Sponsoring jihadis in a foreign conflict may or may not help the sponsor government's chosen side win the war, but historically there has always been one certainty: blowback. Jihadis have never failed to eventually turn on their sponsors, if they get the chance.
Qatar isn't funding jihadis in Somalia (to anyone's knowledge) -but they are likely funding militants linked to al Qaeda either directly or indirectly in Syria.
The fact that al Qaeda-linked militants bombed a military convoy carrying a Qatari delegation in Mogadishu this morning should give the Qataris pause about their strategy in Syria.
There aren't enough bars jihadis would go to. Nowhere you could go, sit with a drink, and eavesdrop on the messy, convoluted and contradictory mess that is violent jihadism around the world. So instead we have the imaginary Sharaaabtoon, a place where various self-proclaimed mujahadeen will be brought forth to be seen and overheard, just as if they were the clientele of a bar. Remember: no shahada, no service. Twitter: @Sharaabtoon
Sunday, 5 May 2013
Syria’s coming Jihadi Ascendancy? Part One: The Government, the Opposition, and the Jihadis
Summary:
jihadis linked to al-Qaeda already
account for at least a quarter of all Syrian rebel fighters, and they are on a
collision course with the non-jihadi opposition,
especially its political leaders in exile.
So far, the only groups that are winning in Syria’s civil war are the violent jihadis.
Jihadi fighters in Syria have punched above their weight in military terms since the early days of the civil war -however, they may come to play an even more significant role in determining the political outcome of the conflict. Their ever-growing power on the internal military front of the war against the al-Assad regime is setting the Syrian opposition up for a struggle between its internal military wing(s), and its external political wing, the Syrian National Council (SNC). Most worryingly, this struggle could follow the path of the similar internal-external clash in newly-independent Algeria, which ended with the ascendancy of those who fought in the trenches, not the politicians who built international alliances in exile.
The Choice
Until early April this year, the Syrian opposition's political leaders abroad faced a choice: should they attempt to integrate the jihadi fighting brigades inside Syria into their political structure and give them a role in a post al-Assad government, or should they do their best to exclude and isolate them? What made this choice difficult was that the most prominent jihadi group was also the most aggressive and successful arm of the rebel forces: the al-Nusra Front (جبهة النصرة لأهل الشام). A salafi group, many of al-Nusra’s members previously fought against under the banner of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) against US forces. The al-Nusra Front formed in Syria between late 2011 and early 2012, when it was joined by several leading militants from Palestinian and Lebanese-Palestinian jihadi groups. It now likely accounts for up to a quarter of all opposition fighters inside Syria, and its popularity continues to grow as it both wins victories and provides services to the civilian population.
The al-Nusra Front has
carried out a string of highly successful bombings (including suicide bombings)
against Syrian government and security forces targets, and has been at the
forefront of the “Battle of Aleppo” alongside the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and
other Islamist and jihadi forces
attempting to capture the city. Other rebels in Aleppo have described
al-Nusra’s fighters as “like special forces”. Its arms and training are widely
considered to be the best amongst the opposition. While the exact origin of its
funding is unclear, it appears to be flush with weapons and money. Generous
Gulf Arab (especially Qatari) aid to Islamist (especially salafi) opposition
fighters is seen as the likely source. This further compounds al-Nusra’s
ability to recruit, as its sponsors furnish it with weapons, whereas rebels
backed by the West receive only “non-lethal” supplies.
Conversely, however, the al-Nusra Front was viewed with deep suspicion by the SNC’s Western allies, due to its history of atrocities (including bombing attacks against civilian targets, the mass execution of captured government soldiers, and the murder of a pro-government Syrian journalist) and its suspected links to international jihadi terrorist organisations. The political exterior faced the choice of marginalizing its own importance in the interior by severing its links with the actual rising power in the warzone, or of trying to build relations with them at the cost of their alliances with Western democracies.
Al-Nusra's Bad Company
This choice was removed earlier this month, when the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq (دولة العراق الإسلامية) -an umbrella organisation of violent jihadi groups largely created out of the former al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) –announced that it was merging with the al-Nusra Front to form a new organisation: the "Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham." Although Abu Golani, the leader of al-Nusra, announced the next day that their relationship constituted an alliance, not a merger, the crucial aspect was established: Syria’s pre-eminent fighting group was being supported with funds and recruits by al Qaeda.
