Wednesday 17 July 2013

"Russia's Bin Laden" Threatens the Winter Olympics


Summary: Doku Umarov and the Caucasus Emirate have threatened Russia's 2014 Winter Olympics. If they make good on this threat, they will cease to be seen as fighting a localized war against Russia, and instead become known as international jihadis.


Doku Umarov, nicknamed "Russia's Osama Bin Laden" for his attacks on civilians there, has called on his followers to employ "maximum force" and "any methods" to prevent the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Umarov was the last President of rebel Chechen Republic of Ichkeria against Russian rule, before he proclaimed himself the first Emir of the Caucasus in 2007. Sochi, in the north Caucasus, thus falls within his declared "emirate", and as a major prestige project of Umarov's arch-enemy President Putin, the Winter Olympics there could hardly fail to be a major target for him.

Umarov's Caucasus Emirate  (Имарат Кавказ Imarat Kavkaz) has pursued a mixed strategy in its war against Russia, on the one hand perpetrating significant attacks on civilians (bombing the Moscow Metro in 2010 and a Moscow airport in 2011) and fostering links with al Qaeda and the Taliban, and on the other hand occasionally declaring halts on attacks against anything but military and police targets. With this threat against the Winter Olympics, Umarov is clearly once more giving the green light to attacks against all Russians, military and civilian alike.

However, he most distinctive feature thus far of the Emirate, and Umarov in particular, has been their distinct and intense localism. Historically, they have tried to assure the world that their struggle is anti-Russian, not pan-Islamist. When terrorists of Chechen descent bombed the Boston Marathon earlier this year, Umarov denied any involvement by his organisation, stressing that their primary enemy is Russia and they “are not engaged in military hostilities with the United States.” They have also paid only the most minimal lip service to the 'Palestinian cause', that sacred cow of jihadis across the world. Umarov's religious beliefs are also unusual and particular to his Chechen homeland. He specifically abjures Salafi and Wahhabi forms of Islam, and instead identifies himself as a "traditionalist" Muslim, placing him at odds with most violent jihadis.

This threat against the Sochi Winter Olympics, however, has a much more international edge to it. Though Umarov may justify attacking this "Satanic dancing" on the grounds that the north Caucasus is the graveyard of innumerable Muslims killed in Russia's conquest of the region two centuries ago, if his organisation actually follows through and strikes at the events their victims will hail from many different countries. This, alongside with the lingering association with the Boston Bombing, would be sufficient to earn the Caucasus Emirate a new international status, and a host of new enemies to go along with it. Umarov will need to consider if striking at Putin's prize is worth making his name known to the angry populations of half the world.

Tuesday 16 July 2013

The Seeds of Jihad in Egypt's Crisis



Summary: If violent jihad arises in Egypt in the coming months, it will likely rest upon four pillars: police clashes at mosques, the Muslim Brotherhood's young male supporters, Syrian refugees, and the Salafis and other small Islamist groups.



The Pillars of Egyptian Jihadism

When the Egyptian Army stepped in and removed President Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood earlier this month, they shattered not only Egypt's first democratically-elected government, but also likely the belief of tens of thousands of Islamists in the power of the ballot box over the bullet. This has raised the spectre that some of the Brotherhood's supporters may now turn to jihadi violence to restore Islamist rule in Egypt.

If this occurs, it will probably not be due to a conspiracy or central plan by existing jihadis, but rather much like the two Egyptian 'revolutions' seen in the past few years: as an outgrowth of mass unrest and anger on the streets. The constituency for this anger will not simply be the members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Rather, it will likely be specifically the young men of the organisation, in concert with members of Egypt's Syrian refugee population and the Salafi and other smaller Islamist groups. The spark for the transition to violence may be provided by provocative security operations against mosques and other religious sites like those the Brotherhood are currently organising from.


The Brotherhood

Probably the most unfounded fear Western fear about the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood is that the organisation will turn to violence and the way of jihad now that democratic means to power have seemingly been denied to it. Make no mistake -the Muslim Brotherhood is sincerely committed to non-violence and achieving power though lawful means. This is not due to an inherent pacifism or profound desire to be law-abiding, but rather a hard-learned lesson of experience. The Brotherhood has faced three serious government crackdowns since it was founded in 1928, including the assassination of their founder (Hassan al-Banna) and the torture and execution of their leading cleric (Sayyid al-Qutb), and it has disavowed violence (at least in Egypt) since the 1970's.

The leadership has also not forgotten the failure of the violent Islamist insurgency in Egypt during the 1990's. Freedom and Justice Party (the political wing of the Brotherhood) leaders may have called for "an uprising by the great people of Egypt against those trying to steal their revolution with tanks", but they mean "uprising" in the fashion of those which brought down Mubarak and now Morsi -through mass protest. To the leadership, this is just one more government crackdown on their long road to what they believe will be their eventual irresistible victory.

The 'Little Brothers'

However, there is risk that the rank and file of the Brotherhood may be more susceptible to jihadi ideologies and tactics in the wake of the coup. This would be especially true of younger members born too late to remember the failed violent campaigns or the harshest government crackdowns, and thus less wedded to non-violence. These 'little Brothers' are also far more likely to be unemployed and face poorer prospects than their older brethren. With Morsi and so much of the senior leadership arrested, they lack clear leadership and will act more on their own initiative.

Most importantly, the youth of the Brotherhood are disproportionately likely to be involved in the wave of sit-ins and protests that their organisation has vowed to paralyze Cairo with until Morsi is restored. These protests are the most likely sites fat which violent confrontation with the police or their opponents will emerge. Almost sixty people have been killed and hundreds more injured in just two such clashes since the coup. Most significantly, the Brotherhood has been holding many of its sit-ins around mosques and organising communal prayers at its protests. Several of the Brotherhood's leaders currently hiding from arrest warrants are believed to be near the sit-in at the Rabaah al-Adawiya Mosque in eastern Cairo.

This creates the explosive potential for scenes of Egypt's police violently dispersing men at prayer or storming into barricaded mosque compounds -images which would almost instantly be beamed across Egypt and around the world. Such scenes would fit perfectly into the narrative that some Islamists are already spreading: that el-Sissi is no more than the head of a "militia" that is seeking to annihilate Islamists, just as al-Assad is doing in Syria. And even if the Brotherhood will not adopt this 'civil war' stance, there are smaller and more extreme Islamist groups, including jihadism who will be far more open to it.

Egypt's Embattled Syrians:

There may be as many as a hundred and forty thousand Syrian refugees in Egypt today, with almost all having fled the Syrian government's crackdown. President Morsi welcomed them warmly, allowing them to travel without visas and extending the use of state hospitals and schools to them. He also spoke loudly in support of Syria's rebels and his senior officials stated that they would not stop Egyptians from going to fight in Syria. All this created a great deal of support for Morsi and the Brotherhood in the pockets of Cairo and other major cities that quickly became dominated by Syrians setting up shops and homes.

This identification of the Syrians as a constituency of the Brotherhood's, however, was used against the refugees once the anti-Morsi protests began. Morsi's appearance at a mid-June rally where many speakers called for jihad in Syria, shocking many more moderate Egyptians, may even have been the tipping point of his unpopularity leading to the July protests which ousted him. Since the coup, anti-Morsi television networks have used the arrest of six Syrians in violent street clashes to claim that the Brotherhood is paying Syrians to fill the pro-Morsi protests. A popular TV presenter has even warned Syrians that they will be beaten with shoes if they "interfere in Egypt"by protesting the coup. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry has also urged Syrians to stay away from such protests. Syrian children are now being denied access to state schools, and only five days after Morsi was removed from power Syrians without visas began to be turned back at Cairo airport. In the eyes of many coup supporters, both in the government and in the streets, a Syrian is a Brotherhood proxy.  

What this means is that Egypt contains a hundred thousand-strong community with affectionate feelings for the Morsi regime, an increasing feeling that the new regime is shutting them out, very raw experiences of another 'secular' state crackdown, and nowhere else to flee to. For the services the Egyptian state previously supplied to them, the Syrians will now have to turn to the Brotherhood's supporters and other Islamists who oppose the new government. This will make it even more likely that their young men will be drawn into the protests, and the combination of their experiences in Syria and their new desperation in Egypt will make them easy recruiting grounds for the most violent Islamist groups, especially if they can provide for their welfare. As witnessed amongst countless other refugee populations, this may mean the Salafis and the jihadis.

The Salafis: The Fighting Man's Brotherhood?

Egypt's leading Salafi (ultra-conservative Sunni) political party, al-Nour, has been something of a wild card so far. While it supported the coup that removed Morsi, after the shooting of over fifty protesters by police last week it withdrew from all talks about forming an interim government and stated that it would not remain silent on the "massacre".

Significantly, al-Nour was only founded after the 2011 uprising that toppled Mubarak, and so is eighty-four years younger than the Brotherhood, giving it no institutional memory of the decades of crackdowns that followed past Brotherhood violence. This also places its mentality much closer to that of the Brotherhood's angry youth. It claims eight hundred thousand members (almost as many as the Brotherhood), and has so far rallied members through advocating for a puritanical vision of Islam and public life in Egypt. It has also displayed political sophistication, supporting and then abandoning Mursi in line with public opinion, and leveraging the Army's need for at least some Islamist backing for a new government in search of political concessions.

