The organisation goes by two names: in Arabic it has referred to itself as "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad" (جماعة اهل السنة للدعوة والجهاد), but it usually goes by its Hausa name "Boko Haram", meaning "western education is sinful". A jihadi organisation named for its grievances on schooling? It's unusual but makes more sense when two contexts are added: firstly, the word "boko" can be translated not just as "western education", but may also refer to Hausa written in the Latin script, or may mean an adulteration, fraud or trick. The name refers not just to education but to the secular or non-Islamic policies and structures of the Nigerian government in general, and this is where the second context comes in: for just over a decade there has been a simmering conflict in Nigeria regarding the introduction of sharia law into some (northern, mostly Muslim) Nigerian states, and attempts to spread it to the country as a whole. Sectarian clashed and atrocities have occurred with a sad regularity, and Boko Haram's rejection of non-Islamic forms of education and government fits into this wider prism.
As a Salafi organisation, Boko Haram is inherently separatist (being based in closed-off Salafi communities which don't interact with local non-Salafi Muslims) and focused on regulating every aspect of life in light of their interpretation of the Koran. Their version of Salafi Islam which makes it "haram" ("sinful" or "forbidden") for Muslims to take part in any political or social activity associated with Western society. This includes voting in elections, wearing shirts and trousers or receiving a secular education. This is on the grounds that the government of Nigeria (even when it has a Muslim President) and the Islamic establishment of Nigeria to both (supposedly) inherently be in the thrall of non-believers. Boko Haram's declared goal is the abolition of all non-Islamic forms of government and the application of sharia law across all of Nigeria (on the Christian half of the country as well as the Muslim northern half). There is also the usual speculation that heavy-handed security forces responding to Boko Haram (including with random arrests alleged and disappearances) have driven recruits into the organisation, probably with some truth behind it.
In pursuit of its cause, Boko Haram has embraced violence against almost every possible target. There have been multiple recent attacks on police stations and jail breaks across northern Nigeria.In claiming responsibility for an attack on a church and its congregation in the central city of Jos this week, a Boko Haram spokesman stated: "We attacked simply because it's a church and we can decide to attack any other church. We have just started." A few days before Boko Haram gunmen killed Muslim worshippers at a (non-Salafi) mosque in the northern city of Kano. A few days before that a bomb in the market of Maiduguri, the mostly Muslim north-eastern city where the organisation was originally founded.
Oddly enough, Boko Haram was founded and led (until his death in 2009) by one Mohammed Yusuf, a man fluent in English and with a graduate-level education, who drove a Mercedes-Benz. This same man was keen on giving interviews in which he insisted rain was a "creation of God rather than an evaporation caused by the sun that condenses and becomes rain", and saying that his group would reject the theory that the world was a sphere if it was found to run contrary to the teachings of Allah. Irony was clearly not his strong point.
Since Yusuf's death, it seems Boko Haram may have splintered into three different factions, but in many areas it may lack any strong chain of command. Increasingly Boko Haram may be taking the form of semi-autonomous militias and cells, with their level of violence and links to external terrorist organisations varying from group to group.
Speaking of external connections, last week for the first time ever a top Nigerian secutiy official claimed there are definite links between Boko Haram and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), elaborating only that these links consisted of "support and training" Boko Haram is said to have received from AQIM.
How strong are these connections? Do they even exist? What is clear is that any links between AQIM and Boko Haram are not very strong ones: Boko Haram still seems to be focused on a largely domestic agenda in terms of its outlook, and so far North African Arab fighters haven't appeared among Boko Haram's ranks. Two areas in which links may exist or may be growing however: since 2011, Boko Haram has increasingly been making engaging in bomb attacks, with several instances of suicide bombings. Its June 2011 attack against a police station included Nigeria's first ever suicide bombing, so if nothing else different styles of jihadism reminiscent of al Qaeda are being imported. The frequency and and audacity of the bombings have also been escalating, as well as the casualties from them. Boko Haram's 2010 and early 2011 bombings tended to kill only a few people, in contrast with its Christmas 2011 bombings (directed against Nigerian Christians) which killed 41, its January 20 bombing which killed dozens and a bombing in a market last week which killed 30. Clearly the organisation is escalating its bombing campaign, and if it hasn't already forged links with the regions premier jihadi bomb-makers (AQIM), it seems only a matter of time before Boko Haram links up with them in order to commit the kind of mass coordinated bombings al Qaeda has perpetrated in Morocco, Algeria and Egypt over the years.
Boko Haram's second preferred attack method, however, is gunmen on motorbikes, which it has made use ofnot only in in multiple recent attacks on police stations and prison breaks, but also against civilian targets (such as its attack on a mosque last week). In this area a connection with AQIM or other violent jihadis across West Africa may emerge also: if Boko Haram wants to escalate its conventional attacks against government and civilian targets, it will need access to more and more small arms and possibly even heavier weaponry, both of which are currently flooding into the Sahara and Sahel from Libya by way of Niger, Algeria and Mali (see "The Dark of the Sahara" post). North African violent jihadis are almost certainly making use of this arms smorgasbord, and so the emergence of connections through these arms networks seems only a matter of time.