For the SNC, or the FSA, to link itself in any formal way with what was now essentially a branch of al Qaeda would be to destroy its international legitimacy and bring ostracism on itself from Washington to Ankara. For its part, a merger or alliance with al Qaeda shows that the al-Nusra Front is entirely unconcerned with building the kind of international alliances that the SNC desires. These two wings of the Syrian opposition have thus chosen two irreconcilable paths. Indeed, in future we will become less likely to speak of the "Syrian opposition" as a singular entity, and more and more come to speak of a divide between jihadi and non-jihadi opposition groups in Syria, if not a greater plurality of competing groups altogether.
Conversely, however, the al-Nusra Front was viewed with deep suspicion by the SNC’s Western allies, due to its history of atrocities (including bombing attacks against civilian targets, the mass execution of captured government soldiers, and the murder of a pro-government Syrian journalist) and its suspected links to international jihadi terrorist organisations. The political exterior faced the choice of marginalizing its own importance in the interior by severing its links with the actual rising power in the warzone, or of trying to build relations with them at the cost of their alliances with Western democracies.
Al-Nusra's Bad Company
This choice was removed earlier this month, when the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq (دولة العراق الإسلامية) -an umbrella organisation of violent jihadi groups largely created out of the former al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) –announced that it was merging with the al-Nusra Front to form a new organisation: the "Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham." Although Abu Golani, the leader of al-Nusra, announced the next day that their relationship constituted an alliance, not a merger, the crucial aspect was established: Syria’s pre-eminent fighting group was being supported with funds and recruits by al Qaeda.
For the SNC, or the FSA, to link itself in any formal way with what was now essentially a branch of al Qaeda would be to destroy its international legitimacy and bring ostracism on itself from Washington to Ankara. For its part, a merger or alliance with al Qaeda shows that the al-Nusra Front is entirely unconcerned with building the kind of international alliances that the SNC desires. These two wings of the Syrian opposition have thus chosen two irreconcilable paths. Indeed, in future we will become less likely to speak of the "Syrian opposition" as a singular entity, and more and more come to speak of a divide between jihadi and non-jihadi opposition groups in Syria, if not a greater plurality of competing groups altogether.
The Ties that Bind
A vicious anti-Shia outlook is a uniting factor for these and many smaller jihadi groups. In an al-Nusra video posted online, a crowd of bearded men stand behind a little boy who, while slitting the air with a knife, sings “Just wait Alawites. We will come to slaughter you." The Alawites are a Shia offshoot which counts around ten per cent of the population (including President Bashar al-Assad himself) among its members, and from which al-Assad draws many prominent officials in his regime and most members of the of pro-government shabiha (الشبيحة) militias (another fifteen per cent of Syria’s population are Christians, other Shias and Druze, and the rest are Sunnis).
In Ahrar al-Sham’s first broadcast, they described the al-Assad regime as part of a “Safavi” (Iranian) plot to spread Shia Islam and establish a Shia state extending from Iran to Lebanon and Palestine. In December of 2012 there appear to have been instances of Shia mosques being burned by rebel forces. In May this year Islamist fighters associated with the FSA posted pictures online of their “exhumation” and secret reburial of a companion of the Prophet Mohammed entombed in the town of Adra, because this “Shiite shrine” had “become a centre of polytheism”. The accusation of “polytheism” against Shias is a staple of (Sunni) jihadis. Jihadi terrorism against Shia targets in Syria predates the current civil war; in September 2008, a Damascus car bombing killed seventeen near a prominent Shia shrine. Another explosion in the same neighbourhood in December 2009 may also have been a bombing. This kind of sectarianism gives the more hard-line Islamists and jihadis a unifying cause, and puts these groups (even those within the FSA) at odds with non-sectarian and secular members of the opposition.