However, while al-Nour's leadership may want to 'sell out' for political gains, its austere constituents and conservative allies may balk at this and demand confrontation. Already, one of the Brotherhood's hardline allies, Assem Abdel Maged, has declared to crowds that al-Nour's leaders must seek repentance from God for their "betrayal". Images of Egyptian police breaking down mosque doors and apprehending clerics may be too much for the religious rank-and-file of both al-Nour and the (leaderless) Brotherhood, who would easily identify with calls for 'jihad' to defend the practice of their faith. The political avenue may also be rapidly closing for Islamists in general and the Salafis in particular. It is widely believed that in new elections al-Nour will come nowhere near to the twenty per cent of the vote and that the Brotherhood's share may fall to little more than that. Violence may thus become a more attractive and plausible path to power in the eyes of many.

The experience of Russian security forces in the Caucasus in seeing how quickly Salafi groups can militarize and turn to violence in the face of 'attacks on their communities' should give the Egyptian Army pause. So should the growing numbers of young men wearing the white shrouds of "martyrdom" at the Brotherhood's sit-ins, and their declarations that will fight and die if necessary to restore an Islamist President. Whatever party or organisation first declares jihad against perceived anti-Islamic police actions may be able to harness the power of such young men, and for al-Nour and its kind, with no hope that temptation may prove too great

Conclusion

Aggressive security operations targeting mosques, the Brotherhood's leaderless youths, Syrian refugees under siege, the presence of Salafi groups with little attachment to non-violence, and sectarian enemies to 'target' may all combine to provide Egypt's political crisis with a religious edge -and that is all that would be required for jihadis to become major players.


Next time: what an Egyptian jihadi insurgency would look like

Sunday 7 July 2013

Boko Haram's School Killings


Summary: Boko Haram is increasingly targeting government and secular schools in Nigeria's Muslim-majority north east, killing large numbers of students and teachers. This campaign may soon be widened to include Islamic schools that eschew their violent jihadi ideology.


Boko Haram has recently been returning to the mission implied by its name: "Boko Haram" means "secular education is sinful" in Hausa, and over the past weeks Nigeria's foremost violent jihadi organisation has been carrying out deadly attacks on non-Islamic schools. In the most recent incident yesterday in Yobe state, thirty people were killed as a school dormitory was set alight as the students slept. Earlier this week in bordering Borno state, suspected Boko Haram militants gunned down a headmaster and his entire family at their home.

These are but the latest in a string of attacks. Since the beginning of 2012, Boko Haram has attacked twelve schools in and around Maiduguri (capital of Borno state) alone. It is not by coincidence that Boko Haram's school attacks have been concentrated in Nigeria's Muslim-majority north east, and especially in the three states placed under a state of emergency earlier this year. Maiduguri itself is seen as the spiritual home of Boko Haram, as well as probably its most important base of operations. Not only does Boko Haram object to the 'corruption' of Muslim children by the secular form of education provided by government schools, but Boko Haram's sources have specifically linked their attacks against these to alleged Nigerian security forces' abuses against Qur'an schools in the region.

Many of these Islamic schools are suspected by government officials of being used as recruitment and training grounds by Boko Haram, and a large number of clerics associated with them have been arrested for having terrorist links since the state of emergency was declared. In March last year, purported Boko Haram spokesman Abu Qaqa justified an attack on a government school thusly: “Certainly, if Quranic education will not be allowed to continue, then secular and Western education will not continue also.” In June this year, he claimed that Nigerian soldiers had beaten Qur'an school students with canes, and declared that "When you attack Koran schools, you totally destroy Western schools."

Although the origin of this 'justification' well before the state of emergency and the security crackdown shows just how contrived it is, Boko Haram's tactic of attacking secular schools is succeeding in at least one sense: an estimated ten thousand students across Nigeria's north east have been forced out of government schools since this violence started. In response to Saturday's attack, the Governor of Yobe state took the extraordinary step of closing all secondary schools in the state (though primary schools have also been targeted). This may not just be Boko Haram's aim for 'theological' reasons -the intention may also be to force all but the Qur'an schools to close, driving more and more students into Boko Haram's recruiting grounds. Of course not all Qur'an schools are linked to violent jihadi organisations, and so if Boko Haram succeeds in shutting more secular schools, expect their next step to be carrying out similar attacks on non-jihadi Islamic schools. The organisation already has a long history of targeting Islamic leaders and congregations that oppose their violent campaign -two such clerics were murdered in Borno state in May.

Boko Haram's campaign against schools it does not control should not be seen as a consequence of the security crackdown. If anything, the increased security presence may be all that is preventing them from casting their bloody net far wider.

Sunday 30 June 2013

Featured News: Boko Haram's violence spreading to southern Nigeria?



Boko Haram's violent campaign for an Islamic state has largely been confined thus far to Nigeria's Muslim-majority north. However, overnight on Saturday this weekend, about twenty unknown gunmen broke into a jail in the south-west state of Ondo and freed roughly one hundred and seventy five inmates.

Although there is currently no clear evidence that Boko Haram carried out the attach, armed mass jail breaks have been one of their signature tactics, and a police spokesman described the assailants as having "superior" arms. Neighbouring Kogi state has seen Islamist violence, but this attack in Ondo would be the southernmost thus far. Ondo is also largely outside the normal area of operations for the (non-Muslim) militants of the Niger Delta.

Over the past years, Boko Haram has been growing in numbers and arms, and the declaration of a state of emergency and military operations three north-east states may have dispersed some of their militants across Nigeria and bordering nations. If Boko Haram is now able to free its incarcerated members as far south as Ondo state, then the Nigerian government's ability to combat militants and ensure order in its territory has clearly slipped further since the declaration of the emergency.

Read more:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/30/us-nigeria-prisonbreak-idUSBRE95T0E020130630

Wednesday 5 June 2013

Update: Syria's Rebel Fighters Oppose Democracy, Condemn their Exiled Leaders, and are Losing to al-Assad



Sadly, our predictions of a jihadi ascendancy within the Syrian armed opposition are coming true, as seen in three pieces of recent news:

Firstly, the fighters are increasingly turning away from the high ideals that were attributed to them in the early days of the anti-regime protests. UN investigators have reported both that most of the rebels actually fighting the war in Syria don't even claim to want a democracy, or a "state for all" which accept's Syria's religious and ethnic minorities. This means that the radical Islamist and jihadi ideologies being pushed by the al-Nusra Front, al Qaeda, and their allies now dominate the armed opposition -feeding into ever more atrocities and sectarianism. What this means is that, when it comes to the rebels winning, a "military solution" in Syria means a jihadi solution.

Secondly, those fighters inside Syria are disillusioned with their political 'leaders' in exile (amongst whom there are genuine democrats and secularists). Rebels in the interior have released a statement condemning the Syrian National Coalition and accuse it of being unable to move beyond "negativity" and "discord", causing it to fail to represent the Syrian revolution. This comes after the Syrian National Coalition failed, yet again, to even agree on who should represent the Coalition in Geneva talks later this month. The rebels called the Coalition "feeble", and demanded that in future at least half the Coalition's leadership bodies should be made up of "revolutionary forces" -meaning fighting men. Their arguments are even those we described before -that those who bear the burden of fighting should lead. The statement included the words: "The revolutionary forces that have signed this statement will no longer bestow legitimacy upon any political body that subverts the revolution or fails to take into account the sacrifices of the Syrian people or adequately represent them." As we predicted, the struggle between the internal and external 'wings' of the opposition is growing and will come to a head -and when it does, the "revolutionary forces" of the interior (those least supportive of democracy and religious tolerance) will prevail.

Thirdly, Hezbollah has doubled down in its support of al-Assad, and their combined forces are winning again. This week, regime and Hezbollah forces working in concert retook the strategic town of Qusair from the rebels. Qusair is key for al-Assad to keep open his supply lines between Damascus and Lebanon (and the Alawite heartland of the coast), and gives his forces an open path to possibly take back control of Homs Governate. This area is often referred to as the key to the Syrian conflict, and it is hard to imagine any road to rebel victory that does not require them to hold Homs.

Syria's civil war is unfolding into the expected tragedy.

Tuesday 4 June 2013

'The Most Unfortunate Incident': The Theri Massacre and Fifty years of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan



Summary: On 3 June 1963, Pakistan saw its first cases of mass anti-Shia violence, with the killing of over one hundred in the village of Theri, as well as attacks in Lahore and Narowal. On the fiftieth anniversary of these events, described by Sharaabtoon research, far from being seen as isolated, they can sadly be identified as the opening act of the fratricidal killings between Sunnis and Shias in Pakistan which still continue after fifty years.


Sectarian Violence in Pakistan

In a piece of original research, Sharaabtoon is proud to bring you the first collation of the evidence, most of it not available on the internet, on the opening salvo of Pakistan's ongoing sectarian conflict: the Theri massacre of June 1963, and the accompanying violence in Lahore and Narowal. In spite of the widespread attention these events received in their immediate aftermath, since then they have become largely forgotten or ignored outside of the communal memories passed down within the Shia community of Pakistan.

Adding to the tragedy of these events is the fact that, despite the many condemnations the killings received at the time from all corners of Pakistan, sectarian violence, particularly against Shias (but also against Christians, Hindus and Ahmadis) has continued to plague the country. Thousands of Shias have been killed since 1963, with their murderers citing religious reasons as 'justification'.

