Featured News: Al Qaeda gives member Poor Job Evaluation

Being a member of al Qaeda nowadays is hard work. Not only do you have to dodge drone strikes worry about your declining brand value, now you have to worry about the upper management getting all testy because you don't file expense reports, don't turn up to meetings, or you spend too much time on internet social media. But this is apparently exactly what was happening to Moktar Belmoktar, a commander in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) who recently got so fed up with the 'brass' that he quit and formed his own jihadi organisation,  the Al-Mulathameen ("Masked") Brigade (also known as the al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam ["Those who Sign with Blood"] Brigade).

In a letter obtained by the Associated Press, AQIM's leaders give a scathing (and very long) review of Belmoktar's performance (referring to him by his alternate name  Khaled Abou El Abbas). Here are a few of the highlights:

• "Abu Abbas is not willing to follow anyone... he is satisfied only when followed and obeyed."

• "your brigade did not achieve a single spectacular operation targeting the crusader alliance"

• "Why do you only turn on your phone with the Emirate when you need it, while your communication with some media [online jihadi forums] is almost never ending!"

• "We ask you also: How many administrative and financial reports have you sent up to your Emirate?"

• "How many meetings was Abu Abbas invited to... only to see him always refuse to participate?"

• "Abu Abbas aired our laundry publicly and spilled secrets of jihad to random young men whom he doesn’t know"
  
  ... and our personal favourite...
  
  

• "As for your whispering in the ear of the organization’s emir, we consider it as derisive and snide and denigrating a figure who by our ancient Islamic law should be esteemed and respected, even if he were a black Ethiopian slave with a head like a raisin."

After job evaluations like that, is it a surprise that so many jihadis need to drink in the Sharaabtoon?


The full letter in English:
http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-belmoktar-letter-english.pdf

The full letter in Arabic:
http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-belmoktar-letter.pdf

Read more:
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-exclusive-rise-al-qaida-saharan-terrorist

French soldier stabbed in Paris -a jihadi attack?

A French soldier was stabbed in the throat in a busy commercial district outside Paris today. The soldier was on patrol, in uniform, along with two other men as part of France's Vigipirate anti-terrorist surveillance plan. The wound is reported to be serious but not life-threatening.

The fact that his attacker has been described as a bearded man of North-African origin (wearing what has been described as a "white Arab-style tunic") has raised comparisons with the jihadi murder of a British soldier in London earlier this week. Although the French government has thus far declined to comment officially on the nature of the attack, sources in side the Paris prosecutors office have been reported that the attack is being treated as a "terrorist incident" and is therefore being handled by the anti-terrorist branch of the office.

These events come a little over a year after French-Algerian jihadi murdered seven people in Toulouse and Montauban, including three French soldiers and a parent and three children at a Jewish school. The terrorist in question is believed to have been motivated, in part at least, by the participation of French soldiers NATO operations in Afghanistan. As of of November last year, France's combat troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan (though the logistical contingent remains), but French troops troops are currently involved in anti-jihadi operations in Mali and Niger.

The fact that, fortunately, the French soldier survived the attack seems to indicate the amateur nature of the terrorist attack, if that is what it was. The perpetrator is unlikely to have been linked to any meaningful jihadi network or organisation which would have flagged him to French security services as a threat. This is a distinct parallel with the killers of the British soldier earlier this week, the Boston bombers earlier this year, and the jihadi who perpetrated the Toulouse and Mountauban attacks last year. Instances of "do-it-yourself jihadis" committing attacks in the West seem to be increasing in their frequency.

Featured News: Malian jihadis carry out two more suicide bombings

Less than a week after their last suicide attack near Gao, another tow simultaneous attacks were carried out by five bombers in the towns of Gossi and and Menaka. The targets were Malian and Nigerien troops, and although the only casualties (besides the bombers themselves) were two wounded soldiers, the frequency with which these attacks are occurring is testimony to the enduring capacity of Mali's jihadis.