However jihadi sectarian violence has not just been directed against Shias; following a pattern seen in many other conflicts involving salafi jihadis, other Sunni Muslims of the “wrong” school or persuasion, and other religious minorities, have been targeted. Most notably, the leading (though not uncritical) pro-regime Sunni cleric and over forty other worshippers were killed in March when a prominent Sunni mosque in Damascus was targeted by a suicide bomber during a sermon. In February, following animosity between the United Courts Council (which is linked to the SNC) and sharia courts backed by al-Nusra, fighters belonging to the latter stormed a United Courts Council courthouse in Aleppo, where they assaulted and kidnapped scholars and judges.
Attacks against Christians by anti-government protesters began in mid-2011, and in Homs especially even Islamist fighters associated with the FSA have been implicated in the ethnic cleansing of Christians. Chechen fighters suspected of being linked with the al-Nusra Front (and likely also the Brigade of Emigrants in Greater Syria) are believed to have kidnapped two Syrian bishops in late April. Kidnapping, either for ransom or execution, is a well-established jihadi tactic. Shared sympathy for all these kinds of sectarian actions, as well as established co-operation on the battlefield, will make it difficult for the SNC or FSA to distance themselves from al-Nusra without alienating other jihadi groups and even more ‘moderate’ Islamist fighters within their own ranks. Such alienation would only foster an ever-closer jihadi alliance.
International Terrorism
Pressure from Western democracies to sever links with, and possibly even combat, such jihadi groups is likely to grow with time. This will be due to both horror at such attacks on civilians, and the possibility of Syrian jihadis (or foreigners trained by them) being linked to future terrorist attacks against Western targets. An indicative event occurred on April 29th this year, when two ground-to-air missiles were launched at a Russian passenger jet carrying around 160 travellers over Syria (en route from Egypt to Russia), which only survived destruction due to emergency manoeuvres. Although the identity of the attackers remains unconfirmed, barring a spectacularly risky "false flag" attack by the al-Assad regime (which would risk alienating its most powerful ally), it would seem that those responsible were certainly Syrian opposition fighters, and specifically jihadis judging by the fact that the target was both foreign and unquestionably civilian.
If similar attacks continue, and succeed, when it comes to Syria the designation of "terrorist" may well become synonymous with "rebel" in the minds of Europeans and Americans. Whether the bombings occur in Damascus, London, or over the skies of the Middle East, the SNC and FSA may find Western democracies demanding that jihadis be excluded from their areas of control in order for equipment and funds to continue flowing.
From now on, when speaking of the Syrian civil war, it will increasingly make sense to refer to three mutually opposed sides: the al-Assad regime, the Western-backed opposition, and the jihadis.
In
Part Two: the lessons France’s war in Algeria holds for the future of Syria’s jihadis.
Thursday, 5 April 2012
Sunni-Shia Violence: Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq -and Syria?
Conflict between Sunnis and Shias is probably one of the bloodiest and longest-enduring forms of violent jihadism, as well as being amongst the least covered or understood forms in the West. In recent years this has predominantly taken the form of attacks against Shia populations by hardline Sunni jihadis, although instances of Shia attacks on Sunnis do occur from time to time. This imbalance in the violence between the communities can most likely be attributed to the massive numerical advantage Sunnis enjoy in most Islamic countries, the much wider embrace of violent jihadism in general by Sunni sects when compared to Shia ones, which has meant that in Shia-majority nations (primarily Iraq and Iran) the majority sect tends to enshrine its power through social and political discrimination rather than open violence. Anti-Shia jihadi violence remains prolific in some regions, and may well be about to expand into Syria.
The general character of Sunni-Shia violence will be observed through a discussion of recent instances in Pakistan, Yemen, and Iraq, and the potential for similar sectarian bloodshed in Syria (incorporating Lebanon) will then be discussed. This isn't an exhaustive account of Sunni-Shia violence across the world, but it should hopefully provide some context and insight into such conflicts.
Pakistan
Sectarian killings of Shias in Pakistan often follow a tragically regular pattern: a bus (usually travelling in the north of the country) is stopped by gunmen, the Shias are ordered off the bus, they are shot at the roadside, and a Sunni jihadi organisation (usually the Pakistani Taliban, تحریک طالبان پاکستان) claims responsibility through its website. Strange as it may sound to unfamiliar observes, within the minds of the perpetrators such killings of Shias falls as much under the banner of jihad as the killing of unbelievers does. After one such bus massacre in late February this year, a commander of the Jundulluh (جند اللہ) faction of the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack with these words: "They were Shiite infidels and our mujahedeen shot them dead one by one after bringing them down from a bus".
