'The Most Unfortunate Incident': The Theri Massacre and Fifty years of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan

Summary: On 3 June 1963, Pakistan saw its first cases of mass anti-Shia violence, with the killing of over one hundred in the village of Theri, as well as attacks in Lahore and Narowal. On the fiftieth anniversary of these events, described by Sharaabtoon research, far from being seen as isolated, they can sadly be identified as the opening act of the fratricidal killings between Sunnis and Shias in Pakistan which still continue after fifty years.


Sectarian Violence in Pakistan

In a piece of original research, Sharaabtoon is proud to bring you the first collation of the evidence, most of it not available on the internet, on the opening salvo of Pakistan's ongoing sectarian conflict: the Theri massacre of June 1963, and the accompanying violence in Lahore and Narowal. In spite of the widespread attention these events received in their immediate aftermath, since then they have become largely forgotten or ignored outside of the communal memories passed down within the Shia community of Pakistan.

Adding to the tragedy of these events is the fact that, despite the many condemnations the killings received at the time from all corners of Pakistan, sectarian violence, particularly against Shias (but also against Christians, Hindus and Ahmadis) has continued to plague the country. Thousands of Shias have been killed since 1963, with their murderers citing religious reasons as 'justification'.

Strange as it may sound to unfamiliar observes, within the minds of the perpetrators such killings of Shias falls as much under the banner of jihad as the killing of unbelievers does. After one massacre in February 2012 this year, a commander of the Jundulluh faction of the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack with these words: "They were Shiite infidels and our mujahedeen shot them dead one by one after bringing them down from a bus."

This conception of Shias as "infidels" (كفّار) is at the root of most anti-Shia violence, and springs usually from an accusation that Shias have "deviated" from "true Islam" by their reverence for Mohammed's son-in-law Ali (as Mohammed's supposed true successor) and other members of his family, as well as differences in practices such as prayer. This particularly comes to a head during the public displays of the differences between Shia and Sunni religious views, such as during the processions of the Day of Ashura, which was the case in 1963.

Shia processions remain a main target, frequently being targeted with bombings by organisations such as the Pakistani Taliban, as well as a vast network of smaller violent jihadi groups. Many of these groups have received the patronage or tacit cooperation of various arms of the Pakistani government and armed forces, who often see them as useful proxies against India, or a "last line of defence" in case of a future invasion.

Although the violence in Pakistan is largely directed against Shias by Sunni jihadis, reverse attacks do occur: a wave of sectarian violence between the two communities (with attacks on both sides) flared up in Gilgit (northern Pakistan) last year after a hand grenade was thrown at a gathering of a Sunni organisation (purportedly by Shia militants).


The Day of Ashura

Like so much of the Sunni-Shia violence seen since, these events centred around the Day of Ashura. This is the tenth day of the month of Muhharam in the Islamic calendar, on which Shia Muslims mourn the death of Hussein ibn Ali at the Battle of Karbala. This battle was the climax of the struggle over who should lead the followers of Islam after the death of the Prophet Mohammed, with the Umayyad Caliph Yazid I defeating Hussein (Mohammed's grandson). Shias mark this day with processions and displays of public mourning, and have often consequently clashed with Sunnis, as the diverging points of their sects are brought out into the streets.

One consequence of the great forgetting surrounding the events of 1963 is that even the date on which they occurred has become obscured, with many Shia sources now identifying the date as 6 June 1963. However, the Day of Ashura in 1963 fell on 3 June, and the contemporary newspapers began covering the killings on 4 June, noting the date they were perpetrated as 3 June (and the night of 2 June in Lahore).


The Riots in Lahore

Throughout Pakistan on the Day of Ashura in 1963, there were a great many peaceful processions and commemorations, including in Karachi, Peshawar and Multan. However, Lahore proved to be far more turbulent. The origin of riots seems to be found in events of the night before, when Sunni-Shia scuffles broke out, and bottles and broken bricks ("brick-bats") were thrown at a Shia procession that had halted outside a Sunni mosque (Dawn: 5 June: p.11; The Pakistan Times: 4 June: p.1). Members of Sunnat-Jama'at (a traditionalist Barelvi Sunni organisation) tried to rush the procession and had to be prevented from doing so by a police baton charge (The Pakistan Times: 11 June: p.9 ; Dawn: 12 June: p.6).