Strange as it may sound to unfamiliar observes, within the minds of the perpetrators such killings of Shias falls as much under the banner of jihad as the killing of unbelievers does. After one massacre in February 2012 this year, a commander of the Jundulluh faction of the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack with these words: "They were Shiite infidels and our mujahedeen shot them dead one by one after bringing them down from a bus."

This conception of Shias as "infidels" (كفّار) is at the root of most anti-Shia violence, and springs usually from an accusation that Shias have "deviated" from "true Islam" by their reverence for Mohammed's son-in-law Ali (as Mohammed's supposed true successor) and other members of his family, as well as differences in practices such as prayer. This particularly comes to a head during the public displays of the differences between Shia and Sunni religious views, such as during the processions of the Day of Ashura, which was the case in 1963.

Shia processions remain a main target, frequently being targeted with bombings by organisations such as the Pakistani Taliban, as well as a vast network of smaller violent jihadi groups. Many of these groups have received the patronage or tacit cooperation of various arms of the Pakistani government and armed forces, who often see them as useful proxies against India, or a "last line of defence" in case of a future invasion.

Although the violence in Pakistan is largely directed against Shias by Sunni jihadis, reverse attacks do occur: a wave of sectarian violence between the two communities (with attacks on both sides) flared up in Gilgit (northern Pakistan) last year after a hand grenade was thrown at a gathering of a Sunni organisation (purportedly by Shia militants).


The Day of Ashura

Like so much of the Sunni-Shia violence seen since, these events centred around the Day of Ashura. This is the tenth day of the month of Muhharam in the Islamic calendar, on which Shia Muslims mourn the death of Hussein ibn Ali at the Battle of Karbala. This battle was the climax of the struggle over who should lead the followers of Islam after the death of the Prophet Mohammed, with the Umayyad Caliph Yazid I defeating Hussein (Mohammed's grandson). Shias mark this day with processions and displays of public mourning, and have often consequently clashed with Sunnis, as the diverging points of their sects are brought out into the streets.

One consequence of the great forgetting surrounding the events of 1963 is that even the date on which they occurred has become obscured, with many Shia sources now identifying the date as 6 June 1963. However, the Day of Ashura in 1963 fell on 3 June, and the contemporary newspapers began covering the killings on 4 June, noting the date they were perpetrated as 3 June (and the night of 2 June in Lahore).


The Riots in Lahore

Throughout Pakistan on the Day of Ashura in 1963, there were a great many peaceful processions and commemorations, including in Karachi, Peshawar and Multan. However, Lahore proved to be far more turbulent. The origin of riots seems to be found in events of the night before, when Sunni-Shia scuffles broke out, and bottles and broken bricks ("brick-bats") were thrown at a Shia procession that had halted outside a Sunni mosque (Dawn: 5 June: p.11; The Pakistan Times: 4 June: p.1). Members of Sunnat-Jama'at (a traditionalist Barelvi Sunni organisation) tried to rush the procession and had to be prevented from doing so by a police baton charge (The Pakistan Times: 11 June: p.9 ; Dawn: 12 June: p.6).

By the morning of 3 June, rumours were spreading that Shias had killed two Sunnis near the mosque where the procession had halted (The Pakistan Times: 12 June: p.3 ; Dawn: 12 June: p.6). Stone-throwing against the Shia processions ensued, and, despite assurances from Sunni leaders that they would be allowed to pass freely, when a large procession passed the Bhati Gate, what was described as a "free fight" broke out between the two groups, and the police opened fire to restore order. As broken brick-throwing started against processions in other areas, Army units were called in, and the police repeatedly opened fire throughout the city (Dawn: 5 June: p.11 ; Dawn: 27 June: p.1). Witnesses later reported seeing two Shias being beaten by a crowd which the police had just dispersed from the Bhati Gate (The Pakistan Times: 27 June: p.11). A curfew was imposed and maintained for several proceeding nights.

More than eighty people were injured in these riots, and four people (including one policeman) eventually died of injuries they sustained on 2 and 3 June (Dawn: 5 June: p.11 ; Sawn: 6 June: p.9). Police registered incidents of "stabbing, arson and loot" throughout the two days (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.5). In the following days, six hundred and thirty people were arrested in association with the riots, though over seventy of these were for violating the ensuring curfew (The Pakistan Times: 7 June: p.11 ; The Pakistan Times: 8 June: p.1).

This kind of violence was new to Lahore. It was reported that “elder citizens of the town… could not recall such a violence in Lahore on Ashura during the last 150 years” (The Pakistan Times: 5 June: p.1). An inquiry into the violence was ordered by the Governor of West Pakistan, but this was (to quote one news report) “not so much for fixing the blame of the incident, but for assessing the causes for the tension between the two sects, and for remedies to prevent such recurrence in the future” (The Pakistan Times: 5 June: p.1). Not surprisingly, Pakistan's Shias were left with a sense that little was done to bring the instigators of the riots to justice, and by July the kind of "future remedies" being suggested to prevent such riots included the pre-publication censorship of all Shia religious literature to remove content Sunnis found "objectionable" (The Civil & Military Gazette: 2 July: p.4). Quickly, those who had largely been the victims of the riots were blamed for causing them in the first place.


The Massacre in Theri

Far more bloody than the riots in Lahore were the killings in Theri (or "Therhi"), a village in Khairpur district. The incident began with a single stone-throwing against a Shia tazia (processional model of Hussein's mausoleum), and when news of this reached Khairpur city, a large number of armed men descended on the town and set both the tazia and the house where the Shias were meeting on fire (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.5 ; Dawn: 5 June: p.1). What followed was described as a "pitched battle" by the time the police arrived and used tear gas to disperse the mob, with re-enforcements from nearby towns and even the Indus Rangers being called in (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.5 ; Dawn: 5 June: p.1 & p.11). A dawn-to dusk curfew was imposed for several subsequent nights.

Over one hundred people were killed and at least thirty injured in this massacre (CGI: 18 April 2005: p.9 ; Dawn: 9 June: p.13). The characterization of the incident as a "battle" seems to be contradicted by the fact that almost every victim was identified as a Shia. In the following weeks, ninety-eight people were arrested from all over Khairpur district on charges of arson, murder and riot in Theri (Dawn: 27 June, p.1 & P.7). As with Lahore, a government inquiry was ordered, but later suspended and seems not to have reached any real conclusions (The Civil and Military Gazette: July 3: p.3).

The accounts passed on by victims and witnesses of the killings in Theri present a lurid picture. Knives, axes, and stones are said to have been used to murder the processionists. The perpetrators reportedly walked through the area of the attack shouting Shia slogans and offering water, only to murder any of the wounded who replied (Shaheed Foundation Pakistan). The dead bodies were then thrown into a well in an attempt to conceal the scale of the killings (with some sources saying the next planned step was to burn them in the well) before the police arrived to take custody of them. (CGI: 18 April 2005: p.9 ; Shaheed Foundation Pakistan).  The Shaheed Foundation of Pakistan has preserved a number of (graphic) photographs showing the state of the bodies recovered and the site of the massacre. Many of these accounts describe the perpetrators as "Wahhabis", but the tiny size of the Wahhabi population of Pakistan at this time suggests that they were likely more mainstream Sunnis.

Under the protection of the Pakistani police the Shia ceremonies that had been interrupted by the killings and the ensuing curfews were completed on 7 June, without violence violence (Dawn: 7 June: p.7 ; The Pakistan Times: 8 June: p.10). In subsequent years, however, there was repeated anti-Shia violence in this and nearby villages on the Day of Ashura.


Narowal's Violence among Neighbours

In Narowal, before the Ashura procession went ahead, an agreement was struck between the Sunni and Shia communities that the march would be made up of only ten Shias. On the day, only nine went, but they were escorted by four prominent Sunnis walking alongside them. The Pakistan Times reported that, as the procession passed through the town, some Sunnis began “abusing the Shias and also instigating the Sunnis to attack them as they had not carried out the agreement made earlier. The situation took an ugly turn when the rival groups started exchanging brickbats on the mourners. At this point the police intervened and the furious mob started throwing brickbats on the police as well” (The Pakistan Tunes: 6 June: p.8). The mob was ordered to disperse, and the police made an unsuccessful attempt to disperse it with a baton charge. When this failed, the police then fired “to scare away the crowd” (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.8) Later, about five hundred persons gathered armed with improvised batons and axes and attached the processionists. The Police fired for a second time, injuring “several persons” and killing two (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.8).

In this case, many of the leaders of this attack were not only arrested and charged, but also named in Pakistani newspaper stories (The Pakistan Times: 6 June: p.8). All involved seem to have been locals, well-known to their victims.


Conclusion

The events in Theri, Lahore and Narowal acted as a bloody opening to the ongoing dark chapter in Pakistani history, and the nation as a whole has yet to come to terms with the ongoing violence. At the time, one newspaper correspondent described it as "the most unfortunate incident in the history of the country" (The Pakistan Times: 5 June: p.9), but many more tragic atrocities have since been committed. Pakistan's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, one said that "There is no power on earth that can undo Pakistan." We have yet to see if Pakistan can undo the ongoing spiral of sectarian strife which still plagues it after fifty years.