This conception of Shias as "infidels" (كفّار) is at the root of most anti-Shia violence, and springs usually from an accusation that Shias have "deviated" from "true Islam" by their reverence for Mohammed's son-in-law Ali (as Mohammed's supposed true successor) and other members of his family, as well as differences in practices such as prayer. Thus the aforementioned justification by the Pakistani Taliban for murdering Shia civilians would be familiar to Sunni jihadis across the Islamic world, to whom attacks on Shias are as much the business of the mujahadin ("those engaged in jihad", مجاهد) as attacks on American troops are.
Although the violence in Pakistan is largely directed against Shias by Sunni jihadis, reverse attacks do occur: a wave of sectarian violence between the two communities (with attacks on both sides) flared up in Gilgit (northern Pakistan) after a hand grenade was thrown at a gathering of a Sunni organisation (purportedly by Shia militants).
Yemen
The Yemeni uprising may be the least-covered of the Arab Spring rebellions in the Western Media, but the Shia Houthi insurgency in Yemen is even less covered still, and is practically unknown outside the region. Since 2004, Shia insurgents in northern Yemen have waged what they claim is a war of self defence to protect their community against government discrimination and aggression, and which the Yemeni Government characterizes as a Iran-backed attempt to seize control and impose Shia religious law on the country.
Where the jihadi angle appears in this conflict, however, again surrounds Yemen's Arab Spring uprising. In the increasingly anarchic situation in Yemen, violent jihadi groups have begun to perpetrate attacks against Shias here also. In January 2011 al Qaeda declared a jihad against the Houthis, and followed this up with a car bombing in August that killed 14 Shias. In early March this year, a bomb at a Houthi anti-US protest in northern Yemen killed 22. With Yemen's al Qaeda branch in control of territory and already perpetrating an increasing number of attacks against government and military targets, more and more sectarian attacks similar to those mentioned can be expected.
Iraq
Although no longer in the throes of the sectarian bloodletting which characterized the civil war between 2006 and 2008, in which both Sunni and Shia groups perpetrated massacres and attacks on places of worship, religiously motivated attacks continue. These now primarily take the form of coordinated bombings by the Islamic State of Iraq (دولة العراق الإسلامية) organisation, which includes al Qaeda in Iraq under its umbrella. Such attacks targeting Shias have occurred already in January, February and March this year, killing dozens. Though the body count of the Iraqi insurgency has been in heavy decline in recent months (with February being the least violent month in years), Iraq's violent jihadis (along with those in Lebanon, to be discussed below) may well come to play a resurgent role due to the conflict in Syria.
(It should be noted that the inter-communal conflict in Iraq is not simply one directed against Shias by Sunnis. Especially since the US withdrawal earlier this year, the Shia-dominated government of Iraq seems to be trying to entrench the domination of its community. Sunnis complain of being shut out of government jobs, the most senior Sunni in the Government, Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, is in hiding in Iraqi Kurdistan from state prosecutors who want him tried on terror charges, and there appears to be an increasing attempt by Shias to control the public space of mixed Iraqi cities; Baghdad has lately appeared to be covered by Shia banners. This sort of exclusion of Sunnis from public and political life can only entrench the sectarian divides which the violent jihadis use to recruit new fighters.)
The general character of Sunni-Shia violence will be observed through a discussion of recent instances in Pakistan, Yemen, and Iraq, and the potential for similar sectarian bloodshed in Syria (incorporating Lebanon) will then be discussed. This isn't an exhaustive account of Sunni-Shia violence across the world, but it should hopefully provide some context and insight into such conflicts.
Pakistan
Sectarian killings of Shias in Pakistan often follow a tragically regular pattern: a bus (usually travelling in the north of the country) is stopped by gunmen, the Shias are ordered off the bus, they are shot at the roadside, and a Sunni jihadi organisation (usually the Pakistani Taliban, تحریک طالبان پاکستان) claims responsibility through its website. Strange as it may sound to unfamiliar observes, within the minds of the perpetrators such killings of Shias falls as much under the banner of jihad as the killing of unbelievers does. After one such bus massacre in late February this year, a commander of the Jundulluh (جند اللہ) faction of the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack with these words: "They were Shiite infidels and our mujahedeen shot them dead one by one after bringing them down from a bus".
