Summary: if jihadis come to dominate the armed opposition in Syria, it will only cause al-Assad’s foreign allies to increase their support for his regime, greater tacit support for the jihadis by the Gulf Arab states, and a West that is increasingly left out in the cold. This may force al-Assad, his allies, the West, and the non-jihadi rebels into an alliance of necessity to stem the jihadi tide. The only alternative, a direct Western intervention, would likely just make the conflict even bloodier.
The interested parties abroad
The ascension of jihadi groups to leadership in the interior military struggle, as described in the last two Sharaabtoon posts on Syria, would have considerable consequences for the increasing number of other countries and bodies are invested in the outcome of the civil war.
Al-Assad’s allies
Some responses seem predictable: Russia and Iran, both staunch allies of the al-Assad regime, would react with alarm and are likely to be driven to support the government to even greater degrees -and to grow ever more hostile to international diplomatic efforts to weaken al-Assad, or recognise the Syrian National Council (SNC). It will become easier for them to join Bashir al-Assad in decrying the Syrian opposition (whom they will likely continue to portray as a singular body) as "terrorists" seeking a "military solution", who need to stop fighting or be defeated so that a "political solution" can be effected. Any future attacks akin to the aforementioned targeting of a Russian passenger jet will make Russia's "terrorist" characterization of the Syrian rebels even more compelling. Already, Iran has extended the Syrian government a $1 billion line of credit, and Russia is believed to be selling a new sophisticated missile system to Syria, one that could even be used against a Western intervention force. Russia and Iran would only invest more if al-Assad seems to be in danger of losing control of Syria altogether.
Hezbollah, with Iran's blessing, would likely be even more robust in its response to a (Sunni) jihadi ascendancy. Hezbollah has no choice but to back al-Assad to the hilt: his regime has been (along with Iran) their most important sponsor and is an irreplaceable supply route for weapons. Al-Assad’s fall would leave Hezbollah isolated and lacking in the weapons and funds it needs to confront its domestic enemies inside Lebanon, and its existential foe in neighbouring Israel. Through the support it has given to the al-Assad regime already, Hezbollah has isolated itself from most of the region, changing its perception in the Arab world from a lionized leader of the “resistance” against Israel to a bloody-handed accomplice to al-Assad’s slaughter. Without al-Assad, Hezbollah would be almost without friends, and surrounded by bitter enemies. Therefore, it should not be dismissed as mere bluster that in April Hezbollah’s leader declared that his organization would not allow the al-Assad regime to fall, and that is possible that his “forces of resistance” might have to intervene.
Although it denies having taken an official side in the conflict, in recent weeks Hezbollah has acknowledged that several of its members, including a notable commander, have died while “performing their jihadi duties” in Syria. Significantly, on May 19th this year Hezbollah militants openly fought alongside Syrian government troops in an offensive to retake the town of Qusair (near the Lebanese border) from rebels. Hezbollah is also much more adept at the kind of sectarian and guerrilla-style conflict now characterizing the Syrian civil war than the Syrian government itself is. Hezbollah has announced that it is supporting the Shia fighters in Syria who are calling themselves “Popular Committees”, and who claim to be protecting Syria’s Shias against sectarian attacks. These are non-Alawite Shias, and many of them already hold Lebanese passports, making their appeals to self-defence an emotive one in Hezbollah’s base of Lebanon.
The other main mission of Hezbollah in Syria (along with other foreign Shia fighters) is the defence of the Sayyida Zaynab shrine near Damascus, which contains the grave of Zaynab, a granddaughter of the Prophet Mohammed and wife of Caliph Ali. The shrine, its neighbourhood and visiting pilgrims have been the target of sectarian attacks since before the Syrian civil war, and Syria’s Sunni jihadis have already demonstrated a willingness to attack what they see as “Shia” shrines. If strategic interests weren’t enough, these religious links would be a strong enough draw to ensure that Hezbollah, the region’s leading Shia jihadi group, would be ever more drawn into a conflict if Syria’s Sunni jihadis seemed to be winning it.