By the morning of 3 June, rumours were spreading that Shias had killed two Sunnis near the mosque where the procession had halted (The Pakistan Times: 12 June: p.3 ; Dawn: 12 June: p.6). Stone-throwing against the Shia processions ensued, and, despite assurances from Sunni leaders that they would be allowed to pass freely, when a large procession passed the Bhati Gate, what was described as a "free fight" broke out between the two groups, and the police opened fire to restore order. As broken brick-throwing started against processions in other areas, Army units were called in, and the police repeatedly opened fire throughout the city (Dawn: 5 June: p.11 ; Dawn: 27 June: p.1). Witnesses later reported seeing two Shias being beaten by a crowd which the police had just dispersed from the Bhati Gate (The Pakistan Times: 27 June: p.11). A curfew was imposed and maintained for several proceeding nights.

More than eighty people were injured in these riots, and four people (including one policeman) eventually died of injuries they sustained on 2 and 3 June (Dawn: 5 June: p.11 ; Sawn: 6 June: p.9). Police registered incidents of "stabbing, arson and loot" throughout the two days (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.5). In the following days, six hundred and thirty people were arrested in association with the riots, though over seventy of these were for violating the ensuring curfew (The Pakistan Times: 7 June: p.11 ; The Pakistan Times: 8 June: p.1).

This kind of violence was new to Lahore. It was reported that “elder citizens of the town… could not recall such a violence in Lahore on Ashura during the last 150 years” (The Pakistan Times: 5 June: p.1). An inquiry into the violence was ordered by the Governor of West Pakistan, but this was (to quote one news report) “not so much for fixing the blame of the incident, but for assessing the causes for the tension between the two sects, and for remedies to prevent such recurrence in the future” (The Pakistan Times: 5 June: p.1). Not surprisingly, Pakistan's Shias were left with a sense that little was done to bring the instigators of the riots to justice, and by July the kind of "future remedies" being suggested to prevent such riots included the pre-publication censorship of all Shia religious literature to remove content Sunnis found "objectionable" (The Civil & Military Gazette: 2 July: p.4). Quickly, those who had largely been the victims of the riots were blamed for causing them in the first place.


The Massacre in Theri

Far more bloody than the riots in Lahore were the killings in Theri (or "Therhi"), a village in Khairpur district. The incident began with a single stone-throwing against a Shia tazia (processional model of Hussein's mausoleum), and when news of this reached Khairpur city, a large number of armed men descended on the town and set both the tazia and the house where the Shias were meeting on fire (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.5 ; Dawn: 5 June: p.1). What followed was described as a "pitched battle" by the time the police arrived and used tear gas to disperse the mob, with re-enforcements from nearby towns and even the Indus Rangers being called in (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.5 ; Dawn: 5 June: p.1 & p.11). A dawn-to dusk curfew was imposed for several subsequent nights.

Over one hundred people were killed and at least thirty injured in this massacre (CGI: 18 April 2005: p.9 ; Dawn: 9 June: p.13). The characterization of the incident as a "battle" seems to be contradicted by the fact that almost every victim was identified as a Shia. In the following weeks, ninety-eight people were arrested from all over Khairpur district on charges of arson, murder and riot in Theri (Dawn: 27 June, p.1 & P.7). As with Lahore, a government inquiry was ordered, but later suspended and seems not to have reached any real conclusions (The Civil and Military Gazette: July 3: p.3).

The accounts passed on by victims and witnesses of the killings in Theri present a lurid picture. Knives, axes, and stones are said to have been used to murder the processionists. The perpetrators reportedly walked through the area of the attack shouting Shia slogans and offering water, only to murder any of the wounded who replied (Shaheed Foundation Pakistan). The dead bodies were then thrown into a well in an attempt to conceal the scale of the killings (with some sources saying the next planned step was to burn them in the well) before the police arrived to take custody of them. (CGI: 18 April 2005: p.9 ; Shaheed Foundation Pakistan).  The Shaheed Foundation of Pakistan has preserved a number of (graphic) photographs showing the state of the bodies recovered and the site of the massacre. Many of these accounts describe the perpetrators as "Wahhabis", but the tiny size of the Wahhabi population of Pakistan at this time suggests that they were likely more mainstream Sunnis.