Bibliography: 

  • The Civil & Military Gazette; Lahore; 1963 (British Library Newspaper collection)
  • Dawn; Karachi; 1963; (British Library Newspaper collection)
  • International Crisis Group, “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan”, Asia Report, N°95 – 18 April 2005 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/095_the_state_of_sectarianism_in_pakistan
  • The Pakistan Times; Lahore; 1963 (British Library Newspaper collection)
  • Shaheed Foundation Pakistan, "Tragic Event" http://www.shaheedfoundation.org/tragic.asp?Id=13

Other Resources:

  • http://criticalppp.com/archives/266633
  • http://worldshiaforum.wordpress.com/2012/12/26/therhikhaipur-massacre-49th-anniversary-of-the-first-large-scale-sectarian-attack-in-pakistan/

Saturday 1 June 2013

"Sheikh of the Arab Spring" now calls for jihad in Syria

Radical Egyptian cleric Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi is one of the world's most renowned Sunni clerics, chairman of the International Federation of Muslim Scholars, and has been dubbed the "Sheikh of the Arab Spring" for lending his support and legitimacy to many of the recent anti-government protests and revolutions in Arab countries. In May, he called for "jihad to death" against Israel -and now he has added Syria to the list of countries in need of jihad.

Specifically, al-Qaradawi's official website stated that he has called for "those able to undertake jihad and fighting to head to Syria to stand by the Syrian people who are being killed at the hands of the regime and are now being killed at the hands of what he called the party of Satan" -referring to the al-Assad regime in Syria and Lebanon's Hezbollah ("Party of God"), respectively. Regarding the latter, many Sunni clerics and laymen alike have taken to renaming Hezbollah after the devil due to its full-scale intervention on behalf of al-Assad.

Regarding al-Assad's regime, al-Qaradawi's motivations here are not hard to deduce. Firstly, al-Qaradawi not only has a record of supporting recent popular ('democratic') uprisings against Arab dictators, but also has a history of describing Shia Muslims as "heretics", and of accusing Shias of "invading" Sunni countries. This has led him to be criticized even by a fellow Sunni member of the International Federation of Muslim Scholars for fomenting sectarian tensions. All of this has great relevance to why he would call for a jihad against an Alawite (Shia) regime in a majority-Sunni country, in a conflict already riven with religious and communal violence. But secondly, the clue is in al-Qaradawi's current base of operations: Qatar. Qatar has been staunchly backing Islamist rebels against al-Assad's regime -and probably (tacitly, indirectly, or even consciously) the most radical jihadis like the al-Nusra Front and their allies.

In its better days, Sheikh al-Qaradawi could be said to symbolize the Arab Spring's democratic aspirations and popular appeal. Now, the Sheikh also embodies the uprisings' darker side of sectarianism, trans-national proxies, and violent jihad.

Featured News: "Sheikh of the Arab Spring" calls for "jihad to death" against Israel

Radical Egyptian cleric Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi was welcomed to Gaza by Hamas on Wednesday. Ever since the start of the Arab Spring, Hamas has been weaking its ties to its former patron in Iran, and is seeking ever-closer links to the new Islamist-led governments of the Middle East -and other jhadi groups in the region. Especially in Syria.

Read more:
http://news.yahoo.com/radical-egyptian-cleric-qaradawi-arrives-gaza-declares-wish-174013509.html;_ylt=At1TQ4CG_DRkFYZ2MY.1d1ZvaA8F;_ylu=X3oDMTNmbnJhZDJxBG1pdAMEcGtnAzBhOTUxMmU5LTcxOTUtMzQxOS1iOWYzLWQxOWY4Yjg4MjJlYQRwb3MDOARzZWMDbG5fTWlkRWFzdF9nYWwEdmVyAzgxMmI4NDMwLWI4Y2YtMTFlMi1iZmVmLTkyN2VlY2FmYmUxMw--;_ylg=X3oDMTBhYWM1a2sxBGxhbmcDZW4tVVM-;_ylv=3

Thursday 30 May 2013

Hezbollah Militants arrested in Nigeria (of all places)



Summary: Hezbollah militants have been arrested in Nigeria, home turf of their theological enemy Boko Haram: were they seeking an odd-couple alliance with Boko Haram, trying to get into the African arms dealing market, or just taking advantage of Nigeria's chaos to move weapons and money? Or were they planning an attack on African soil?



Three Lebanese men have been arrested in northern Nigeria, admitting to being members of Hezbollah, and captured along with their stash of heavy weaponry and cash. They were arrested in Kano, the largest city in northern Nigeria, and a hub of activity for the Boko Haram terrorist organisation.

Now, not all jihadis are the same -and Hezbollah and Boko Haram represent very different parts of the jihadi spectrum, which we would expect to make them deadly enemies. Hezbollah is the world's foremost Shia jihadi group, which has recently hardened its sectarian edge with its pro-(Alawite) regime intervention in the Syrian civil war. By contrast, Boko Haram is a Salafi (ultra-conservative Sunni) organisation which has much in common with Hezbollah's al Qaeda-linked enemies in Syria. So what exactly are three members of Hezbollah doing in Boko Haram's back yard?

There seem to be four likely explanations:

Firstly, Hezbollah is seeking links to Muslim Africa's growing violent jihadi groups, regardless of theology. Having burned so many of is bridges in the Sunni world with its support of al-Assad in Syria, Hezbollah is in need of new jihadi friends to share information with and receive sanctuary abroad from, preferably ones who are indifferent to events in Syria. Boko Haram is not directly linked to al Qaeda or any other 'Arab' terrorist groups, and thus has no direct stake or interest in events inthe Middle East. Being fundamentally local in its outlook (desiring the establishment of shariah law in Nigeria), Boko Haram might not have many qualms about forging an alliance with a far-off Shia group, if the main interaction between them were beneficial to Boko Haram.

Secondly, Hezbollah could be selling weapons to African jihadis to raise funds for its war in Syria, or even seeking to buy heavy weaponry 'liberated' from Gaddafi's armouries and since acquired by militants. The men arrested reportedly had eleven 60 mm anti-tank weapons, four anti-tank landmines, two rounds of ammunition for a 122 mm artillery gun, 21 rocket-propelled grenades, seventeen AK-47s with more than 11,000 bullets and some dynamite. This economic endeavour would fall below the level of an operational alliance, and would simply entail Hezbollah and Boko Haram being occasional business partners. Boko Haram could perhaps become the middleman between Hezbollah and the wider network of African jihadis which the former has links to, and which the latter may want to sell to or buy from.

Thirdly, Hezbollah might just be taking advantage of the security crisis in northern Nigeria to smuggle weapons and money under the radar. This would mean no link to Boko Haram, and rather a focus on Nigeria's large and business-savvy Lebanese expatriate community. Hezbollah is believed to have extensive fundraising networks amongst Shia Lebanese groups overseas, and the arrested militants in this case had over $60,000 in cash. Nigeria also has a small indigenous Shia population, the product of conversions by the radical preacher  Ibrahim Zakzaky since the 1980's. Zakzaky still leads this community in Nigeria, and calls for an Islamic government enforcing shariah law, albeit campaigning for this in a peaceful manner.

Finally, and possibly consistently with any of the above, Hezbollah could have been amassing these weapons in preparation for a terrorist attack on African soil. Hezbollah has committed terrorist attacks abroad, especially against Israeli targets, as far apart as Buenos Aires (1992) and Bulgaria (2012). Israel has an embassy in Nigeria's capital Abuja, as do the United States and several other Western powers backing Hezbollah's enemies in Syria.

If not bedfellows, it seems jihadism at least makes for strange neighbours.

Al Qaeda allies had Sarin Gas in Turkey -were they targeting Alawites Abroad?



Summary: Al Qaeda's ally the al-Nusra Front was caught with sarin gas in Turkey, allegedly planning an attack on a Turkish city known for its Alawite community. With al Qaeda in Iraq simultaneously striking Shia targets there, are these jihadi groups now trying to export Syria (and Iraq)'s Sunni-Shia violence across the region?



A 2kg cylinder of sarin gas was found yesterday by Turkish authorities after they searched the homes of militants belonging to the Syrian al-Nusra Front. This jihadi organisation is either a close ally or a full-blown branch of Al Qaeda (depending on who you talk to), as well as being the most aggressive and successful rebel fighting group in the Syrian civil war.

That al-Nusra possesses sarin gas is not in itself surprising. The rebels have already captured significant amounts of chemical weapons formerly belonging to Syria's al-Assad regime, and are believed to have used sarin in an attack that killed twenty-six people, including government forces, in March this year. As the leaders of the opposition's armed struggle, it was only a matter of time before al-Nusra was able to get its hands on some of these captured stockpiles. Al-Assad has even claimed that militants linked to al Qaeda (most likely al-Nusra) were behind the sarin attack in March -though al-Assad's regime attributes almost all rebel actions to al Qaeda lately.

However, the fact that al-Nusra was caught with Sarin in a foreign country (even one next door) is more significant. According to the authorities, the gas intended for use in an attack in the Turkish city of Adana. If so, this would be the first clear attack by Syrian rebels on a foreign target. A car bombing in the Turkish city of Reyhanlı earlier in May is believed to have been carried out by the al-Assad regime or its proxies. No immediate explanation has been offered for why al-Nusra would want to strike a Turkish city with Sarin Gas -Turkey's government and population are broadly pro-rebel, if not pro-jihadi (though this distinction could have been enough to motivate al-Nusra to strike). One extremely worrying explanation is that the target was to be Adana's significant population of Alawites, the Shia offshoot which forms the core of the al-Assad regime and its supporters. The Alawite community is well-established and was in place long before the current civil war, making it a visible and accessible target if al-Nusra desired to strike against Alawites abroad.

