lebanon –such an alliance in Syria also is not unlikely. Iran and Russia also have every incentive to keep any new regime which Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the jihadis hold sway over as weak as possible, and so would likely keep backing the al-Assad/Hezbollah alliance in fighting the new government. The kind of war this alliance would be fighting would likely be just as sectarian and brutal as that being waged by the Sunni jihadis. Already, pro-regime forces have begun massacring civilians in Sunni villages in the coastal region in order to consolidate their control and ‘demographic advantage’ there. These atrocities would only escalate if bitter and vengeful al-Assad/Shia forces were forced to withdraw to this area, and could even be expanded to include terrorist-style bombings in the (Sunni-majority) rest of Syria. Notably, in May the al-Assad regime is already suspected of using its own terrorist or jihadi proxies to carry out a sophisticated bombing in a Turkish border town which has become a haven for Syrian refugees.

There is also little reason to suspect that a Western intervention which ousts al-Assad would dampen the appeal of Sunni jihadi organisations to ordinary Syrians. In addition to how unpopular any intervention which put Western troops into Syria would be (and thus how much more popular the jihadis fighting the “invaders” would become), the civil war has already taken on enough of a sectarian edge to be self-sustaining. This would be especially true in the face of the aforementioned on-going war by Shia armed groups. It is notable that even the non-sectarian Sunni rebel groups are not “secular.” It has been widely observed that there have been no truly secular rebel forces or staff in the rebel courts for some time. This is yet another difference between the rebels of the interior and the political opposition in exile, which includes true secularists. 

This perceived religious edge to the conflict will keep the jihadis’ sectarian message appealing even after al-Assad falls. This will be coupled with the desire for revenge against the communities perceived as having supported al-Assad, and the growing acceptance among the rebels of brutal acts as “just part of war.” The head of the Syrian National Colaition has notably argued that rebel atrocities cannot be compared with those of the government as “we cannot employ Platonic idealism to judge those who risk their lives against a barbaric campaign." If the jihadis become the only outlet for such revenge, their numbers will continue to grow even after a Western intervention.

Thus a Syria where both al-Assad's regime and the jihadis are excluded from power would likely face ongoing terrorist-style violence from these two opponents simultaneously for the foreseeable future. Such a war on two fronts would weaken the regime, and would likely leave the Syrian jihadis in a much stronger position than even their allies in Iraq are currently, and stronger than they themselves would likely be if the regime and opposition allied together against them. The level of sectarian violence could be even greater than that which was seen at the height of Iraq’s civil war: the most powerful groups on both the Sunni and Shia sides would be radicalized, and each in engaging in their own bloody sectarian “jihad”.

As matters stand, the black flag of jihad is rising like a tide in Syria. Sooner or later, rolling it back will become the most pressing concern for all others involved.

Featured News: Sectarian and anti-government bombs kill 35 in Iraq

A series of car bombs on Wednesday targeted Shia neighbourhoods in Baghdad and government buildings in Kirkuk, in northern Iraq, killing at least 35 overall.

The aim of these attacks is fairly clear: with the onset of sectarian warfare in Syria, Iraq's jihadis are now trying to widen the 'battlefield' into Iraq. Tens of thousands of Iraqis died in the sectarian blood-letting from 2006 to 2007, and this is exactly the kind of conflict that the Syrian-Iraqi jihadis would like to recreate. With the merger/alliance of the "Islamic State of Iraq" and Syria's al-Nusra Front, it has been ensured that the more success either enjoys, the other will be able to push their own country deeper into conflict.

Read more:
http://news.yahoo.com/series-bombs-kills-least-14-people-across-iraq-134640415.html

Featured News: Syrian Islamist rebel eats opponent's heart on video

Every conflict has an image that comes to symbolize it. Syria's civil war may now have that very picture; a video showing a rebel fighter taking a bite from the heart of a dead government soldier.

The video conveys so much of what Syria's conflict has become: not only in its brutality, but also in its sectarianism; in the video, the cannibalistic rebel leader calls on others to follow his example and terrorize Syria's Alawites. The identity of the rebel also says much about the civil war: he is Abu Sakkar, a famous leader of a group called the Independent Omar al-Farouq Brigade. This is an offshoot -and close ally -of the Farouq Brigades, one of the largest units of the Free Syrian Army. The Independent Brigade has previously been accused of imposing the jizyah (tax on non-Muslims), expelling Christians from the city of Homs, and Abu Sakkar himself has been filmed firing rockets into Shia areas of Lebanon and posing with dead Hezbollah soldiers. The neighbourhood in which the video seems to have been taken is also telling of the conflict as a whole: Baba Amr in west Homs was an early centre of opposition to the al-Assad regime, but was subject to a brutal government counteroffensive earlier this year.