This conception of Shias as "infidels" (كفّار) is at the root of most anti-Shia violence, and springs usually from an accusation that Shias have "deviated" from "true Islam" by their reverence for Mohammed's son-in-law Ali (as Mohammed's supposed true successor) and other members of his family, as well as differences in practices such as prayer. Thus the aforementioned justification by the Pakistani Taliban for murdering Shia civilians would be familiar to Sunni jihadis across the Islamic world, to whom attacks on Shias are as much the business of the mujahadin ("those engaged in jihad", مجاهد) as attacks on American troops are.
Although the violence in Pakistan is largely directed against Shias by Sunni jihadis, reverse attacks do occur: a wave of sectarian violence between the two communities (with attacks on both sides) flared up in Gilgit (northern Pakistan) after a hand grenade was thrown at a gathering of a Sunni organisation (purportedly by Shia militants).
Yemen
The Yemeni uprising may be the least-covered of the Arab Spring rebellions in the Western Media, but the Shia Houthi insurgency in Yemen is even less covered still, and is practically unknown outside the region. Since 2004, Shia insurgents in northern Yemen have waged what they claim is a war of self defence to protect their community against government discrimination and aggression, and which the Yemeni Government characterizes as a Iran-backed attempt to seize control and impose Shia religious law on the country.
Where the jihadi angle appears in this conflict, however, again surrounds Yemen's Arab Spring uprising. In the increasingly anarchic situation in Yemen, violent jihadi groups have begun to perpetrate attacks against Shias here also. In January 2011 al Qaeda declared a jihad against the Houthis, and followed this up with a car bombing in August that killed 14 Shias. In early March this year, a bomb at a Houthi anti-US protest in northern Yemen killed 22. With Yemen's al Qaeda branch in control of territory and already perpetrating an increasing number of attacks against government and military targets, more and more sectarian attacks similar to those mentioned can be expected.
Iraq
Although no longer in the throes of the sectarian bloodletting which characterized the civil war between 2006 and 2008, in which both Sunni and Shia groups perpetrated massacres and attacks on places of worship, religiously motivated attacks continue. These now primarily take the form of coordinated bombings by the Islamic State of Iraq (دولة العراق الإسلامية) organisation, which includes al Qaeda in Iraq under its umbrella. Such attacks targeting Shias have occurred already in January, February and March this year, killing dozens. Though the body count of the Iraqi insurgency has been in heavy decline in recent months (with February being the least violent month in years), Iraq's violent jihadis (along with those in Lebanon, to be discussed below) may well come to play a resurgent role due to the conflict in Syria.
(It should be noted that the inter-communal conflict in Iraq is not simply one directed against Shias by Sunnis. Especially since the US withdrawal earlier this year, the Shia-dominated government of Iraq seems to be trying to entrench the domination of its community. Sunnis complain of being shut out of government jobs, the most senior Sunni in the Government, Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, is in hiding in Iraqi Kurdistan from state prosecutors who want him tried on terror charges, and there appears to be an increasing attempt by Shias to control the public space of mixed Iraqi cities; Baghdad has lately appeared to be covered by Shia banners. This sort of exclusion of Sunnis from public and political life can only entrench the sectarian divides which the violent jihadis use to recruit new fighters.)
Syria
The circumstances surrounding the current Syrian uprising are of course very complicated, with a large number of groups operating towards various ends. However, there is the distinct potential for a sectarian edge to the conflict to emerge, and to an extent it already has.
Often neglected in analysis of the Syrian conflict is precedent for an anti-regime rebellion taking on a sectarian dimension: during the 1976-1982 uprising of Sunni Islamists (linked to the Muslim Brotherhood) against the then-regime of Hafez al-Assad (father of the current dictator Bashar al-Assad), rebel assassinations and massacres were often targeted specifically against the Alawi (a form of Shia Islam) community, which was seen as a cadre for the government as many of its members featured prominently in the regime (including the President himself and his family). The demographics of Syria's recent uprising ere highly similar: the rebels are overwhelming Sunni and enjoy the support of most of Syia's Sunni majority, whereas the government prominently features Alawis and draws its main support from this community and the other religious minorities (mostly other kinds of Shias and Christians), who fear their rights may be eroded if the Sunni majority comes to power.