Read more:
http://news.yahoo.com/suicide-bombers-launch-attacks-2-mali-towns-124309450.html;_ylt=Ao3De1F5r90prwnmiNED0vxvaA8F;_ylu=X3oDMTNlajRtcWc2BG1pdAMEcGtnA2UzMDIyM2ZiLTZjMjEtM2ExYy04MzljLTRlNmIwYzI1NzczYwRwb3MDNgRzZWMDbG5fQWZyaWNhX2dhbAR2ZXIDM2ZmYmM4NjAtYjk5NC0xMWUyLTk2ZmYtZWFkNjIwZjEyODc0;_ylg=X3oDMTBhYWM1a2sxBGxhbmcDZW4tVVM-;_ylv=3

Featured News: Two Malian soldiers killed in Gao suicide attack

France hasn't even finished withdrawing its troops from Mali yet, but the jihadis they were sent to fight are already stepping up their attacks.

Read more:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22416987

The Dark of the Sahara

What's happening in the Sahara?

The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad) (MNLA) says that in January they launched an armed campaign to liberate of all the peoples of the Azawad (north-east Mali), not just the Tuareg people, from the rule of the Government of Mali.

The Malian Government says the MNLA are Tuareg 'bandits' with links to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a charge the MNLA vehemently denies.

The French Government originally downplayed the AQIM connection, but has since then accused the MNLA of adopting tactics which “resembled that used by al Qaeda.”

British anthropologist and authority on the Tuareg Jeremy Keenan says this is yet another part of a long saga of the US and Algerian Governments fabricating false claims of al Qaeda links (and even directing kidnappings and false-flag attacks by 'Islamists') in order to boost their military influence over the region. In January, Algerian troops crossed in to Mali.

And the Nigerian Government says the arms flowing into the region could aid the al Qaeda-linked Boko Haram terrorist organisation in Nigeria.

So what's really going on?

The MNLA and Libya

There is definitely an armed insurrection by the MNLA going on in north-eastern Mali, with its fighters being primarily drawn from the traditionally-nomadic Tuareg people of the region. This should be seen in the context of the multiple Tuareg rebellions that have occurred since Mali gained independence (and the similar past rebellions in neighbouring Niger), the most of which (prior to the current rebellion) ended in 2009. Largely they stem from a resentment of the Government of Mali (based in Bamako, in the far south-west) which many Tuaregs feel has long marginalized them, and consequently many desire independence or self-determination for their region, the Azawad.

The MNLA has captured and lost various towns in its struggle against the Malian armed forces. It was during the MNLA's assault on the town of Aguelhoc in late January that the Malian government accused them of of perpetrating a joint attack with AQIM. The "al Qaeda-style" tactics the MNLA are accused of using are the alleged execution of 60-100 captured Malian soldiers and civilians, many ostensibly with their hands bound.

The problem lately in North Africa is that everyone seems to be accused of working with al Qaeda, but (unlike al Shabaab in Somalia) no-one seems happy to admit to actually having any ties.

Why is the al Qaeda link accusation against the MNLA problematic? Because it is contradicted by what we do know about why this most recent Tuareg rebellion is doing so well; Malian officials (including members of the military) have described the MNLA as being surprisingly well armed (with heavy weaponry, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft rockets) and as sometimes having better logistics and equipment than the Malian military (including satellite phones). Where did this all come from? From Tuareg soldiers returning after the end of the recent Libyan civil war.

Several of the past Tuareg rebellions in Mali were at least in part sponsored by Moammar Gadhafi's regime, with Gadhafi himself claiming to have blood ties to the Tuaregs. He felt such affinity with the Tuareg that he entrusted a part of his security to them, and it was Tuareg guides who evacuated his son to Niger across the desert after the fall of Tripoli. Most importantly, Gadhafi recruited hundreds of Tuareg into his armed forces over the years, and many of these are now returning to Mali, armed with everything they could loot from Gadhafi's arsenals. The MNLA was actually born just last October, when career veterans of past Tuareg rebellions, Malian deserters from Gadhafi's army and a few young activists met up in the oasis settlement of Zahak, by the Algerian border. The MNLA's top military commander is one Colonel Mahamed Ag Najim, recently of the Libyan armed forces.