Most worryingly, this heart-eating leader is essentially in charge of the rebel forces struggling to control Homs -one of the most significant battles in the conflict. As a consequence, the rebel National Coalition's half-hearted promise to put Abu Sakkar on trial will likely ring hollow. They are unlikely to ever gain the will or means to carry it out.


Read more:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22519770

Featured News: Car bombs kill 40 in Turkish town near Syrian border

Car bombs have killed around forty people today in the Turkish town of Rehanlı, just across the border from Syria.

While the perpetrators of this attack remain unconfirmed, the composition and current state of the town may give clues as to their identity. Rehanlı is located in Turkey's Hatay Province, which is historically linked to Syria, and before the present Syrian civil war was evenly divided in population between Alwites and Sunni Muslims. However, Rehanlı has always been proportionately more Sunni than the rest of the province, and since the outbreak of the civil war it has become an entry point for Syria refugees into Turkey. The bombs appear to have targeted the town hall and post office.

These demographic insights make it an unlikely target for jihadis linked to Syria's opposition. The al-Assad regime has always had deep links to its own jihadi and other terrorist groups which it uses as proxies, and the  Turkish government has already accused Syrian intelligence agencies of being involved. Syrian agencies have been suspected of being involved in terrorist-style bombings in the past.

It is also possible that this bombing is the work of sectarian-minded terrorists or jihadis acting independently of the Syrian government, but nevertheless anti-Sunni and anti-opposition. It is notable that after today's attacks, the members of the local Turkish population in Rehanlı attacked Syrian refugees and vehicles with Syrian number-plates.

With significant Alawite, Turkish Sunni and Syrian refugee populations throughout its southern border regions, Turkey has good reasons to fear that the sectarian conflict that has engulfed Syria, and is already spreading into Lebanon, could bleed through into Turkey as well.

Read more
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22494128

Syria’s coming Jihadi Ascendancy? Part Two: Algerian Lessons

Summary: in newly-independent Algeria, a split between the political leaders of the government in exile and the armed brigades on the front lines led to a conflict between them –one which the military leaders easily one. Syria’s opposition appears to be following this model of a weak, vacillating political leadership outside the country coming to clash with a much stronger “opposition” military force inside Syria: the jihadis. If al-Assad is toppled from within, we may see a jihadi-led military alliance taking power in Syria at the expense of the political leadership.

The Setting

A once-powerful regime, with heavy support from overseas, despite its advanced weaponry, supremacy in the air and considerable power to win conventional battles, nevertheless found its control rapidly deteriorating to cover only a series of coastal enclaves. Its enemy called itself “mojahedin” and employed terrorist and guerrilla-style warfare. The regime decided to give up on the goal of keeping control of the country, and negotiated with the rebellion’s political leaders in exile. The members of the exile government, who spent years building the international alliances and legitimacy they believed their new regime would need, returned to their “liberated” country, only to find it themselves facing a new opponent. Most of the leaders of the fighting groups had no intention of allowing the returning politicos to assume power won by their blood and struggle. The two sides came to open conflict with each other, and the military leaders swiftly crushed the politicians, handing power to those with the best military connections, not necessarily to those with the widest public support.

The country was newly-independent Algeria –but it could just as easily be Syria, if the al-Assad regime falls to its armed internal enemies. In the previous instalment of Sharaabtoon, the coming split between the out-of-country Syrian National Council (SNC) and the armed opposition within Syria (especially the jihadis like the al-Nusra Front, but also the more hard-line Islamist elements of the Free Syrian Army –FSA) was explained. The military prowess, extensive funding and ‘uniting’ sectarian message of the jihadis will continue to draw fighters to them, and the SNC and more moderate FSA elements will have to shun and exclude the jihadis to keep receiving assistance from their Western allies.

If al-Assad falls, and these two sides fight for control of the new Syria, the result will likely be the same as was seen in Algeria. The fighting brigades, led by jihadis and their allies, will come to dominate the new Syrian political landscape.

How Algeria was Won

What doomed the Algerian Provisional Government (consisting largely of the political leaders who had waited out the war against the French in exile) was essentially its lack of sufficient firepower inside the country when the struggle with the military-led faction broke out. Only a minority of the National Liberation Front (FLN) fighters backed the Provisional Government, causing them to have little control outside of parts of the capitol city region, and one other area. Much of this lack of support can be attributed to the fact that the commanders of the military faction had far closer connections with the fighting brigades, and much deeper relationships with them after years of leading them against French forces. This was compounded by the “cult of the gun” that had emerged amongst the internal FLN fighters and supporters. France’s focus on defeating the Algerian rebellion with military means had its mirror in convincing the supporters of that revolt that only a military solution could end French rule. Hence the armed struggle was elevated above all other endeavours, and politicians were seen as weak and ineffectual.