If al-Nusra really is trying to extend its sectarian campaign against Alawites abroad, this would be a significant escalation of the conflict. Turkey has over seven hundred thousand Alawites, and Lebanon has over a hundred thousand. The fact that al Qaeda in Iraq is also currently trying to foment sectarian blood-letting there by striking at Shia targets makes it hard not to see al-Nusra's actions here as part of a wider Sunni jihadi plan to spread their "war on Shi'ism" across the Middle East.

As previously related in Sharaabtoon, to truly put it to devastating use significant quantities of sarin gas, as well as an advanced delivery system, are required. More primitive attempts to use it tactically are likely to fail, as Iraqi insurgents found out in May 2004. However, it can be used very effectively in smaller strikes on concentrated civilians targets, as was seen in the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1994. If the al-Nusra/al Qaeda alliance is planning to use chemical weapons against Shia civilians across the region, the inhabitants of Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran may have even more to fear from these jihadis gaining such armaments than even Israel's people do.

Alawite Distribution in the Levant

Wednesday 29 May 2013

Featured News: Al Qaeda gives member Poor Job Evaluation



Being a member of al Qaeda nowadays is hard work. Not only do you have to dodge drone strikes worry about your declining brand value, now you have to worry about the upper management getting all testy because you don't file expense reports, don't turn up to meetings, or you spend too much time on internet social media. But this is apparently exactly what was happening to Moktar Belmoktar, a commander in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) who recently got so fed up with the 'brass' that he quit and formed his own jihadi organisation,  the Al-Mulathameen ("Masked") Brigade (also known as the al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam ["Those who Sign with Blood"] Brigade).

In a letter obtained by the Associated Press, AQIM's leaders give a scathing (and very long) review of Belmoktar's performance (referring to him by his alternate name 
 Khaled Abou El Abbas). Here are a few of the highlights:

  • "Abu Abbas is not willing to follow anyone... he is satisfied only when followed and obeyed."
  • "your brigade did not achieve single spectacular operation targeting the crusader alliance"
  • "Why do you only turn on your phone with the Emirate when you need it, while your communication with some media [online jihadi forums] is almost never ending!"
  • "We ask you also: How many administrative and financial reports have you sent up to your Emirate?"
  • "How many meetings was Abu Abbas invited to... only to see him always refuse to participate?"
  • "Abu Abbas aired our laundry publicly and spilled secrets of jihad to random young men whom he doesn’t know"

    ... and our personal favourite...

  • "As for your whispering in the ear of the organization’s emir, we consider it as derisive and snide and denigrating a figure who by our ancient Islamic law should be esteemed and respected, even if he were a black Ethiopian slave with a head like a raisin."

Featured News: Arrest in suspected jihadi stabbing of French soldier

French police made an arrest today in connection with the stabbing of a French soldier on counter-terrorism patrol last week, with the suspect admitting his crime. The details released so far seem consistent with, if not conclusive of, the assualt being a jihadi attack in the vein of the murder (and attempted beheading) of a British soldier in Woolwich, London, a week ago today. A Paris prosecutor has revealed that “Alexandre” (as the suspect has been named) is almost 22 years old and converted to Islam around age 18. He reportedly follows a "traditionalist even radical Islam", according to unnamed sources close to the investigation. He also has a record in the national police database from an identity check for praying in the street in 2007. Notably, Alexandre was seen on surveillance footage performing a Muslim prayer less than ten minutes before the attack, leading the prosecutor to conclude that he acted on the based on his "religious ideology" -presumably jihadism.

However, Alexandre also has a record of petty crimes as a juvenile, and was reportedly homeless and unemployed before the attack. Beyond the (tenuous) 2007 identity check, the security services had no reason to connect him to radical Islamism. It is unclear how the identification of the suspect as a “convert” with a native French-sounding name interacts with the previous description of the attacker as a man of “North African origin”, and it is possible that this was a mischaracterization made due to his wearing of an Arab-style robe and beard.

French Defense Minister Jean-Yves has stated: "The aim was to kill the soldier because he was a soldier, to kill a soldier who is in charge of French security ".

Read more:
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/29/world/europe/france-stabbing-suspect/

Sunday 26 May 2013

The Woolwich Jihadis and al Shabaab's Western Outreach









Summary: a; Shabaab has increasingly been recuiting Westerners, and turning Kenyans against their own country. Considering that one of the Woolwich jihadis previously attempted to join al Shabaab al Shabaab, we must ask what his target was to be? Will other Western recruits to al Shabaab be turned against the West itself?


Al Shabaab has a long-standing recruitment drive aimed at Westerns and other foreigners. But with the recent murder and attempted beheading of a British soldier in Woolwich, London, a would-be al Shabaab has been connected to a terrorist attack in the West for the first time. Kenyan authorities have confirmed that Michael Adebolajo was held by their police in 2010 on suspicion of trying to join al Shabaab, al Qaeda's regional branch in the Horn of Africa. He was arrested and deported back to the UK in November 2010, after he was caught trying to cross the border to Somalia along with five other men. UK government sources have stated that one of the two Woolwich jihadis (it has not been confirmed which) was prevented from flying to Somalia last year, on suspicion that he intended to join al Shabaab.

Previously on Sharaabtoon, we have noted that Somalia's outreach to the Western recruits and donors has the potential to evolve into jihadi attacks on the West itself. Earlier this month, four ethnic Somalis were convicted of fundraising and recruiting for al Shabaab in Minnesota. Over forty Americans and dozens of Europeans, including Britons, are believed to be fighting for the organisation in Somalia. They also appear to have a "reporter" with a British accent working for their media wing. Increasingly, al Shabaab has been using 'new media' in suspected attempts to reach out to Western Muslims, notably using its official Twitter feed in October 2012 to threaten terrorist attacks against the UK if radical preacher Abu Hamza was deported to the USA (although such attacks have not yet emerged).

Although al Shabaab was likely not involved in the planning or execution of the Woolwich attack, al Shabaab has displayed a previous willingness to make use of foreign recruits in attacks against their own nation in one particular case: Kenya. Up to ten percent of al Shabaab's forces inside Somalia are now believed to be Kenyan citizen not of Somali ancestry, many of them recent converts from the predominantly Christian country. The "Kenyan mujahadeen", as they are referred to, have been used extensively by al Shabaab to carry out terrorist attacks (typically with guns, grenades and bombs) of increasing frequency in Kenya, as their ability to blend in to the majority population aids them in avoiding detection. Kenyan members of al Shabaab were even involved in carrying out the July 2010 bombing of crowds in Kampala, Uganda, watching screenings of the World Cup. Al Shabaab's leaders justifies these attacks as in response to the support of the Kenyan and Ugandan governments for Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (al Shabaab's bitter foe), a charge which can easily be levelled against many Western nations also. What the Woolwich jihadis have demonstrated is that al Shabaab-linked extremists are indeed capable of carrying out horrifying (if small) terrorist attacks inside the West -a worrying lesson for al Shabaab to take to heart.

Meanwhile, last night al Shabaab gunmen killed six people in attacks on Kenyan police posts near the Somali border. Two of them were police officers, one was a Red Cross teacher, and another was a fifteen year-old boy. Al Shabaab took credit for these attacks via Twitter, claiming that it had killed eight people and taken two hostages as well.


Saturday 25 May 2013

Featured News: 'Black widow' suicide bomber strikes in Russia

A female suicide bomber blew herself up in Russia's Dagestan region in the north Caucasus today, injuring eighteen. She has been identified as a widow of not just one, but two Islamists killed by Russian security forces, making her another of the "black widow" jihadis.

"Black widow" is a term applied to the at least two dozen women (mostly from the Caucasus) who have blown themselves up in jihadi attacks in Russia since the year 2000, as most of them are widows or relatives of militants killed in their anti-Russian insurgency. While nationalist in origin back during the breakup of the USSR, this insurgency was rapidly Islamized throughout the 1990's, and today is largely being waged under the black banner of jihad. Russian security forces in the region are routinely accused of extra-judicial killings and rights violations.

Read more:
http://news.yahoo.com/female-suicide-bomber-injures-12-russian-region-104132442.html

French soldier stabbed in Paris -a jihadi attack?

A French soldier was stabbed in the throat in a busy commercial district outside Paris today. The soldier was on patrol, in uniform, along with two other men as part of France's Vigipirate anti-terrorist surveillance plan. The wound is reported to be serious but not life-threatening.

The fact that his attacker has been described as a bearded man of North-African origin (wearing what has been described as a "white Arab-style tunic") has raised comparisons with the jihadi murder of a British soldier in London earlier this week. Although the French government has thus far declined to comment officially on the nature of the attack, sources in side the Paris prosecutors office have been reported that the attack is being treated as a "terrorist incident" and is therefore being handled by the anti-terrorist branch of the office.

These events come a little over a year after French-Algerian jihadi murdered seven people in Toulouse and Montauban, including three French soldiers and a parent and three children at a Jewish school. The terrorist in question is believed to have been motivated, in part at least, by the participation of French soldiers NATO operations in Afghanistan. As of of November last year, France's combat troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan (though the logistical contingent remains), but French troops troops are currently involved in anti-jihadi operations in Mali and Niger.

