Summary:
jihadis linked to al-Qaeda already
account for at least a quarter of all Syrian rebel fighters, and they are on a
collision course with the non-jihadi opposition,
especially its political leaders in exile.
So far, the only groups that are winning in Syria’s civil war are the violent jihadis.
Jihadi fighters in Syria have punched above their weight in military terms since the early days of the civil war -however, they may come to play an even more significant role in determining the political outcome of the conflict. Their ever-growing power on the internal military front of the war against the al-Assad regime is setting the Syrian opposition up for a struggle between its internal military wing(s), and its external political wing, the Syrian National Council (SNC). Most worryingly, this struggle could follow the path of the similar internal-external clash in newly-independent Algeria, which ended with the ascendancy of those who fought in the trenches, not the politicians who built international alliances in exile.
The Choice
Until early April this year, the Syrian opposition's political leaders abroad faced a choice: should they attempt to integrate the jihadi fighting brigades inside Syria into their political structure and give them a role in a post al-Assad government, or should they do their best to exclude and isolate them? What made this choice difficult was that the most prominent jihadi group was also the most aggressive and successful arm of the rebel forces: the al-Nusra Front (جبهة النصرة لأهل الشام). A salafi group, many of al-Nusra’s members previously fought against under the banner of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) against US forces. The al-Nusra Front formed in Syria between late 2011 and early 2012, when it was joined by several leading militants from Palestinian and Lebanese-Palestinian jihadi groups. It now likely accounts for up to a quarter of all opposition fighters inside Syria, and its popularity continues to grow as it both wins victories and provides services to the civilian population.
The al-Nusra Front has
carried out a string of highly successful bombings (including suicide bombings)
against Syrian government and security forces targets, and has been at the
forefront of the “Battle of Aleppo” alongside the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and
other Islamist and jihadi forces
attempting to capture the city. Other rebels in Aleppo have described
al-Nusra’s fighters as “like special forces”. Its arms and training are widely
considered to be the best amongst the opposition. While the exact origin of its
funding is unclear, it appears to be flush with weapons and money. Generous
Gulf Arab (especially Qatari) aid to Islamist (especially salafi) opposition
fighters is seen as the likely source. This further compounds al-Nusra’s
ability to recruit, as its sponsors furnish it with weapons, whereas rebels
backed by the West receive only “non-lethal” supplies.
Conversely, however, the al-Nusra Front was viewed with deep suspicion by the SNC’s Western allies, due to its history of atrocities (including bombing attacks against civilian targets, the mass execution of captured government soldiers, and the murder of a pro-government Syrian journalist) and its suspected links to international jihadi terrorist organisations. The political exterior faced the choice of marginalizing its own importance in the interior by severing its links with the actual rising power in the warzone, or of trying to build relations with them at the cost of their alliances with Western democracies.
Al-Nusra's Bad Company
This choice was removed earlier this month, when the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq (دولة العراق الإسلامية) -an umbrella organisation of violent jihadi groups largely created out of the former al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) –announced that it was merging with the al-Nusra Front to form a new organisation: the "Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham." Although Abu Golani, the leader of al-Nusra, announced the next day that their relationship constituted an alliance, not a merger, the crucial aspect was established: Syria’s pre-eminent fighting group was being supported with funds and recruits by al Qaeda.
For the SNC, or the FSA, to link itself in any formal way with what was now essentially a branch of al Qaeda would be to destroy its international legitimacy and bring ostracism on itself from Washington to Ankara. For its part, a merger or alliance with al Qaeda shows that the al-Nusra Front is entirely unconcerned with building the kind of international alliances that the SNC desires. These two wings of the Syrian opposition have thus chosen two irreconcilable paths. Indeed, in future we will become less likely to speak of the "Syrian opposition" as a singular entity, and more and more come to speak of a divide between jihadi and non-jihadi opposition groups in Syria, if not a greater plurality of competing groups altogether.
Conversely, however, the al-Nusra Front was viewed with deep suspicion by the SNC’s Western allies, due to its history of atrocities (including bombing attacks against civilian targets, the mass execution of captured government soldiers, and the murder of a pro-government Syrian journalist) and its suspected links to international jihadi terrorist organisations. The political exterior faced the choice of marginalizing its own importance in the interior by severing its links with the actual rising power in the warzone, or of trying to build relations with them at the cost of their alliances with Western democracies.
Al-Nusra's Bad Company
This choice was removed earlier this month, when the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq (دولة العراق الإسلامية) -an umbrella organisation of violent jihadi groups largely created out of the former al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) –announced that it was merging with the al-Nusra Front to form a new organisation: the "Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham." Although Abu Golani, the leader of al-Nusra, announced the next day that their relationship constituted an alliance, not a merger, the crucial aspect was established: Syria’s pre-eminent fighting group was being supported with funds and recruits by al Qaeda.