Under the protection of the Pakistani police the Shia ceremonies that had been interrupted by the killings and the ensuing curfews were completed on 7 June, without violence violence (Dawn: 7 June: p.7 ; The Pakistan Times: 8 June: p.10). In subsequent years, however, there was repeated anti-Shia violence in this and nearby villages on the Day of Ashura.


Narowal's Violence among Neighbours

In Narowal, before the Ashura procession went ahead, an agreement was struck between the Sunni and Shia communities that the march would be made up of only ten Shias. On the day, only nine went, but they were escorted by four prominent Sunnis walking alongside them. The Pakistan Times reported that, as the procession passed through the town, some Sunnis began “abusing the Shias and also instigating the Sunnis to attack them as they had not carried out the agreement made earlier. The situation took an ugly turn when the rival groups started exchanging brickbats on the mourners. At this point the police intervened and the furious mob started throwing brickbats on the police as well” (The Pakistan Tunes: 6 June: p.8). The mob was ordered to disperse, and the police made an unsuccessful attempt to disperse it with a baton charge. When this failed, the police then fired “to scare away the crowd” (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.8) Later, about five hundred persons gathered armed with improvised batons and axes and attached the processionists. The Police fired for a second time, injuring “several persons” and killing two (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.8).

In this case, many of the leaders of this attack were not only arrested and charged, but also named in Pakistani newspaper stories (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.8). All involved seem to have been locals, well-known to their victims.


Conclusion

The events in Theri, Lahore and Narowal acted as a bloody opening to the ongoing dark chapter in Pakistani history, and the nation as a whole has yet to come to terms with the ongoing violence. At the time, one newspaper correspondent described it as "the most unfortunate incident in the history of the country" (The Pakistan Times: 5 June: p.9), but many more tragic atrocities have since been committed. Pakistan's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, one said that "There is no power on earth that can undo Pakistan." We have yet to see if Pakistan can undo the ongoing spiral of sectarian strife which still plagues it after fifty years.



Bibliography: 

• The Civil & Military Gazette; Lahore; 1963 (British Library Newspaper collection)
• Dawn; Karachi; 1963; (British Library Newspaper collection)
• International Crisis Group, “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan”, Asia Report, N°95 – 18 April 2005 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/095_the_state_of_sectarianism_in_pakistan
• The Pakistan Times; Lahore; 1963 (British Library Newspaper collection)
• Shaheed Foundation Pakistan, "Tragic Event" http://www.shaheedfoundation.org/tragic.asp?Id=13

Other Resources:

• http://criticalppp.com/archives/266633
• http://worldshiaforum.wordpress.com/2012/12/26/therhikhaipur-massacre-49th-anniversary-of-the-first-large-scale-sectarian-attack-in-pakistan/

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Sunni-Shia Violence: Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq -and Syria?

Conflict between Sunnis and Shias is probably one of the bloodiest and longest-enduring forms of violent jihadism, as well as being amongst the least covered or understood forms in the West. In recent years this has predominantly taken the form of attacks against Shia populations by hardline Sunni jihadis, although instances of Shia attacks on Sunnis do occur from time to time. This imbalance in the violence between the communities can most likely be attributed to the massive numerical advantage Sunnis enjoy in most Islamic countries, the much wider embrace of violent jihadism in general by Sunni sects when compared to Shia ones, which has meant that in Shia-majority nations (primarily Iraq and Iran) the majority sect tends to enshrine its power through social and political discrimination rather than open violence. Anti-Shia jihadi violence remains prolific in some regions, and may well be about to expand into Syria.

The general character of Sunni-Shia violence will be observed through a discussion of recent instances in Pakistan, Yemen, and Iraq, and the potential for similar sectarian bloodshed in Syria (incorporating Lebanon) will then be discussed. This isn't an exhaustive account of Sunni-Shia violence across the world, but it should hopefully provide some context and insight into such conflicts.


Pakistan

Sectarian killings of Shias in Pakistan often follow a tragically regular pattern: a bus (usually travelling in the north of the country) is stopped by gunmen, the Shias are ordered off the bus, they are shot at the roadside, and a Sunni jihadi organisation (usually the Pakistani Taliban, تحریک طالبان پاکستان) claims responsibility through its website. Strange as it may sound to unfamiliar observes, within the minds of the perpetrators such killings of Shias falls as much under the banner of jihad as the killing of unbelievers does. After one such bus massacre in late February this year, a commander of the Jundulluh (جند اللہ) faction of the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack with these words: "They were Shiite infidels and our mujahedeen shot them dead one by one after bringing them down from a bus".