Those same French military operations did the greatest damage to the kind of fighting brigades amongst which the future leaders of the Provisional Government had the most support, the ordinary maquis (guerrilla brands), especially in Algiers. Least affected had been the ‘Army of the Frontiers’ fighters, who enjoyed heavy backing from the Moroccan and Tunisian governments and who could move back and forth across the borders at will, giving them both greater arms and protection. This Army of the Frontiers was dominated by those FLN military leaders who refused to submit to the rule of politicians, and who would subsequently undertake the “March on Algiers” and oust the Provisional Government and its scattered supporters.


Syria’s Fighting Men

The current scenario in Syria has its differences, but the broad similarities are compelling, and the factors which favour a jihadi rise are even stronger than those which aided the rise of the military leaders in Algeria. Like French counterinsurgency operations, al-Assad’s forces have compelled Syria’s opposition politicians to largely reside abroad. The rising size and power of the jihadis, detailed in the previous instalment, is akin to the lopsided advantage the Army of the Frontiers enjoyed in Algeria, as is the jihadis’ comparatively generous foreign support. The more moderate FSA brigades have the “non-lethal” support of the West; the jihadis have arms and funds from the deep pockets of the pro-Islamist Gulf Arabs. The failure of the West to provide effectual assistance to the rebels has led many fighters who previously pinned their hope on NATO (as in Libya) to give this up, and lose any desire to make themselves acceptable to the West by shunning the jihadis. More and more Syrian rebels are asking “What has the West done for us? Now, we have only God." Al-Assad’s forces have so far been able to inflict greater defeats on the non-jihadi fighters than the jihadis (hence the admiration the other rebels feel for the jihadis’ “special forces” prowess), again weakening the forces most likely to ally themselves with the SNC in a post-al-Assad contest. 

Al-Assad’s air power continues to be formidable, and allows his regime to frustrate many conventional rebel offensives, giving an edge to those rebels skilled at non-conventional attacks on the regime, such as co-ordinated suicide bombings. Al Nusra and other jihadis’ alliances with al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) give them unique access to the necessary skills. The jihadis also enjoy an implicit ally in the government of Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom has witnessed horrific violence resulting from large militarized refugee populations residing within its borders before, and so is keen to see the hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees already within its borders return home as soon as possible. More likely than not, that means a military solution by those rebels who are currently strongest, giving the Jordanian government an incentive to let arms and supplies move across its borders to the rebels. Much of the same is true of the Turkish government. All this is to say nothing of the public services the jihadis run, which builds their support amongst the Syrian population daily. At present the jihadis and their allies in Syria remain a minority of rebel fighters, albeit a sizeable one, but all these factors will cause them to quickly grow the longer the conflict continues. Not only will a “cult of the gun” emerge, but as the most effective wielders of the gun, a “cult of jihad” is likely to take hold of much of Syria’s internal opposition.


Syria’s Forlorn Political Hopes

The successes of the jihadis on the battlefield are only mirrored by the vacillation and squabbling in the halls of politics. The SNC has been seen as consumed by infighting and ineffectual on the ground almost since it was formed in October 2011. Many of its members are long-standing exiles and opponents of the al-Assad regime, seen by many within Syria as disconnected from recent events and the on-going struggle.

These weaknesses caused another body, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, to be set up in November 2012 as an alternative. Despite the recognition and diplomatic support the National Coalition has subsequently enjoyed from other nations (especially Western democracies), it has received little more than lip-service support from the armed brigades within Syria, and what little influence it enjoys largely stems from the fact that the SNC controls twenty-two of its seventy council seats. The National Coalition as a whole has firmly shunned Syria’s jihadis, comparatively to the limited links the SNC maintains with them. This is a poor omen for its ability to influence events on the ground. Significantly, it was the jihadis who initiated the recent rebel offensives in Aleppo, Damascus and Raqqa province, which were not sanctioned by the local leaders linked to the National Coalition. The al-Tawhid Brigade (كتائب التوحيد‎), a prominent and powerful Islamist unit of the FSA, refused to join the National Coalition when the latter was founded, even though this brigade actively supports the SNC.