The obvious problem with claiming a rebellion closely associated with the former Libyan regime is backed by al Qaeda is that that same former Libyan regime claimed its own opponents were working with al Qaeda! Not surprising, as the "al Qaeda card" is played frequently by regimes against rebels in the region, but it does not seem particularly convincing that Gadhafi's Tuareg former soldiers have suddenly developed close ties with al Qaeda that simply did not exist a few months ago. It has not been so long that these Tuareg soldiers were being told by their beloved leader that AQIM was fighting alongside their enemies.

Al Qaeda, the US and Algeria

The only detailed version of the al Qaeda link accusation surrounds Iyad Ag Ghali, a former Tuareg rebel who served briefly as Mali's Consul General in Saudi Arabia before returning home to found an Islamic movement, some of whose men have allegedly been seen fighting with the MNLA recently. Ag Ghali has a cousin who is confirmed as a local al Qaeda commander. A reputed AQIM leader was also killed during a MNLA attack on a Malian town last week, but it's not clear how he died or why he was there. When that is as "concrete" as the MNLA-al Qaeda link theory gets, the whole story begins to look dubious.

So is Jeremy Keenan right? Is this another example of a fake allegation of an al Qaeda link, pushed from behind the scenes by the US and Algerian Governments?

Also unlikely: the current insurrection in Mali has actually disrupted the planned Operation Flintlock, a major military exercise in Mali between US, European and African troops later this month, because the Malian army is busy responding to attacks from Tuareg rebels. Flintlock was intended to help boost the counterterrorism capacity in African countries. The small unit of Algerian trainers dispatched to Mali's north to train and equip local units (the forces Keenan cited as an indication of Algerian expansionism) has been forced to leave due to the fighting. Moreover, former Gadhafi fighters (whom even Keenan admits are resentful of the West for toppling his regime) are hardly the sort of people the US wants gaining in power in the Sahara. If the US and Algeria really are trying to secretly use "al Qaeda" false-flag attacks to boost their military influence in the region, it is severely backfiring.

Jihadis and Guns

But none of this is to say that the situation in Mali has no relevance for violent jihadism in the region. The fallout from the Libyan civil war and this new conflict in Mali is driving arms proliferation, and leaving the region awash in small arms and light weapons. Nigeria's president warned of this at a West African regional summit last week. There have been multiple allegations that former Libyan weapons are on sale to the highest bidder throughout north-east Mali. As for recruits, the Malian conflict has already driven 15,000 refugees into neighbouring countries, and a regional food crisis is causing desperation (especially as the conflict interferes with food distribution). This situation greatly increases the ability of violent jihadi organisations like AQIM to obtain weaponry and fighters for use in local conflicts.

And there definitely are active, violent jihadi groups in the region who desire such weapons. Last week, three armed Islamists (allegedly linked to AQIM) and one Algerian gendarme were killed when al Algerian patrol intercepted two all-terrain vehicles attempting to enter Algeria from Mali. The Algerian government has been engaged in a long-simmering conflict with AQIM in its country. In 2009, AQIM launched assassinations and attacks against Malian security officials. The other main jihadi beneficiary of the situation may be Nigeria's Boko Haram terrorist group, which is engaged in conflict against the Nigerian Government, Western influence and non-Muslims in their country, and has killed 200 people already this year. Last week, Boko Haram gunmen freed 119 inmates from a Nigerian prison in order to liberate a few of their members being held their, having launched a similar prison break operation in 2010. The kind of arms now flooding into Mali and the wider region are exactly the kind which Boko Haram could use to launch more such attacks.

Alongside the aforementioned disruption to training and joint operations between US and West African nations' armed forces against jihadi groups, this flood of arms-for-sale and refugees has the real potential to be a boon to the violent Islamic organisations in the region. In that sense, indirectly the MNLA's struggle may aid the jihadis' cause.