The jihadis and their sponsors
Conversely, a jihadi ascendancy inside Syria would be welcomed by Hamas. The Syrian civil war has driven a wedge between Hamas and its former patron Iran, forcing the former to seek out new partners and sponsors in the region. Already, Hamas has been fostering its links with deep-pocketed Gulf Arab states, and is allegedly helping train Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters Damascus, focusing on aiding them in developing better rockets and making better use of tunnels in combat. The great hope of the jihadis, and the fear of the West, is that the Syrian jihadis may find themselves also receiving at least the tacit or indirect support of the rising regional player now likely acting the shadowy role of Hamas' new patron: Qatar. Qatar appears to be taking the place of Iran (which heavily supports the al-Assad regime) as Hamas’ patron; the Emir of Qatar notably visited Gaza in late 2012, and pledged $400 million to the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.
Qatar seems to be competing with Saudi Arabia for influence among Syrian rebel forces. Both are backing the entire rebel spectrum from mainstream Islamists in the FSA to violent jihadi groups with money and arms. However Qatar’s chosen militants seem to be enjoying the upper hand thus far. Qatar is the site of the only SNC “embassy” abroad –as well as Hamas’ only “embassy”. The candidate favoured by the Qatari government, Ghassan Hitto, has even been elected Prime Minister of the Syrian National Coalition. Qatar and Hamas share the same motivation for their involvement: to build up their own influence and connections with jihadis and Islamists alike in a post-al-Assad Syria –although Hamas may also specifically have Syria in mind as a future launching pad for attacks on Israel. Qatar is unlikely to be funding the al Nusra Front directly, its funding of Islamist groups that share its outlook and desire al Nusra’s support on the battle field means that Qatari money and arms will certainly bleed through to the most radical jihadis. Qatar’s specific favouring of Islamist and jihadi groups is actually producing resentment among other rebel groups which it deems insufficiently “Islamic” and therefore doesn’t fund. This resentment, however, is a sign of the strength that Qatar’s backing is bringing to the Islamist and jihadi rebels.
Saudi Arabia’s motives are similar to Qatar’s: it wants to break Iran’s “arc of influence” from Iran to Lebanon (Hezbollah), and to shore up its own influence in the Sunni world by being seen as defending Syrian Sunnis from the “Alawite” al-Assad regime. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has its own large supply of unemployed and restless young radicals, which the Saudi regime believes are less likely to become a source of trouble at home if they can be sent to fight (and die) in Syria’s “jihad”. This has been Saudi Arabia’s approach to past conflicts such as Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan. There have even been reports that the Saudi government is equipping and transporting Yemeni jihadis to Syria, however this may be a sign of weakness as much as strength. The fact that Saudi Arabia is going to such lengths to bring in fighters loyal to itself may be an indication that it is struggling to find allies amongst Syria’s indigenous jihadis.
For their part, the al-Nusra front seems to be ever more dominated by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of the Islamic State of Iraq (formerly “al Qaeda in Iraq”) who has moved into northern Syria and is now directing much of al-Nusra’s struggle. His leadership will only make al-Nusra progressively more radical, violent and focused on sectarian killings.
The wallflower West
The Western powers (including Israel) would likely be put in the most difficult position by a jihadi takeover of the interior military struggle. Each of these nations would find itself having to choose between doubling down its support of the political leaders in exile (who would seem increasingly unable to affect the situation on the ground in Syria), or seeking a new means to end the conflict in the West's (and their own) favour, which most essentially means excluding violent jihadis from power. However, the rebels controlling northern Syria have already splintered into hundreds of separate armed groups, and in the face of growing jihadi power would all have a much greater incentive to make a deal with the jihadis and their allies than they would with the West.
Israel would face the most troubling situation right on its doorstep: Hezbollah empowered by its alliance with al-Assad, and the rest of Syria now a safe haven for jihadis. Israel might even find itself nostalgic for the days of its old, but predictable, enemy Bashir al-Assad.