The first leader of the National Coalition, Moaz al-Khatib (a Sunni cleric, seen as a unifying figure in Syria) resigned in March this year, complaining of too much Western interference and rule-setting. He was replaced by the President of the SNC, George Sabra. Just before al-Khatib’s resignation, an interim government with a SNC-linked Islamist Prime Minister, Ghassan Hitto. Hitto, however, is a joint Syrian and American citizen, having lived in the USA since 1980 –longer than many of the rebel fighters have even been alive. President Sabra has insisted that the SNC will not be “subsumed under anybody.” The National Coalition is further hampered by its failure to provide meaningful services to civilians inside Syria. Essentially, the National Coalition has significant weaknesses of its own, and only enjoys influence on the ground through the SNC politicians who increasingly dominate it. At best, it is becoming a weak appendage of the SNC it was meant to replace.

The political opposition is further divided by the refusal of the National Co-ordination Committee (NCC) to work with either the National Coalition or the SNC. Formed in November 2011, the NCC is made up largely of left-leaning, Kurdish and independent non-Islamist political parties and activists. It calls for dialogue with the al-Assad regime rather than its military ouster, and vociferously opposes Western intervention or diplomatic pressure. Although its influence is limited, the fact that even the political exiles cannot be united against al-Assad is a severe sign of weakness.

But perhaps the greatest indictment of all against these political leaders is that even the Western democracies that were initially so keen to embrace these councils are now beginning to side-line them. In late February this year, the US government announced that it was stepping up with another $60 million in aid to the Syrian rebels –but this aid is to be provided directly to the FSA’s military groups inside Syrian. The SNC will continue to be involved and consulted on the distribution, but the sense that the internal actors are those most significant to the outcome of the struggle is undeniable.


What can be done?

All of these factors indicate that, if al-Assad falls or retreats with his forces to an Alawite-majority rump state on the coast, the contest for who will control newly “liberated” areas of Syria will be won by the jihadis, not the SNC or National Coalition, just as the Army of the Frontiers won control in Algeria.

It is possible that foreign intervention could change this internal equation, but it would depend highly on the form that intervention takes. The simple enforcement of a “no fly zone” against regime air power, or the creation of safe “humanitarian corridors” to ensure safe movement of refugees (and implicitly also of rebel forces), would do little to truly change the outcome. These actions would only amplify the on-going military trends without shifting the balance between the different armed wings of the opposition. The provision of “lethal” aid (meaning weapons) by the West to their preferred armed groups could help them win greater success and prominence on the battlefield, but potentially these weapons could simply end up flowing to those who already have the most power to control territory and distribution: the jihadis. Direct Western intervention with troops could certainly win the war and allow the West to choose the new regime, at least in the immediate sense, but this course of action is fraught with its own series of complications, especially the fact that most of the aforementioned political groups oppose Western troops entering Syria. Most importantly, however, no amount of arms or funds, or even direct intervention, can rectify the weak and fractured nature of the exiled political leadership itself –and a political alternative is needed to exclude the jihadis from power.

The flailing and non-co-operation of Syria’s self-proclaimed political leaders empowers the armed brigades inside Syria, and especially so the jihadis, who draw their arms from their rich Gulf Arab backers, not from the flailing councils, who are now not even the sole conduit for what little Western non-lethal aid is available. If the war continues its current course, and al-Assad falls to his internal military opponents, the most powerful of these armed brigades will dominate the new Syria –and that means a very large slice for the violent jihadis. That means significant power and resources for the jihadis to put to use everywhere else they wish to spread conflict.

In Part 3: Syria’s jihadis and the wider world.

Syria’s coming Jihadi Ascendancy? Part One: The Government, the Opposition, and the Jihadis

Summary: jihadis linked to al-Qaeda already account for at least a quarter of all Syrian rebel fighters, and they are on a collision course with the non-jihadi opposition, especially its political leaders in exile.

So far, the only groups that are winning in Syria’s civil war are the violent jihadis.
Jihadi fighters in Syria have punched above their weight in military terms since the early days of the civil war -however, they may come to play an even more significant role in determining the political outcome of the conflict. Their ever-growing power on the internal military front of the war against the al-Assad regime is setting the Syrian opposition up for a struggle between its internal military wing(s), and its external political wing, the Syrian National Council (SNC). Most worryingly, this struggle could follow the path of the similar internal-external clash in newly-independent Algeria, which ended with the ascendancy of those who fought in the trenches, not the politicians who built international alliances in exile.