For the SNC, or the FSA, to link itself in any formal way with what was now essentially a branch of al Qaeda would be to destroy its international legitimacy and bring ostracism on itself from Washington to Ankara. For its part, a merger or alliance with al Qaeda shows that the al-Nusra Front is entirely unconcerned with building the kind of international alliances that the SNC desires. These two wings of the Syrian opposition have thus chosen two irreconcilable paths. Indeed, in future we will become less likely to speak of the "Syrian opposition" as a singular entity, and more and more come to speak of a divide between jihadi and non-jihadi opposition groups in Syria, if not a greater plurality of competing groups altogether.
The Ties that Bind
A vicious anti-Shia outlook is a uniting factor for these and many smaller jihadi groups. In an al-Nusra video posted online, a crowd of bearded men stand behind a little boy who, while slitting the air with a knife, sings “Just wait Alawites. We will come to slaughter you." The Alawites are a Shia offshoot which counts around ten per cent of the population (including President Bashar al-Assad himself) among its members, and from which al-Assad draws many prominent officials in his regime and most members of the of pro-government shabiha (الشبيحة) militias (another fifteen per cent of Syria’s population are Christians, other Shias and Druze, and the rest are Sunnis).
In Ahrar al-Sham’s first broadcast, they described the al-Assad regime as part of a “Safavi” (Iranian) plot to spread Shia Islam and establish a Shia state extending from Iran to Lebanon and Palestine. In December of 2012 there appear to have been instances of Shia mosques being burned by rebel forces. In May this year Islamist fighters associated with the FSA posted pictures online of their “exhumation” and secret reburial of a companion of the Prophet Mohammed entombed in the town of Adra, because this “Shiite shrine” had “become a centre of polytheism”. The accusation of “polytheism” against Shias is a staple of (Sunni) jihadis. Jihadi terrorism against Shia targets in Syria predates the current civil war; in September 2008, a Damascus car bombing killed seventeen near a prominent Shia shrine. Another explosion in the same neighbourhood in December 2009 may also have been a bombing. This kind of sectarianism gives the more hard-line Islamists and jihadis a unifying cause, and puts these groups (even those within the FSA) at odds with non-sectarian and secular members of the opposition.
However jihadi sectarian violence has not just been directed against Shias; following a pattern seen in many other conflicts involving salafi jihadis, other Sunni Muslims of the “wrong” school or persuasion, and other religious minorities, have been targeted. Most notably, the leading (though not uncritical) pro-regime Sunni cleric and over forty other worshippers were killed in March when a prominent Sunni mosque in Damascus was targeted by a suicide bomber during a sermon. In February, following animosity between the United Courts Council (which is linked to the SNC) and sharia courts backed by al-Nusra, fighters belonging to the latter stormed a United Courts Council courthouse in Aleppo, where they assaulted and kidnapped scholars and judges.
Attacks against Christians by anti-government protesters began in mid-2011, and in Homs especially even Islamist fighters associated with the FSA have been implicated in the ethnic cleansing of Christians. Chechen fighters suspected of being linked with the al-Nusra Front (and likely also the Brigade of Emigrants in Greater Syria) are believed to have kidnapped two Syrian bishops in late April. Kidnapping, either for ransom or execution, is a well-established jihadi tactic. Shared sympathy for all these kinds of sectarian actions, as well as established co-operation on the battlefield, will make it difficult for the SNC or FSA to distance themselves from al-Nusra without alienating other jihadi groups and even more ‘moderate’ Islamist fighters within their own ranks. Such alienation would only foster an ever-closer jihadi alliance.
International Terrorism
Pressure from Western democracies to sever links with, and possibly even combat, such jihadi groups is likely to grow with time. This will be due to both horror at such attacks on civilians, and the possibility of Syrian jihadis (or foreigners trained by them) being linked to future terrorist attacks against Western targets. An indicative event occurred on April 29th this year, when two ground-to-air missiles were launched at a Russian passenger jet carrying around 160 travellers over Syria (en route from Egypt to Russia), which only survived destruction due to emergency manoeuvres. Although the identity of the attackers remains unconfirmed, barring a spectacularly risky "false flag" attack by the al-Assad regime (which would risk alienating its most powerful ally), it would seem that those responsible were certainly Syrian opposition fighters, and specifically jihadis judging by the fact that the target was both foreign and unquestionably civilian.
If similar attacks continue, and succeed, when it comes to Syria the designation of "terrorist" may well become synonymous with "rebel" in the minds of Europeans and Americans. Whether the bombings occur in Damascus, London, or over the skies of the Middle East, the SNC and FSA may find Western democracies demanding that jihadis be excluded from their areas of control in order for equipment and funds to continue flowing.
From now on, when speaking of the Syrian civil war, it will increasingly make sense to refer to three mutually opposed sides: the al-Assad regime, the Western-backed opposition, and the jihadis.
In
Part Two: the lessons France’s war in Algeria holds for the future of Syria’s jihadis.
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