This conception of Shias as "infidels" (كفّار) is at the root of most anti-Shia violence, and springs usually from an accusation that Shias have "deviated" from "true Islam" by their reverence for Mohammed's son-in-law Ali (as Mohammed's supposed true successor) and other members of his family, as well as differences in practices such as prayer. Thus the aforementioned justification by the Pakistani Taliban for murdering Shia civilians would be familiar to Sunni jihadis across the Islamic world, to whom attacks on Shias are as much the business of the mujahadin ("those engaged in jihad", مجاهد‎) as attacks on American troops are.

Although the violence in Pakistan is largely directed against Shias by Sunni jihadis, reverse attacks do occur: a wave of sectarian violence between the two communities (with attacks on both sides) flared up in Gilgit (northern Pakistan) after a hand grenade was thrown at a gathering of a Sunni organisation (purportedly by Shia militants).



Yemen

The Yemeni uprising may be the least-covered of the Arab Spring rebellions in the Western Media, but the Shia Houthi insurgency in Yemen is even less covered still, and is practically unknown outside the region. Since 2004, Shia insurgents in northern Yemen have waged what they claim is a war of self defence to protect their community against government discrimination and aggression, and which the Yemeni Government characterizes as a Iran-backed attempt to seize control and impose Shia religious law on the country.

Where the jihadi angle appears in this conflict, however, again surrounds Yemen's Arab Spring uprising. In the increasingly anarchic situation in Yemen, violent jihadi groups have begun to perpetrate attacks against Shias here also. In January 2011 al Qaeda declared a jihad against the Houthis, and followed this up with a car bombing in August that killed 14 Shias. In early March this year, a bomb at a Houthi anti-US protest in northern Yemen killed 22. With Yemen's al Qaeda branch in control of territory and already perpetrating an increasing number of attacks against government and military targets, more and more sectarian attacks similar to those mentioned can be expected.

Iraq

Although no longer in the throes of the sectarian bloodletting which characterized the civil war between 2006 and 2008, in which both Sunni and Shia groups perpetrated massacres and attacks on places of worship, religiously motivated attacks continue. These now primarily take the form of coordinated bombings by the Islamic State of Iraq (دولة العراق الإسلامية‎) organisation, which includes al Qaeda in Iraq under its umbrella. Such attacks targeting Shias have occurred already in January, February and March this year, killing dozens. Though the body count of the Iraqi insurgency has been in heavy decline in recent months (with February being the least violent month in years), Iraq's violent jihadis (along with those in Lebanon, to be discussed below) may well come to play a resurgent role due to the conflict in Syria.

(It should be noted that the inter-communal conflict in Iraq is not simply one directed against Shias by Sunnis. Especially since the US withdrawal earlier this year, the Shia-dominated government of Iraq seems to be trying to entrench the domination of its community. Sunnis complain of being shut out of government jobs, the most senior Sunni in the Government, Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, is in hiding in Iraqi Kurdistan from state prosecutors who want him tried on terror charges, and there appears to be an increasing attempt by Shias to control the public space of mixed Iraqi cities; Baghdad has lately appeared to be covered by Shia banners. This sort of exclusion of Sunnis from public and political life can only entrench the sectarian divides which the violent jihadis use to recruit new fighters.)

Syria

The circumstances surrounding the current Syrian uprising are of course very complicated, with a large number of groups operating towards various ends. However, there is the distinct potential for a sectarian edge to the conflict to emerge, and to an extent it already has.

Often neglected in analysis of the Syrian conflict is precedent for an anti-regime rebellion taking on a sectarian dimension: during the 1976-1982 uprising of Sunni Islamists (linked to the Muslim Brotherhood) against the then-regime of Hafez al-Assad (father of the current dictator Bashar al-Assad), rebel assassinations and massacres were often targeted specifically against the Alawi (a form of Shia Islam) community, which was seen as a cadre for the government as many of its members featured prominently in the regime (including the President himself and his family). The demographics of Syria's recent uprising ere highly similar: the rebels are overwhelming Sunni and enjoy the support of most of Syia's Sunni majority, whereas the government prominently features Alawis and draws its main support from this community and the other religious minorities (mostly other kinds of Shias and Christians), who fear their rights may be eroded if the Sunni majority comes to power.