The Choice

Until early April this year, the Syrian opposition's political leaders abroad faced a choice: should they attempt to integrate the jihadi fighting brigades inside Syria into their political structure and give them a role in a post al-Assad government, or should they do their best to exclude and isolate them? What made this choice difficult was that the most prominent jihadi group was also the most aggressive and successful arm of the rebel forces: the al-Nusra Front (جبهة النصرة لأهل الشام‎). A salafi group, many of al-Nusra’s members previously fought against under the banner of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) against US forces. The al-Nusra Front formed in Syria between late 2011 and early 2012, when it was joined by several leading militants from Palestinian and Lebanese-Palestinian jihadi groups. It now likely accounts for up to a quarter of all opposition fighters inside Syria, and its popularity continues to grow as it both wins victories and provides services to the civilian population. 

The al-Nusra Front has carried out a string of highly successful bombings (including suicide bombings) against Syrian government and security forces targets, and has been at the forefront of the “Battle of Aleppo” alongside the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and other Islamist and jihadi forces attempting to capture the city. Other rebels in Aleppo have described al-Nusra’s fighters as “like special forces”. Its arms and training are widely considered to be the best amongst the opposition. While the exact origin of its funding is unclear, it appears to be flush with weapons and money. Generous Gulf Arab (especially Qatari) aid to Islamist (especially salafi) opposition fighters is seen as the likely source. This further compounds al-Nusra’s ability to recruit, as its sponsors furnish it with weapons, whereas rebels backed by the West receive only “non-lethal” supplies.

Conversely, however, the al-Nusra Front was viewed with deep suspicion by the SNC’s Western allies, due to its history of atrocities (including bombing attacks against civilian targets, the mass execution of captured government soldiers, and the murder of a pro-government Syrian journalist) and its suspected links to international jihadi terrorist organisations. The political exterior faced the choice of marginalizing its own importance in the interior by severing its links with the actual rising power in the warzone, or of trying to build relations with them at the cost of their alliances with Western democracies.


Al-Nusra's Bad Company

This choice was removed earlier this month, when the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq (دولة العراق الإسلامية‎) -an umbrella organisation of violent jihadi groups largely created out of the former al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) –announced that it was merging with the al-Nusra Front to form a new organisation: the "Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham." Although Abu Golani, the leader of al-Nusra, announced the next day that their relationship constituted an alliance, not a merger, the crucial aspect was established: Syria’s pre-eminent fighting group was being supported with funds and recruits by al Qaeda.

For the SNC, or the FSA, to link itself in any formal way with what was now essentially a branch of al Qaeda would be to destroy its international legitimacy and bring ostracism on itself from Washington to Ankara. For its part, a merger or alliance with al Qaeda shows that the al-Nusra Front is entirely unconcerned with building the kind of international alliances that the SNC desires. These two wings of the Syrian opposition have thus chosen two irreconcilable paths. Indeed, in future we will become less likely to speak of the "Syrian opposition" as a singular entity, and more and more come to speak of a divide between jihadi and non-jihadi opposition groups in Syria, if not a greater plurality of competing groups altogether.

The Ties that Bind

The identification of the al-Nusra Front in particular as the rising star of the armed opposition inside Syria is based not just on its own ever-growing military prowess, but also on its links with the other hard-line Islamist and jihadi fighters. Increasingly, more and more rebel groups are flying the black flag of jihad instead of the distinctive green, black, white and red flags of the original anti-government protests. Al-Nusra is dedicated to the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate and sharia law after the fall of the al-Assad regime, and shares these aims with several other armed groups. Most notable are the salafi Harakat Ahrar al-Sham Al Islami (حركة أحرار الشام الإسلامية), and the Brigade of Emigrants in Greater Syria (كتائب المهاجرين), composed of foreign jihadis and led by an ethnic Chechen. The former largely draws its funding from donors in Kuwait, and the latter has by necessity strong links to international jihadi organisations.

A vicious anti-Shia outlook is a uniting factor for these and many smaller jihadi groups. In an al-Nusra video posted online, a crowd of bearded men stand behind a little boy who, while slitting the air with a knife, sings “Just wait Alawites. We will come to slaughter you." The Alawites are a Shia offshoot which counts around ten per cent of the population (including President Bashar al-Assad himself) among its members, and from which al-Assad draws many prominent officials in his regime and most members of the of pro-government shabiha (الشبيحة) militias (another fifteen per cent of Syria’s population are Christians, other Shias and Druze, and the rest are Sunnis).