The fact that, fortunately, the French soldier survived the attack seems to indicate the amateur nature of the terrorist attack, if that is what it was. The perpetrator is unlikely to have been linked to any meaningful jihadi network or organisation which would have flagged him to French security services as a threat. This is a distinct parallel with the killers of the British soldier earlier this week, the Boston bombers earlier this year, and the jihadi who perpetrated the Toulouse and Mountauban attacks last year. Instances of "do-it-yourself jihadis" committing attacks in the West seem to be increasing in their frequency.

Friday 24 May 2013

Update on the Woolwich Jihadis

Ever since two jihadis killed and attempted to behead an off-duty British soldier in Woolwich, London, two days ago, details of the attack have been emerging slowly -details that paint quite a different picture to some of the early speculation, including Sharaabtoon's first analysis.

The characterization of the attackers as jihadis is still certain. Notably, it has been established that the attacker seen speaking in an amateur video taken at the scene (named as Michael Adebolajo) made an explicit reference to the Ninth Sura (chapter) of the Quran, known as the "at-Tawba" (سورة التوبة) -"the Repentance". Adebolajo stated: "we are forced in the Quran in Sura at-Tawba through many, many ayah [verses] throughout the Quran that we must fight them as they fight us, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." The "them" can be taken to refer to those Adebolajo considered the 'enemies of Islam' -which, in context, seems to mean British soldiers.

The at-Tawba includes the so-called "sword verse", which has frequently been cited by jihadis to justify their actions: it states: "
Then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever ye find them, and take them (captive), and besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush. But if they repent and establish worship and pay the poor-due, then leave their way free. Lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful" (فَإِذَا ٱنسَلَخَ ٱلۡأَشۡہُرُ ٱلۡحُرُمُ فَٱقۡتُلُواْ ٱلۡمُشۡرِكِينَ حَيۡثُ وَجَدتُّمُوهُمۡ وَخُذُوهُمۡ وَٱحۡصُرُوهُمۡ وَٱقۡعُدُواْ لَهُمۡ ڪُلَّ مَرۡصَدٍ۬‌ۚ فَإِن تَابُواْ وَأَقَامُواْ ٱلصَّلَوٰةَ وَءَاتَوُاْ ٱلزَّڪَوٰةَ فَخَلُّواْ سَبِيلَهُمۡ‌ۚ إِنَّ ٱللَّهَ غَفُورٌ۬ رَّحِيمٌ۬). Many Islamic scholars interpret this verse to refer only to a specific group of "idolaters" at a particular time, but most jihadis take it as an instruction to wage unending war against non-Muslims across the world.

However, the kind of radicalization the attackers seem to have gone through now appears to be quite different to Sharaabtoon's first post. Although both the attackers (the other being named as Michael Adebowale) are indeed of Nigerian origin (though born in the UK), they are believed to both come from Christian backgrounds and have converted to Islam as youths. Significantly, Adebolajo seems to have come under the influence of two radical Islamist leaders early on. The first is Omar Bakri Muhammad, a militant leader whose UK-based organisation Al-Muhajiroun (المهاجرون‎ -"the Emigrants") was banned as a terrorist group in 2005, causing him to live in exile in Lebanon since then. Bakri says Adebolajo attended his lectures around ten years ago, describing him as "very shy". The other is Anjem Choudary, spokesman for the radical Islamist "Islam4UK" until it was banned 2010. Islam4UK was known for its attempts to protest against the funeral processions of British soldiers killed in the Middle East.It has been established that Adelbolajo attended one of Choudary's protests in 2007.

The significance of these two figures, one Syrian-born and one of South Asian ancestral origin, is that they acted as the gateway to Islam for at least one of the two Michaels. This means that the kind of Islam that Adebolajo was converted into was not only a jihadist form, but also one which culturally was more closely linked with the Middle East and South Asia than it was to the Islam of the two men's country of ancestral origin (Nigeria). This indicates that any connection or particular identification with the aims or grievances of Nigerian jihadis (such as Boko Haram) is actually highly unlikely. In terms of the substance of their beliefs and the 'Islamic' causes they sympathise with, the two Michaels would likely both be much closer to the jihadis of Syria's al-Nusra Front, or Pakistan's Lashkar-eTaiba. This would explain the reported references Adebowale made to Afghanistan at the scene of the attack in Woolwich, and their selection of a British soldier as a target. Rather than being a product of the jihadism of their ancestor's country, these men were  converts to a more globalized jihadi mindset. 
An indication of this is the reported fact that one of the men had previously been prevented form flying to Somalia, because he was suspected of intending to join up with al Shabaab (al Qaeda's regional branch) there. What really mattered to these men was killing in the name of jihad, not the particular country it was taking place in.

This makes what these two jihadi Michaels represent all the more worrying to Western security services: converted from non-traditional backgrounds by radical preachers based in the West, made to identify with conflicts they had no personal association with, and willing and (despite being known to the authorities as extremists) able to independently plan and commit an attack that struck fear into the heart of a nation.

They are the "do-it-yourself" jihadis -the UK's equivalent of the Boston bombers. They are determined, deadly, and extremely difficult to catch before they strike.


Wednesday 22 May 2013

Featured News: Jihadi attack in London -Boko Haram connection?

Of the little that is known about the murder of a British soldier just outside the Woolwich Barracks in London by two as yet unidentified attackers, one thing is certain: the 'justifications' offered for the killing by one of the perpetrators are distinctly reminiscent of those usually offered by jihadis. But one statement may be telling of a specific connection to a foreign conflict.

In released videos, one of the attackers declares: ""We swear by almighty Allah we will never stop fighting you. The only reason we have done this is because Muslims are dying every day... We must fight them as they fight us. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth... You people will never be safe. Remove your government. They don't care about you." He and his accomplice are also reported to have yelled "Allahu Akbar" ("God is greatest") as they beheaded the soldier. With these two elements of an Islamic religious appeal and a notion of revenge or defending the umma (global Islamic community), the perpetrators clearly positioned themselves on the jihadi spectrum.

However, on the aforementioned video the attacker added: "I apologise that women have had to witness this today, but in our land our women have to see the same." It is entirely speculative at this point, but this focus on the suffering of Muslim women in particular may be significant. Both the jihadis appear to be of sub-Saharan African origin, and it is notable that in the last few weeks, sub-Saharan Africa's largest violent jihadi organisation, Boko Haram, has been loudly decrying (even focusing on) the fact that wives and female relatives of their (suspected) members have been detained in prisons by the Nigerian government. This is such a big issue that there that the Nigerian government this week announced that it would be releasing these female prisoners, in a move seen as a sign that the government is seriously trying to placate Boko Haram's militants (as well as aggressively pursuing them with military operations).

It is obviously not unusual for radical Islamists an jihadis to make the alleged mistreatment of Muslim women by non-Muslim authorities a rallying cry, as Iraqi and Afghan insurgents have demonstrated again and again. We also have no indication what country these two men trace their ancestry to, or if they have any meaningful connections to it today (the one in the video had an accent distinct to London's East End). What he referred to as "our land" could either be taken as a reference to Muslim lands in general, or to a specific country he identifies with. But the filmed attacker notably omitted to mention Afghanistan (the only country where British soldiers could actually be said to be "killing Muslims") in his grievances, and the world of jihadis is no stranger to conspiracy theories where almost anyone can be a "proxy agent for the "infidel West". Without a doubt, the real Boko Haram will have had no meaningful connection with this attack -but it is just possible that at least one of the jihadis had Boko Haram's grievances partly in mind when he beheaded a British soldier on a London street.

Read more:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22630303

Featured News: Anti-Taliban Afghan elder killed by suicide bomber

The Afghan Taliban has long pursued a campaign of assassination against many of their country's tribal elders, and on Wednesday May 22 they claimed another victim. Habibullah Khan, along with his two bodyguards and one bystander, was killed in a marketplace in Moqur district. Less than a week ago, a provincial chief was among the fourteen victims of another suicide attack in Kandahar.

These assassinations aren't simply a case of the Taliban attacking its enemies in the Afghan government. It should be remembered that the Taliban's "Islamic state" form of government is as alien to Afghanistan as their salafi/wahhabi brand of Islam is. The traditional elders and tribal chiefs have historically been seen by the Taliban at best as something to be tolerated for a time if they don't cause trouble, and at worst as bitter enemies and representatives of the 'old order'. This is why NATO forces have so often found allies within the traditional leaders of the Afghan tribes -and possibly their best hope for building a non-Taliban or jihadi government in the future.

Read more:
http://news.yahoo.com/afghanistan-suicide-bomb-kills-anti-taliban-elder-152300470.html;_ylt=AgmFXmvMqI99E8Yk_O2vBtMSscB_;_ylu=X3oDMTByZ2s2M2M1BG1pdAMEcG9zAzE4BHNlYwNsbl9Bc2lhX2dhbA--;_ylg=X3oDMTBhYWM1a2sxBGxhbmcDZW4tVVM-;_ylv=3

Tuesday 21 May 2013

Featured News: Kenya police kill serial jihadi couple, infant "human shield" survives

A pair of star-crossed lovers, experienced in terrorism. The Kenyan police, shooting to kill. Grenades. Tear gas. And a baby used as a human shield. These were all involved in an overnight stand-off in Nairobi this weekend, serving as a reminder that al Shabaab is actively seeking to strike against Somalia's neighbours.

The couple were shot dead at their apartment on the outskirts of Nairobi, after a lengthy stand-off during which they threw grenades at the police. The man killed was a Kenyan citizen suspected of carrying out two grenade attacks in October 2011, as the first blows in what became a string of al Shabaab violent attacks against Kenya. Despite the deaths of the jihadi couple, the firing of tear gas into the apartment, and militants' use of their eight month-old baby as a human shield, the child survived.