The ‘odd couple’
The West’s need to banish the jihadis from a post-war Syria may cause the most unlikely-seeming alliance to come about: an accord between the Western democracies (including Israel), Russia, the non-jihadi Syrian opposition (especially its political exterior), and the al-Assad regime. This deal would allow them all to lessen or cease attacks on each other in order to focus on the military defeat of the jihadi groups, in exchange for a "political solution" to the conflict whereby exiled opposition politicians receive a share of power and Bashir al-Assad (likely) remains President. Iran and Hezbollah would likely be silent, if not official, partners in such an accord. Such an arrangement will become ever more likely the more the jihadi groups gain in military strength for two reasons: jihadi clashes with the non-jihadi Syrian opposition fighters would weaken the latter more and more, and the latter are the wing of the opposition most likely to oppose a "political solution" (which would almost certainly favour the political exiles over the military leaders).
Secondly, if the jihadis emerge as the pre-eminent threat to the al-Assad regime on the battlefield, it increases the perception that a "military solution" (toppling al-Assad) would really mean a jihadi solution, thus encouraging the non-jihadi opposition to turn increasingly away from military means. It would be impossible to exclude the al-Assad regime from such an accord, if not Bashir himself, as such a jihadi ascendancy would leave the government as the only non-jihadi party still possessing true military power in the interior. There is some limited evidence that suggests an accord between the non-jihadi rebels and the al-Assad regime is possible. Smokescreen it may be, but the government has set up a “ministry of reconciliation” led by Ali Haidar, who himself has lost a son in the civil war. The prospect of peace talks reared its head in February, when SNC offers to meet with regime officials in Rome and to visit Moscow were both made and subsequently rescinded. There has been no real progress so far, but the pressure to reach a settlement increases every day as the jihadi rebels grow stronger.
However, even if such an "odd couple" alliance occurred and succeeded in both implementing the political integration of much of the opposition and driving back the jihadis on the conventional battlefield, it would by no means mean the end of jihadi violence in Syria. Still flush with their links to the Islamic State of Iraq, the Syrian jihadi groups would almost certainly follow the path the former has laid out in Iraq: revert to large-scale, often sectarian bombings against civilian and government targets. This would serve their twin aims of destabilizing the new regime and harming the internal populations they see as their enemies.
By this point, these jihadi groups in Syria would likely have outlived their usefulness to Qatar and the other Gulf Arab states (no longer having any real chance of toppling al-Assad from power), and so their supplies of money and weapons from these sources would likely dry up. However this would be unlikely to prevent the jihadis from continuing their fight, as they would now be involved in a far less monetarily costly "war" (terrorist bombings being less expensive than fielding fighting units and controlling territory) which could sustain itself in much the same the fashion as its counterparts in Iraq: kidnapping for ransom, "protection money", and other profit-making crimes. The Syrian jihadis would also retain their network of non-state friends abroad, especially Hamas, who would continue to enjoy deep pockets if it retained its Qatari backers (which seems probable, the Qataris being unlikely to want to jettison its other new agent of influence if they abandon Syria's jihadis). Horrific jihadi bombings and violence would remain a sad fact of life in Syria for years to come.
Intervention -the Alternative?
Growing consensus that the al-Assad regime has already used chemical weapons against insurgents has increased the chances that Western democracies, possibly in concert with Israel, will begin intervening more directly against the government in the civil war, as the use of such weapons was set out as the "redline" for intervention by President Obama. It is possible that if Western nations commenced lethal support, especially in the form of heavy and high-tech weaponry, for the non-jihadi opposition, that they would be able to reverse the rising jihadi tide on the battlefield and also topple the Assad regime. Direct Western military intervention (however unlikely) would certainly achieve the same aim, and indeed do so more directly. However, at best these paths would still result in the same post-war jihadi terrorism that is described above and still seen in Iraq years after the end of true military conflict there, and run the significant risk of adding to this bloody mix pro-al-Assad/anti-opposition insurgencies and terrorism.