In Ahrar al-Sham’s first broadcast, they described the al-Assad regime as part of a “Safavi” (Iranian) plot to spread Shia Islam and establish a Shia state extending from Iran to Lebanon and Palestine. In December of 2012 there appear to have been instances of Shia mosques being burned by rebel forces. In May this year Islamist fighters associated with the FSA posted pictures online of their “exhumation” and secret reburial of a companion of the Prophet Mohammed entombed in the town of Adra, because this “Shiite shrine” had “become a centre of polytheism”. The accusation of “polytheism” against Shias is a staple of (Sunni) jihadis. Jihadi terrorism against Shia targets in Syria predates the current civil war; in September 2008, a Damascus car bombing killed seventeen near a prominent Shia shrine. Another explosion in the same neighbourhood in December 2009 may also have been a bombing. This kind of sectarianism gives the more hard-line Islamists and jihadis a unifying cause, and puts these groups (even those within the FSA) at odds with non-sectarian and secular members of the opposition.

However jihadi sectarian violence has not just been directed against Shias; following a pattern seen in many other conflicts involving salafi jihadis, other Sunni Muslims of the “wrong” school or persuasion, and other religious minorities, have been targeted. Most notably, the leading (though not uncritical) pro-regime Sunni cleric and over forty other worshippers were killed in March when a prominent Sunni mosque in Damascus was targeted by a suicide bomber during a sermon. In February, following animosity between the United Courts Council (which is linked to the SNC) and sharia courts backed by al-Nusra, fighters belonging to the latter stormed a United Courts Council courthouse in Aleppo, where they assaulted and kidnapped scholars and judges.

Attacks against Christians by anti-government protesters began in mid-2011, and in Homs especially even Islamist fighters associated with the FSA have been implicated in the ethnic cleansing of Christians. Chechen fighters suspected of being linked with the al-Nusra Front (and likely also the Brigade of Emigrants in Greater Syria) are believed to have kidnapped two Syrian bishops in late April. Kidnapping, either for ransom or execution, is a well-established jihadi tactic. Shared sympathy for all these kinds of sectarian actions, as well as established co-operation on the battlefield, will make it difficult for the SNC or FSA to distance themselves from al-Nusra without alienating other jihadi groups and even more ‘moderate’ Islamist fighters within their own ranks. Such alienation would only foster an ever-closer jihadi alliance.

International Terrorism

Pressure from Western democracies to sever links with, and possibly even combat, such jihadi groups is likely to grow with time. This will be due to both horror at such attacks on civilians, and the possibility of Syrian jihadis (or foreigners trained by them) being linked to future terrorist attacks against Western targets. An indicative event occurred on April 29th this year, when two ground-to-air missiles were launched at a Russian passenger jet carrying around 160 travellers over Syria (en route from Egypt to Russia), which only survived destruction due to emergency manoeuvres. Although the identity of the attackers remains unconfirmed, barring a spectacularly risky "false flag" attack by the al-Assad regime (which would risk alienating its most powerful ally), it would seem that those responsible were certainly Syrian opposition fighters, and specifically jihadis judging by the fact that the target was both foreign and unquestionably civilian.

If similar attacks continue, and succeed, when it comes to Syria the designation of "terrorist" may well become synonymous with "rebel" in the minds of Europeans and Americans. Whether the bombings occur in Damascus, London, or over the skies of the Middle East, the SNC and FSA may find Western democracies demanding that jihadis be excluded from their areas of control in order for equipment and funds to continue flowing.

From now on, when speaking of the Syrian civil war, it will increasingly make sense to refer to three mutually opposed sides: the al-Assad regime, the Western-backed opposition, and the jihadis.

In Part Two: the lessons France’s war in Algeria holds for the future of Syria’s jihadis.

Sunni-Shia Violence: Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq -and Syria?

Conflict between Sunnis and Shias is probably one of the bloodiest and longest-enduring forms of violent jihadism, as well as being amongst the least covered or understood forms in the West. In recent years this has predominantly taken the form of attacks against Shia populations by hardline Sunni jihadis, although instances of Shia attacks on Sunnis do occur from time to time. This imbalance in the violence between the communities can most likely be attributed to the massive numerical advantage Sunnis enjoy in most Islamic countries, the much wider embrace of violent jihadism in general by Sunni sects when compared to Shia ones, which has meant that in Shia-majority nations (primarily Iraq and Iran) the majority sect tends to enshrine its power through social and political discrimination rather than open violence. Anti-Shia jihadi violence remains prolific in some regions, and may well be about to expand into Syria.

The general character of Sunni-Shia violence will be observed through a discussion of recent instances in Pakistan, Yemen, and Iraq, and the potential for similar sectarian bloodshed in Syria (incorporating Lebanon) will then be discussed. This isn't an exhaustive account of Sunni-Shia violence across the world, but it should hopefully provide some context and insight into such conflicts.