There are also signs of expanding jihadi elements among the rebels. New rebel brigades with names such as the "God is Great" Bridade or the "Supporters of God" Brigade are springing up and couching their statements on the struggle in the language of jihad. This occurs alongside an increasing number of suicide and car bombings perpetrated by rebel groups, many of which are causing significant civilian casualties. However more worrying is the nature and sophistication of the attacks, which may point to links with violent jihadi groups in Iraq (who continue to perpetrate similar attacks in their own country). Many of these bombings have been claimed by the newly-formed Al-Nusra Front to Protect the Levant (جبهة النصرة لأهل الشام‎), which (if not simply a front organisation) definitely has links to al Qaeda in Iraq, which means it brings, along with bombing expertise, the kind of hardline anti-Shia ideology has been behind so many past (and present) attacks in Iraq. In addition to the large-scale bombings in major cities, however, there have also been a string of smaller suicide and car bombings in smaller cities and towns (with much lower death tolls), which points to a proliferation of this sort of tactic, and perhaps the violent jihadi ideology which usually accompanies suicide bombings. In February this year Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's successor as head of al Qaeda, declared the rebellion a jihad and called for all Muslims to help in the struggle. The flow of Iraqi fighters and arms into Syria has become significant enough that the (Shia-dominated) government of Iraq has announced increased measures to try to prevent it, at the same time as Sunni Gulf Arab states are announcing that they will bankroll and arm the rebellion.

In terms of explicitly sectarian violence, the details remain somewhat uncertain at present but do coincide with the conclusion of an increasingly sectarian conflict. The Syrian government has certainly tried to characterize the rebellion as a sectarian one, describing them as "terrorists" in the media and possibly having gone so far as to pay government workers to shout anti-Alawi slogans (for the media's observance) at anti-government rallies and write anti-Alawi graffiti in public places. Thus not all reported instances of sectarian rhetoric by rebels should be considered as genuine, however an increasing number of anti-Alawi statements have emerged from rebel leaders and sympathisers in Syria and abroad. A voice purported to belong to Mamoun al-Homsy, one of the opposition leaders, warned in a recorded message in December 2011 that Alawites should abandon Assad, or else "Syria will become the graveyard of the Alawites". Amateur video posted online appears to show Abdul Baset Sarut, a leader of the opposition in Homs, calling for the extermination of the Alawites during a demonstration. This has been mirrored in some instances of actual violence: reports have emerged that in the villages of the Syrian countryside Alawis are being murdered, sometimes in large numbers, by Sunni rebels. In mid-2011, Christians were reportedly attacked by anti-government protesters for their community's (perceived) failure to join the protests. The government itself may also have directly fomented sectarian violence by using largely Alawi militias (known as "shahiba" -"thugs", الشبيحة‎) to attack (largely Sunni) protesters.

Perhaps the clearest instance of sectarian violence surrounding the Syrian conflict, however, has actually occurred in Lebanon. In February, supporters and opponents of Assad's regime took to the streets of Tripoli armed with guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Although only a few injuries resulted, the clash was clearly between inhabitants of the Sunni district of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the Alawite district of Jebel Mohsen. Like their co-religionists in Syria, the inhabitants of these districts have a history of clashes with each other. and Lebanon has no shortage of its own violent groups that may be drawn into a sectarian conflict in Syria; the Shia terrorist organisation Hezbollah, which currently sits in Lebanon's governing coalition and whose militias control much of the country, especially springs to mind. Hezbollah is notably already supporting the Assad regime, as is the Shia government of Iran. There is also a significant Alawi community in Turkey which is growing increasingly worried about the fate of its brethren in Syria. The recipe for a sectarian conflict fed by other regional players seems to be in place.


Conclusion

Overall, especially with the new funding from Gulf Arab states, it seems increasingly likely that sectarian conflict and terrorism will emerge in Syria, as native Syrian jihadi brigades form links with Iraqi jihadi fighters and as both the government and certain rebel leaders portray the conflict as one between sects of Islam. Syria may well become yet another country, like those discussed above, with a serious problem of sectarian jihadism.