Finally, the Nigerian government itself may be pushing Boko Haram and violent jihadis across North Africa closer together. Boko Haram is believed to currently draw a small number of its fighters from neighbouring countries. However in response to Boko Haram's attacks the Nigerian government has stepped up its repatriation of illegal foreigners from northern Nigeria to Niger and Chad, deporting over 11,000 over the past six months. Far from stemming Boko Haram's insurgency, however, this policy may add to it. It is almost certain that most of those deported were not Boko Haram members, however they now have a grievance against the Nigerian government and form a part of a growing refugee crisis (see "The Dark of the Sahara" post) a cross the Sahel, a fertile breeding ground for Boko Haram recruitment, away from the watchful eye of the Nigerian government and in countries with growing food scarcity and weapons abundance. This could drive up the recruitment of violent jihadis across the region, including Boko Haram.
One final note on Boko Haram's connections: there is at least a perception in Nigeria that the insurgency in the Niger Delta (in southern Nigeria, among predominantly Christian ethnic groups in this oil-rich area) and the unrest surrounding it was instrumental in Goodluck Jonathan (a southern Christian from the area of the insurgency) rising to the Presidency and in gaining greater national focus on the grievances of southern Nigerians. In some ways Boko Haram may be playing a similar role for the poorer, mostly Muslim north of Nigeria, which lacks the south's oil resources. There is speculation that some in the north may actually be abetting Boko Haram in order to ensure that northern (and Muslim) issues and grievances are at the fore during the 2015 elections, and that a northern Muslim becomes the next President. No proof of any connections between Boko Haram and anyone with official power has yet been found, and such links may not exist, but they may well emerge, considering the political power and oil money at stake in this divided country.
Since Yusuf's death, it seems Boko Haram may have splintered into three different factions, but in many areas it may lack any strong chain of command. Increasingly Boko Haram may be taking the form of semi-autonomous militias and cells, with their level of violence and links to external terrorist organisations varying from group to group.
Speaking of external connections, last week for the first time ever a top Nigerian secutiy official claimed there are definite links between Boko Haram and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), elaborating only that these links consisted of "support and training" Boko Haram is said to have received from AQIM.
How strong are these connections? Do they even exist? What is clear is that any links between AQIM and Boko Haram are not very strong ones: Boko Haram still seems to be focused on a largely domestic agenda in terms of its outlook, and so far North African Arab fighters haven't appeared among Boko Haram's ranks. Two areas in which links may exist or may be growing however: since 2011, Boko Haram has increasingly been making engaging in bomb attacks, with several instances of suicide bombings. Its June 2011 attack against a police station included Nigeria's first ever suicide bombing, so if nothing else different styles of jihadism reminiscent of al Qaeda are being imported. The frequency and and audacity of the bombings have also been escalating, as well as the casualties from them. Boko Haram's 2010 and early 2011 bombings tended to kill only a few people, in contrast with its Christmas 2011 bombings (directed against Nigerian Christians) which killed 41, its January 20 bombing which killed dozens and a bombing in a market last week which killed 30. Clearly the organisation is escalating its bombing campaign, and if it hasn't already forged links with the regions premier jihadi bomb-makers (AQIM), it seems only a matter of time before Boko Haram links up with them in order to commit the kind of mass coordinated bombings al Qaeda has perpetrated in Morocco, Algeria and Egypt over the years.
Boko Haram's second preferred attack method, however, is gunmen on motorbikes, which it has made use ofnot only in in multiple recent attacks on police stations and prison breaks, but also against civilian targets (such as its attack on a mosque last week). In this area a connection with AQIM or other violent jihadis across West Africa may emerge also: if Boko Haram wants to escalate its conventional attacks against government and civilian targets, it will need access to more and more small arms and possibly even heavier weaponry, both of which are currently flooding into the Sahara and Sahel from Libya by way of Niger, Algeria and Mali (see "The Dark of the Sahara" post). North African violent jihadis are almost certainly making use of this arms smorgasbord, and so the emergence of connections through these arms networks seems only a matter of time.
Finally, the Nigerian government itself may be pushing Boko Haram and violent jihadis across North Africa closer together. Boko Haram is believed to currently draw a small number of its fighters from neighbouring countries. However in response to Boko Haram's attacks the Nigerian government has stepped up its repatriation of illegal foreigners from northern Nigeria to Niger and Chad, deporting over 11,000 over the past six months. Far from stemming Boko Haram's insurgency, however, this policy may add to it. It is almost certain that most of those deported were not Boko Haram members, however they now have a grievance against the Nigerian government and form a part of a growing refugee crisis (see "The Dark of the Sahara" post) a cross the Sahel, a fertile breeding ground for Boko Haram recruitment, away from the watchful eye of the Nigerian government and in countries with growing food scarcity and weapons abundance. This could drive up the recruitment of violent jihadis across the region, including Boko Haram.
One final note on Boko Haram's connections: there is at least a perception in Nigeria that the insurgency in the Niger Delta (in southern Nigeria, among predominantly Christian ethnic groups in this oil-rich area) and the unrest surrounding it was instrumental in Goodluck Jonathan (a southern Christian from the area of the insurgency) rising to the Presidency and in gaining greater national focus on the grievances of southern Nigerians. In some ways Boko Haram may be playing a similar role for the poorer, mostly Muslim north of Nigeria, which lacks the south's oil resources. There is speculation that some in the north may actually be abetting Boko Haram in order to ensure that northern (and Muslim) issues and grievances are at the fore during the 2015 elections, and that a northern Muslim becomes the next President. No proof of any connections between Boko Haram and anyone with official power has yet been found, and such links may not exist, but they may well emerge, considering the political power and oil money at stake in this divided country.
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