Pakistan

Sectarian killings of Shias in Pakistan often follow a tragically regular pattern: a bus (usually travelling in the north of the country) is stopped by gunmen, the Shias are ordered off the bus, they are shot at the roadside, and a Sunni jihadi organisation (usually the Pakistani Taliban, تحریک طالبان پاکستان) claims responsibility through its website. Strange as it may sound to unfamiliar observes, within the minds of the perpetrators such killings of Shias falls as much under the banner of jihad as the killing of unbelievers does. After one such bus massacre in late February this year, a commander of the Jundulluh (جند اللہ) faction of the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack with these words: "They were Shiite infidels and our mujahedeen shot them dead one by one after bringing them down from a bus".

This conception of Shias as "infidels" (كفّار) is at the root of most anti-Shia violence, and springs usually from an accusation that Shias have "deviated" from "true Islam" by their reverence for Mohammed's son-in-law Ali (as Mohammed's supposed true successor) and other members of his family, as well as differences in practices such as prayer. Thus the aforementioned justification by the Pakistani Taliban for murdering Shia civilians would be familiar to Sunni jihadis across the Islamic world, to whom attacks on Shias are as much the business of the mujahadin ("those engaged in jihad", مجاهد‎) as attacks on American troops are.

Although the violence in Pakistan is largely directed against Shias by Sunni jihadis, reverse attacks do occur: a wave of sectarian violence between the two communities (with attacks on both sides) flared up in Gilgit (northern Pakistan) after a hand grenade was thrown at a gathering of a Sunni organisation (purportedly by Shia militants).



Yemen

The Yemeni uprising may be the least-covered of the Arab Spring rebellions in the Western Media, but the Shia Houthi insurgency in Yemen is even less covered still, and is practically unknown outside the region. Since 2004, Shia insurgents in northern Yemen have waged what they claim is a war of self defence to protect their community against government discrimination and aggression, and which the Yemeni Government characterizes as a Iran-backed attempt to seize control and impose Shia religious law on the country.

Where the jihadi angle appears in this conflict, however, again surrounds Yemen's Arab Spring uprising. In the increasingly anarchic situation in Yemen, violent jihadi groups have begun to perpetrate attacks against Shias here also. In January 2011 al Qaeda declared a jihad against the Houthis, and followed this up with a car bombing in August that killed 14 Shias. In early March this year, a bomb at a Houthi anti-US protest in northern Yemen killed 22. With Yemen's al Qaeda branch in control of territory and already perpetrating an increasing number of attacks against government and military targets, more and more sectarian attacks similar to those mentioned can be expected.

Iraq

Although no longer in the throes of the sectarian bloodletting which characterized the civil war between 2006 and 2008, in which both Sunni and Shia groups perpetrated massacres and attacks on places of worship, religiously motivated attacks continue. These now primarily take the form of coordinated bombings by the Islamic State of Iraq (دولة العراق الإسلامية‎) organisation, which includes al Qaeda in Iraq under its umbrella. Such attacks targeting Shias have occurred already in January, February and March this year, killing dozens. Though the body count of the Iraqi insurgency has been in heavy decline in recent months (with February being the least violent month in years), Iraq's violent jihadis (along with those in Lebanon, to be discussed below) may well come to play a resurgent role due to the conflict in Syria.

(It should be noted that the inter-communal conflict in Iraq is not simply one directed against Shias by Sunnis. Especially since the US withdrawal earlier this year, the Shia-dominated government of Iraq seems to be trying to entrench the domination of its community. Sunnis complain of being shut out of government jobs, the most senior Sunni in the Government, Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, is in hiding in Iraqi Kurdistan from state prosecutors who want him tried on terror charges, and there appears to be an increasing attempt by Shias to control the public space of mixed Iraqi cities; Baghdad has lately appeared to be covered by Shia banners. This sort of exclusion of Sunnis from public and political life can only entrench the sectarian divides which the violent jihadis use to recruit new fighters.)

Syria

The circumstances surrounding the current Syrian uprising are of course very complicated, with a large number of groups operating towards various ends. However, there is the distinct potential for a sectarian edge to the conflict to emerge, and to an extent it already has.