There are also signs of expanding jihadi elements among the rebels. New rebel brigades with names such as the "God is Great" Bridade or the "Supporters of God" Brigade are springing up and couching their statements on the struggle in the language of jihad. This occurs alongside an increasing number of suicide and car bombings perpetrated by rebel groups, many of which are causing significant civilian casualties. However more worrying is the nature and sophistication of the attacks, which may point to links with violent jihadi groups in Iraq (who continue to perpetrate similar attacks in their own country). Many of these bombings have been claimed by the newly-formed Al-Nusra Front to Protect the Levant (جبهة النصرة لأهل الشام), which (if not simply a front organisation) definitely has links to al Qaeda in Iraq, which means it brings, along with bombing expertise, the kind of hardline anti-Shia ideology has been behind so many past (and present) attacks in Iraq. In addition to the large-scale bombings in major cities, however, there have also been a string of smaller suicide and car bombings in smaller cities and towns (with much lower death tolls), which points to a proliferation of this sort of tactic, and perhaps the violent jihadi ideology which usually accompanies suicide bombings. In February this year Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's successor as head of al Qaeda, declared the rebellion a jihad and called for all Muslims to help in the struggle. The flow of Iraqi fighters and arms into Syria has become significant enough that the (Shia-dominated) government of Iraq has announced increased measures to try to prevent it, at the same time as Sunni Gulf Arab states are announcing that they will bankroll and arm the rebellion.
In terms of explicitly sectarian violence, the details remain somewhat uncertain at present but do coincide with the conclusion of an increasingly sectarian conflict. The Syrian government has certainly tried to characterize the rebellion as a sectarian one, describing them as "terrorists" in the media and possibly having gone so far as to pay government workers to shout anti-Alawi slogans (for the media's observance) at anti-government rallies and write anti-Alawi graffiti in public places. Thus not all reported instances of sectarian rhetoric by rebels should be considered as genuine, however an increasing number of anti-Alawi statements have emerged from rebel leaders and sympathisers in Syria and abroad. A voice purported to belong to Mamoun al-Homsy, one of the opposition leaders, warned in a recorded message in December 2011 that Alawites should abandon Assad, or else "Syria will become the graveyard of the Alawites". Amateur video posted online appears to show Abdul Baset Sarut, a leader of the opposition in Homs, calling for the extermination of the Alawites during a demonstration. This has been mirrored in some instances of actual violence: reports have emerged that in the villages of the Syrian countryside Alawis are being murdered, sometimes in large numbers, by Sunni rebels. In mid-2011, Christians were reportedly attacked by anti-government protesters for their community's (perceived) failure to join the protests. The government itself may also have directly fomented sectarian violence by using largely Alawi militias (known as "shahiba" -"thugs", الشبيحة) to attack (largely Sunni) protesters.
Perhaps the clearest instance of sectarian violence surrounding the Syrian conflict, however, has actually occurred in Lebanon. In February, supporters and opponents of Assad's regime took to the streets of Tripoli armed with guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Although only a few injuries resulted, the clash was clearly between inhabitants of the Sunni district of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the Alawite district of Jebel Mohsen. Like their co-religionists in Syria, the inhabitants of these districts have a history of clashes with each other. and Lebanon has no shortage of its own violent groups that may be drawn into a sectarian conflict in Syria; the Shia terrorist organisation Hezbollah, which currently sits in Lebanon's governing coalition and whose militias control much of the country, especially springs to mind. Hezbollah is notably already supporting the Assad regime, as is the Shia government of Iran. There is also a significant Alawi community in Turkey which is growing increasingly worried about the fate of its brethren in Syria. The recipe for a sectarian conflict fed by other regional players seems to be in place.