Kenya has a significant Somali population, especially in its eastern areas and in the slums of Nairobi. Al Shabaab (al Qaeda's East African branch) has been able to draw upon these links in order to make good on its promise to take revenge against Kenya for sending troops to support the Somali Transitional Federal Government, al Shabaab's bitter foe. While Kenyan security forces have prevented this particular atrocity-in-the-making from going ahead, it will certainly not be the last attempt.

Read more:
http://news.yahoo.com/kenya-police-kill-terror-couple-122010655.html;_ylt=AmNFvBUsRb_hzK.uVf.KW7ISscB_;_ylu=X3oDMTB0Y2l1a2VtBG1pdAMEcG9zAzMzBHNlYwNsbl9BZnJpY2FfZ2Fs;_ylg=X3oDMTBhYWM1a2sxBGxhbmcDZW4tVVM-;_ylv=3

Monday 20 May 2013

Featured News: Egyptian security officers in Sinai kidnapped; army responds

In response to the kidnapping of seven Egyptian security officers travelling in north Sinai on Thursday, the Egyptian army has sent re-enforcements into the increasingly lawless peninsula, with a presidential spokesman pledging that "all options" were on the table to free the captives.

What this highlights is the headache that Sinai is becoming for everyone in the Levant who has a militant Islamist or jihadi enemies. Since the fall of Hosni Mubarak, the once tightly-controlled Sinai has deteriorated into bandit country, and violent jihadi groups have taken advantage of the security vacuum to set up their operations there. The post-Mubarak freer flow of traffic between Hamas-ruled Gaza and Egypt, as well as the Israeli treaty limitations on Egyptian troop numbers in the Sinai, has also increased the ability of these groups to work more freely on both the Egyptian and Israeli sides of the border. In addition to this most recent kidnapping, in the past months jihadis have launched other attacks on Egyptian military targets in the Sinai, and have even launched raids into Israel.

Egypt can ill afford jihadis taking advantage of the Sinai's lawlessness. Every time Egypt has to ask Israel's permission to move more troops into the region to counter the threat of militants, it raises tensions along the border (even if the goal is a shared one). The southern end of the Sinai peninsula is also one of Egypt's most popular destinations for foreign tourists (containing the famous Sharm -el Sheikh resort city), and there is a history of jihadis targeting this vital revenue source. In October 2004 thirty-four people were killed in a series of bombings that targeted tourist hotels in Taba and Nuweiba; in July 2005, eighty-eight people were killed in areas of Sharm el-Sheikh popular with foreigners; and in November 2012 a planned Mumbai-style attack with guns and rocket-propelled grenades on Sharm el-Sheikh was foiled by the Egyptian police. More jihadi attacks like these could do huge harm to Egypt's already-embattled tourist industry as well as costing a great many lives. Egypt has every reason to cast a wary eye at the Sinai.

Read more:
http://news.yahoo.com/gunmen-storm-egyptian-security-post-lawless-sinai-peninsula-054827539.html

Syria’s coming Jihadi Ascendancy? Part Three: the Jihadis and the Wider World


Summary: if jihadis come to dominate the armed opposition in Syria, it will only cause al-Assad’s foreign allies to increase their support for his regime, greater tacit support for the jihadis by the Gulf Arab states, and a West that is increasingly left out in the cold. This may force al-Assad, his allies, the West, and the non-jihadi rebels into an alliance of necessity to stem the jihadi tide. The only alternative, a direct Western intervention, would likely just make the conflict even bloodier.


The interested parties abroad
The ascension of jihadi groups to leadership in the interior military struggle, as described in the last two Sharaabtoon posts on Syria, would have considerable consequences for the increasing number of other countries and bodies are  invested in the outcome of the civil war. 

Al-Assad’s allies
Some responses seem predictable: Russia and Iran, both staunch allies of the al-Assad regime, would react with alarm and are likely to be driven to support the government to even greater degrees -and to grow ever more hostile to international diplomatic efforts to weaken al-Assad, or recognise the Syrian National Council (SNC). It will become easier for them to join Bashir al-Assad in decrying the Syrian opposition (whom they will likely continue to portray as a singular body) as "terrorists" seeking a "military solution", who need to stop fighting or be defeated so that a "political solution" can be effected. Any future attacks akin to the aforementioned targeting of a Russian passenger jet will make Russia's "terrorist" characterization of the Syrian rebels even more compelling. Already, Iran has extended the Syrian government a $1 billion line of credit, and Russia is believed to be selling a new sophisticated missile system to Syria, one that could even be used against a Western intervention force. Russia and Iran would only invest more if al-Assad seems to be in danger of losing control of Syria altogether.
Hezbollah, with Iran's blessing, would likely be even more robust in its response to a (Sunni) jihadi ascendancy. Hezbollah has no choice but to back al-Assad to the hilt: his regime has been (along with Iran) their most important sponsor and is an irreplaceable supply route for weapons. Al-Assad’s fall would leave Hezbollah isolated and lacking in the weapons and funds it needs to confront its domestic enemies inside Lebanon, and its existential foe in neighbouring Israel. Through the support it has given to the al-Assad regime already, Hezbollah has isolated itself from most of the region, changing its perception in the Arab world from a lionized leader of the “resistance” against Israel to a bloody-handed accomplice to al-Assad’s slaughter. Without al-Assad, Hezbollah would be almost without friends, and surrounded by bitter enemies. Therefore, it should not be dismissed as mere bluster that in April Hezbollah’s leader declared that his organization would not allow the al-Assad regime to fall, and that is possible that his “forces of resistance” might have to intervene.
Although it denies having taken an official side in the conflict, in recent weeks Hezbollah has acknowledged that several of its members, including a notable commander, have died while “performing their jihadi duties” in Syria. Significantly, on May 19th this year Hezbollah militants openly fought alongside Syrian government troops in an offensive to retake the town of Qusair (near the Lebanese border) from rebels. Hezbollah is also much more adept at the kind of sectarian and guerrilla-style conflict now characterizing the Syrian civil war than the Syrian government itself is. Hezbollah has announced that it is supporting the Shia fighters in Syria who are calling themselves “Popular Committees”, and who claim to be protecting Syria’s Shias against sectarian attacks. These are non-Alawite Shias, and many of them already hold Lebanese passports, making their appeals to self-defence an emotive one in Hezbollah’s base of Lebanon. 
The other main mission of Hezbollah in Syria (along with other foreign Shia fighters) is the defence of the Sayyida Zaynab shrine near Damascus, which contains the grave of Zaynab, a granddaughter of the Prophet Mohammed and wife of Caliph Ali. The shrine, its neighbourhood and visiting pilgrims have been the target of sectarian attacks since before the Syrian civil war, and Syria’s Sunni jihadis have already demonstrated a willingness to attack what they see as “Shia” shrines. If strategic interests weren’t enough, these religious links would be a strong enough draw to ensure that Hezbollah, the region’s leading Shia jihadi group, would be ever more drawn into a conflict if Syria’s Sunni jihadis seemed to be winning it.

The jihadis and their sponsors

Conversely, a jihadi ascendancy inside Syria would be welcomed by Hamas. The Syrian civil war has driven a wedge between Hamas and its former patron Iran, forcing the former to seek out new partners and sponsors in the region. Already, Hamas has been fostering its links with deep-pocketed Gulf Arab states, and is allegedly helping train Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters Damascus, focusing on aiding them in developing better rockets and making better use of tunnels in combat. The great hope of the jihadis, and the fear of the West, is that the Syrian jihadis may find themselves also receiving at least the tacit or indirect support of the rising regional player now likely acting the shadowy role of Hamas' new patron: Qatar. Qatar appears to be taking the place of Iran (which heavily supports the al-Assad regime) as Hamas’ patron; the Emir of Qatar notably visited Gaza in late 2012, and pledged $400 million to the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.
Qatar seems to be competing with Saudi Arabia for influence among Syrian rebel forces. Both are backing the entire rebel spectrum from mainstream Islamists in the FSA to violent jihadi groups with money and arms. However Qatar’s chosen militants seem to be enjoying the upper hand thus far. Qatar is the site of the only SNC “embassy” abroad –as well as Hamas’ only “embassy”. The candidate favoured by the Qatari government, Ghassan Hitto, has even been elected Prime Minister of the Syrian National Coalition. Qatar and Hamas share the same motivation for their involvement: to build up their own influence and connections with jihadis and Islamists alike in a post-al-Assad Syria –although Hamas may also specifically have Syria in mind as a future launching pad for attacks on Israel. Qatar is unlikely to be funding the al Nusra Front directly, its funding of Islamist groups that share its outlook and desire al Nusra’s support on the battle field means that Qatari money and arms will certainly bleed through to the most radical jihadis. Qatar’s specific favouring of Islamist and jihadi groups is actually producing resentment among other rebel groups which it deems insufficiently “Islamic” and therefore doesn’t fund. This resentment, however, is a sign of the strength that Qatar’s backing is bringing to the Islamist and jihadi rebels.
Saudi Arabia’s motives are similar to Qatar’s: it wants to break Iran’s “arc of influence” from Iran to Lebanon (Hezbollah), and to shore up its own influence in the Sunni world by being seen as defending Syrian Sunnis from the “Alawite” al-Assad regime. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has its own large supply of unemployed and restless young radicals, which the Saudi regime believes are less likely to become a source of trouble at home if they can be sent to fight (and die) in Syria’s “jihad”. This has been Saudi Arabia’s approach to past conflicts such as Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan. There have even been reports that the Saudi government is equipping and transporting Yemeni jihadis to Syria, however this may be a sign of weakness as much as strength. The fact that Saudi Arabia is going to such lengths to bring in fighters loyal to itself may be an indication that it is struggling to find allies amongst Syria’s indigenous jihadis.
For their part, the al-Nusra front seems to be ever more dominated by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of the Islamic State of Iraq (formerly “al Qaeda in Iraq”) who has moved into northern Syria and is now directing much of al-Nusra’s struggle. His leadership will only make al-Nusra progressively more radical, violent and focused on sectarian killings.