Often neglected in analysis of the Syrian conflict is precedent for an anti-regime rebellion taking on a sectarian dimension: during the 1976-1982 uprising of Sunni Islamists (linked to the Muslim Brotherhood) against the then-regime of Hafez al-Assad (father of the current dictator Bashar al-Assad), rebel assassinations and massacres were often targeted specifically against the Alawi (a form of Shia Islam) community, which was seen as a cadre for the government as many of its members featured prominently in the regime (including the President himself and his family). The demographics of Syria's recent uprising ere highly similar: the rebels are overwhelming Sunni and enjoy the support of most of Syia's Sunni majority, whereas the government prominently features Alawis and draws its main support from this community and the other religious minorities (mostly other kinds of Shias and Christians), who fear their rights may be eroded if the Sunni majority comes to power.

There are also signs of expanding jihadi elements among the rebels. New rebel brigades with names such as the "God is Great" Bridade or the "Supporters of God" Brigade are springing up and couching their statements on the struggle in the language of jihad. This occurs alongside an increasing number of suicide and car bombings perpetrated by rebel groups, many of which are causing significant civilian casualties. However more worrying is the nature and sophistication of the attacks, which may point to links with violent jihadi groups in Iraq (who continue to perpetrate similar attacks in their own country). Many of these bombings have been claimed by the newly-formed Al-Nusra Front to Protect the Levant (جبهة النصرة لأهل الشام‎), which (if not simply a front organisation) definitely has links to al Qaeda in Iraq, which means it brings, along with bombing expertise, the kind of hardline anti-Shia ideology has been behind so many past (and present) attacks in Iraq. In addition to the large-scale bombings in major cities, however, there have also been a string of smaller suicide and car bombings in smaller cities and towns (with much lower death tolls), which points to a proliferation of this sort of tactic, and perhaps the violent jihadi ideology which usually accompanies suicide bombings. In February this year Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's successor as head of al Qaeda, declared the rebellion a jihad and called for all Muslims to help in the struggle. The flow of Iraqi fighters and arms into Syria has become significant enough that the (Shia-dominated) government of Iraq has announced increased measures to try to prevent it, at the same time as Sunni Gulf Arab states are announcing that they will bankroll and arm the rebellion.

In terms of explicitly sectarian violence, the details remain somewhat uncertain at present but do coincide with the conclusion of an increasingly sectarian conflict. The Syrian government has certainly tried to characterize the rebellion as a sectarian one, describing them as "terrorists" in the media and possibly having gone so far as to pay government workers to shout anti-Alawi slogans (for the media's observance) at anti-government rallies and write anti-Alawi graffiti in public places. Thus not all reported instances of sectarian rhetoric by rebels should be considered as genuine, however an increasing number of anti-Alawi statements have emerged from rebel leaders and sympathisers in Syria and abroad. A voice purported to belong to Mamoun al-Homsy, one of the opposition leaders, warned in a recorded message in December 2011 that Alawites should abandon Assad, or else "Syria will become the graveyard of the Alawites". Amateur video posted online appears to show Abdul Baset Sarut, a leader of the opposition in Homs, calling for the extermination of the Alawites during a demonstration. This has been mirrored in some instances of actual violence: reports have emerged that in the villages of the Syrian countryside Alawis are being murdered, sometimes in large numbers, by Sunni rebels. In mid-2011, Christians were reportedly attacked by anti-government protesters for their community's (perceived) failure to join the protests. The government itself may also have directly fomented sectarian violence by using largely Alawi militias (known as "shahiba" -"thugs", الشبيحة‎) to attack (largely Sunni) protesters.

Perhaps the clearest instance of sectarian violence surrounding the Syrian conflict, however, has actually occurred in Lebanon. In February, supporters and opponents of Assad's regime took to the streets of Tripoli armed with guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Although only a few injuries resulted, the clash was clearly between inhabitants of the Sunni district of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the Alawite district of Jebel Mohsen. Like their co-religionists in Syria, the inhabitants of these districts have a history of clashes with each other. and Lebanon has no shortage of its own violent groups that may be drawn into a sectarian conflict in Syria; the Shia terrorist organisation Hezbollah, which currently sits in Lebanon's governing coalition and whose militias control much of the country, especially springs to mind. Hezbollah is notably already supporting the Assad regime, as is the Shia government of Iran. There is also a significant Alawi community in Turkey which is growing increasingly worried about the fate of its brethren in Syria. The recipe for a sectarian conflict fed by other regional players seems to be in place.


Conclusion

Overall, especially with the new funding from Gulf Arab states, it seems increasingly likely that sectarian conflict and terrorism will emerge in Syria, as native Syrian jihadi brigades form links with Iraqi jihadi fighters and as both the government and certain rebel leaders portray the conflict as one between sects of Islam. Syria may well become yet another country, like those discussed above, with a serious problem of sectarian jihadism.