The most likely source of such violence in an a post-war Syria ruled by a pro-Western opposition would be the on-going alliance of Iran and Hezbollah with the Shia (and possibly other religious) minorities in Syria. There have already been indications that the al-Assad regime has been attempting to cement its control of the Alawite-majority coast region of Syria. The logic is that, should Damascus fall, al-Assad and his forces can withdraw to this rump state, retaining access to the sea and to their ally Hezbollah in Lebanon. This balkanization of Syria would likely mean the continuation and escalation of the kind of military involvement Hezbollah has already engaged in in Syria. After Israeli airstrikes on Syrian government sites earlier in May, al-Assad promised to provide “game-changing” weapons to Hezbollah, which has historically been in the market for exactly the kind of long-range missiles that the Syrian government possesses. Hezbollah desires these weapons so they can be used (or threatened) against Israel, and the al-Assad regime would need a safe place to base these missile systems if it lost control of most of Syria –thus a pact between them would serve both their interests.
The rump al-Assad regime would likely continue to draw support from other non-Alawite minorities in Syria, such as the Christian population, which also has many reasons to fear a Syria where jihadis enjoy significant power. Hezbollah itself already has Christian allies in Lebanon –such an alliance in Syria also is not unlikely. Iran and Russia also have every incentive to keep any new regime which Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the jihadis hold sway over as weak as possible, and so would likely keep backing the al-Assad/Hezbollah alliance in fighting the new government. The kind of war this alliance would be fighting would likely be just as sectarian and brutal as that being waged by the Sunni jihadis. Already, pro-regime forces have begun massacring civilians in Sunni villages in the coastal region in order to consolidate their control and ‘demographic advantage’ there. These atrocities would only escalate if bitter and vengeful al-Assad/Shia forces were forced to withdraw to this area, and could even be expanded to include terrorist-style bombings in the (Sunni-majority) rest of Syria. Notably, in May the al-Assad regime is already suspected of using its own terrorist or jihadi proxies to carry out a sophisticated bombing in a Turkish border town which has become a haven for Syrian refugees.
There is also little reason to suspect that a Western intervention which ousts al-Assad would dampen the appeal of Sunni jihadi organisations to ordinary Syrians. In addition to how unpopular any intervention which put Western troops into Syria would be (and thus how much more popular the jihadis fighting the “invaders” would become), the civil war has already taken on enough of a sectarian edge to be self-sustaining. This would be especially true in the face of the aforementioned on-going war by Shia armed groups. It is notable that even the non-sectarian Sunni rebel groups are not “secular.” It has been widely observed that there have been no truly secular rebel forces or staff in the rebel courts for some time. This is yet another difference between the rebels of the interior and the political opposition in exile, which includes true secularists.
This perceived religious edge to the conflict will keep the jihadis’ sectarian message appealing even after al-Assad falls. This will be coupled with the desire for revenge against the communities perceived as having supported al-Assad, and the growing acceptance among the rebels of brutal acts as “just part of war.” The head of the Syrian National Colaition has notably argued that rebel atrocities cannot be compared with those of the government as “we cannot employ Platonic idealism to judge those who risk their lives against a barbaric campaign." If the jihadis become the only outlet for such revenge, their numbers will continue to grow even after a Western intervention.
Thus a Syria where both al-Assad's regime and the jihadis are excluded from power would likely face ongoing terrorist-style violence from these two opponents simultaneously for the foreseeable future. Such a war on two fronts would weaken the regime, and would likely leave the Syrian jihadis in a much stronger position than even their allies in Iraq are currently, and stronger than they themselves would likely be if the regime and opposition allied together against them. The level of sectarian violence could be even greater than that which was seen at the height of Iraq’s civil war: the most powerful groups on both the Sunni and Shia sides would be radicalized, and each in engaging in their own bloody sectarian “jihad”.
As matters stand, the black flag of jihad is rising like a tide in Syria. Sooner or later, rolling it back will become the most pressing concern for all others involved.