The wallflower West
The Western powers (including Israel) would likely be put in the most difficult position by a jihadi takeover of the interior military struggle. Each of these nations would find itself having to choose between doubling down its support of the political leaders in exile (who would seem increasingly unable to affect the situation on the ground in Syria), or seeking a new means to end the conflict in the West's (and their own) favour, which most essentially means excluding violent jihadis from power. However, the rebels controlling northern Syria have already splintered into hundreds of separate armed groups, and in the face of growing jihadi power would all have a much greater incentive to make a deal with the jihadis and their allies than they would with the West.
Israel would face the most troubling situation right on its doorstep: Hezbollah empowered by its alliance with al-Assad, and the rest of Syria now a safe haven for jihadis. Israel might even find itself nostalgic for the days of its old, but predictable, enemy Bashir al-Assad.

The ‘odd couple’
The West’s need to banish the jihadis from a post-war Syria may cause the most unlikely-seeming alliance to come about: an accord between the Western democracies (including Israel), Russia, the non-jihadi Syrian opposition (especially its political exterior), and the al-Assad regime. This deal would allow them all to lessen or cease attacks on each other in order to focus on the military defeat of the jihadi groups, in exchange for a "political solution" to the conflict whereby exiled opposition politicians receive a share of power and Bashir al-Assad (likely) remains President. Iran and Hezbollah would likely be silent, if not official, partners in such an accord. Such an arrangement will become ever more likely the more the jihadi groups gain in military strength for two reasons: jihadi clashes with the non-jihadi Syrian opposition fighters would weaken the latter more and more, and the latter are the wing of the opposition most likely to oppose a "political solution" (which would almost certainly favour the political exiles over the military leaders). 
Secondly, if the jihadis emerge as the pre-eminent threat to the al-Assad regime on the battlefield, it increases the perception that a "military solution" (toppling al-Assad) would really mean a jihadi solution, thus encouraging the non-jihadi opposition to turn increasingly away from military means. It would be impossible to exclude the al-Assad regime from such an accord, if not Bashir himself, as such a jihadi ascendancy would leave the government as the only non-jihadi party still possessing true military power in the interior. There is some limited evidence that suggests an accord between the non-jihadi rebels and the al-Assad regime is possible. Smokescreen it may be, but the government has set up a “ministry of reconciliation” led by Ali Haidar, who himself has lost a son in the civil war. The prospect of peace talks reared its head in February, when SNC offers to meet with regime officials in Rome and to visit Moscow were both made and subsequently rescinded. There has been no real progress so far, but the pressure to reach a settlement increases every day as the jihadi rebels grow stronger.
However, even if such an "odd couple" alliance occurred and succeeded in both implementing the political integration of much of the opposition and driving back the jihadis on the conventional battlefield, it would by no means mean the end of jihadi violence in Syria. Still flush with their links to the Islamic State of Iraq, the Syrian jihadi groups would almost certainly follow the path the former has laid out in Iraq: revert to large-scale, often sectarian bombings against civilian and government targets. This would serve their twin aims of destabilizing the new regime and harming the internal populations they see as their enemies.
By this point, these jihadi groups in Syria would likely have outlived their usefulness to Qatar and the other Gulf Arab states (no longer having any real chance of toppling al-Assad from power), and so their supplies of money and weapons from these sources would likely dry up. However this would be unlikely to prevent the jihadis from continuing their fight, as they would now be involved in a far less monetarily costly "war" (terrorist bombings being less expensive than fielding fighting units and controlling territory) which could sustain itself in much the same the fashion as its counterparts in Iraq: kidnapping for ransom, "protection money", and other profit-making crimes. The Syrian jihadis would also retain their network of non-state friends abroad, especially Hamas, who would continue to enjoy deep pockets if it retained its Qatari backers (which seems probable, the Qataris being unlikely to want to jettison its other new agent of influence if they abandon Syria's jihadis). Horrific jihadi bombings and violence would remain a sad fact of life in Syria for years to come.

Intervention -the Alternative?
Growing consensus that the al-Assad regime has already used chemical weapons against insurgents has increased the chances that Western democracies, possibly in concert with Israel, will begin intervening more directly against the government in the civil war, as the use of such weapons was set out as the "redline" for intervention by President Obama. It is possible that if Western nations commenced lethal support, especially in the form of heavy and high-tech weaponry, for the non-jihadi opposition, that they would be able to reverse the rising jihadi tide on the battlefield and also topple the Assad regime. Direct Western military intervention (however unlikely) would certainly achieve the same aim, and indeed do so more directly. However, at best these paths would still result in the same post-war jihadi terrorism that is described above and still seen in Iraq years after the end of true military conflict there, and run the significant risk of adding to this bloody mix pro-al-Assad/anti-opposition insurgencies and terrorism. 
The most likely source of such violence in an a post-war Syria ruled by a pro-Western opposition would be the on-going alliance of Iran and Hezbollah with the Shia (and possibly other religious) minorities in Syria. There have already been indications that the al-Assad regime has been attempting to cement its control of the Alawite-majority coast region of Syria. The logic is that, should Damascus fall, al-Assad and his forces can withdraw to this rump state, retaining access to the sea and to their ally Hezbollah in Lebanon. This balkanization of Syria would likely mean the continuation and escalation of the kind of military involvement Hezbollah has already engaged in in Syria. After Israeli airstrikes on Syrian government sites earlier in May, al-Assad promised to provide “game-changing” weapons to Hezbollah, which has historically been in the market for exactly the kind of long-range missiles that the Syrian government possesses. Hezbollah desires these weapons so they can be used (or threatened) against Israel, and the al-Assad regime would need a safe place to base these missile systems if it lost control of most of Syria –thus a pact between them would serve both their interests. 
The rump al-Assad regime would likely continue to draw support from other non-Alawite minorities in Syria, such as the Christian population, which also has many reasons to fear a Syria where jihadis enjoy significant power. Hezbollah itself already has Christian allies in Lebanon –such an alliance in Syria also is not unlikely. Iran and Russia also have every incentive to keep any new regime which Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the jihadis hold sway over as weak as possible, and so would likely keep backing the al-Assad/Hezbollah alliance in fighting the new government. The kind of war this alliance would be fighting would likely be just as sectarian and brutal as that being waged by the Sunni jihadis. Already, pro-regime forces have begun massacring civilians in Sunni villages in the coastal region in order to consolidate their control and ‘demographic advantage’ there. These atrocities would only escalate if bitter and vengeful al-Assad/Shia forces were forced to withdraw to this area, and could even be expanded to include terrorist-style bombings in the (Sunni-majority) rest of Syria. Notably, in May the al-Assad regime is already suspected of using its own terrorist or jihadi proxies to carry out a sophisticated bombing in a Turkish border town which has become a haven for Syrian refugees.
There is also little reason to suspect that a Western intervention which ousts al-Assad would dampen the appeal of Sunni jihadi organisations to ordinary Syrians. In addition to how unpopular any intervention which put Western troops into Syria would be (and thus how much more popular the jihadis fighting the “invaders” would become), the civil war has already taken on enough of a sectarian edge to be self-sustaining. This would be especially true in the face of the aforementioned on-going war by Shia armed groups. It is notable that even the non-sectarian Sunni rebel groups are not “secular.” It has been widely observed that there have been no truly secular rebel forces or staff in the rebel courts for some time. This is yet another difference between the rebels of the interior and the political opposition in exile, which includes true secularists. 
This perceived religious edge to the conflict will keep the jihadis’ sectarian message appealing even after al-Assad falls. This will be coupled with the desire for revenge against the communities perceived as having supported al-Assad, and the growing acceptance among the rebels of brutal acts as “just part of war.” The head of the Syrian National Colaition has notably argued that rebel atrocities cannot be compared with those of the government as “we cannot employ Platonic idealism to judge those who risk their lives against a barbaric campaign." If the jihadis become the only outlet for such revenge, their numbers will continue to grow even after a Western intervention.
Thus a Syria where both al-Assad's regime and the jihadis are excluded from power would likely face ongoing terrorist-style violence from these two opponents simultaneously for the foreseeable future. Such a war on two fronts would weaken the regime, and would likely leave the Syrian jihadis in a much stronger position than even their allies in Iraq are currently, and stronger than they themselves would likely be if the regime and opposition allied together against them. The level of sectarian violence could be even greater than that which was seen at the height of Iraq’s civil war: the most powerful groups on both the Sunni and Shia sides would be radicalized, and each in engaging in their own bloody sectarian “jihad”.
As matters stand, the black flag of jihad is rising like a tide in Syria. Sooner or later, rolling it back will become the most pressing concern for all others involved.