Conclusion
Overall, especially with the new funding from Gulf Arab states, it seems increasingly likely that sectarian conflict and terrorism will emerge in Syria, as native Syrian jihadi brigades form links with Iraqi jihadi fighters and as both the government and certain rebel leaders portray the conflict as one between sects of Islam. Syria may well become yet another country, like those discussed above, with a serious problem of sectarian jihadism.
The circumstances surrounding the current Syrian uprising are of course very complicated, with a large number of groups operating towards various ends. However, there is the distinct potential for a sectarian edge to the conflict to emerge, and to an extent it already has.
Often neglected in analysis of the Syrian conflict is precedent for an anti-regime rebellion taking on a sectarian dimension: during the 1976-1982 uprising of Sunni Islamists (linked to the Muslim Brotherhood) against the then-regime of Hafez al-Assad (father of the current dictator Bashar al-Assad), rebel assassinations and massacres were often targeted specifically against the Alawi (a form of Shia Islam) community, which was seen as a cadre for the government as many of its members featured prominently in the regime (including the President himself and his family). The demographics of Syria's recent uprising ere highly similar: the rebels are overwhelming Sunni and enjoy the support of most of Syia's Sunni majority, whereas the government prominently features Alawis and draws its main support from this community and the other religious minorities (mostly other kinds of Shias and Christians), who fear their rights may be eroded if the Sunni majority comes to power.
There are also signs of expanding jihadi elements among the rebels. New rebel brigades with names such as the "God is Great" Bridade or the "Supporters of God" Brigade are springing up and couching their statements on the struggle in the language of jihad. This occurs alongside an increasing number of suicide and car bombings perpetrated by rebel groups, many of which are causing significant civilian casualties. However more worrying is the nature and sophistication of the attacks, which may point to links with violent jihadi groups in Iraq (who continue to perpetrate similar attacks in their own country). Many of these bombings have been claimed by the newly-formed Al-Nusra Front to Protect the Levant (جبهة النصرة لأهل الشام), which (if not simply a front organisation) definitely has links to al Qaeda in Iraq, which means it brings, along with bombing expertise, the kind of hardline anti-Shia ideology has been behind so many past (and present) attacks in Iraq. In addition to the large-scale bombings in major cities, however, there have also been a string of smaller suicide and car bombings in smaller cities and towns (with much lower death tolls), which points to a proliferation of this sort of tactic, and perhaps the violent jihadi ideology which usually accompanies suicide bombings. In February this year Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's successor as head of al Qaeda, declared the rebellion a jihad and called for all Muslims to help in the struggle. The flow of Iraqi fighters and arms into Syria has become significant enough that the (Shia-dominated) government of Iraq has announced increased measures to try to prevent it, at the same time as Sunni Gulf Arab states are announcing that they will bankroll and arm the rebellion.
In terms of explicitly sectarian violence, the details remain somewhat uncertain at present but do coincide with the conclusion of an increasingly sectarian conflict. The Syrian government has certainly tried to characterize the rebellion as a sectarian one, describing them as "terrorists" in the media and possibly having gone so far as to pay government workers to shout anti-Alawi slogans (for the media's observance) at anti-government rallies and write anti-Alawi graffiti in public places. Thus not all reported instances of sectarian rhetoric by rebels should be considered as genuine, however an increasing number of anti-Alawi statements have emerged from rebel leaders and sympathisers in Syria and abroad. A voice purported to belong to Mamoun al-Homsy, one of the opposition leaders, warned in a recorded message in December 2011 that Alawites should abandon Assad, or else "Syria will become the graveyard of the Alawites". Amateur video posted online appears to show Abdul Baset Sarut, a leader of the opposition in Homs, calling for the extermination of the Alawites during a demonstration. This has been mirrored in some instances of actual violence: reports have emerged that in the villages of the Syrian countryside Alawis are being murdered, sometimes in large numbers, by Sunni rebels. In mid-2011, Christians were reportedly attacked by anti-government protesters for their community's (perceived) failure to join the protests. The government itself may also have directly fomented sectarian violence by using largely Alawi militias (known as "shahiba" -"thugs", الشبيحة) to attack (largely Sunni) protesters.
Perhaps the clearest instance of sectarian violence surrounding the Syrian conflict, however, has actually occurred in Lebanon. In February, supporters and opponents of Assad's regime took to the streets of Tripoli armed with guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Although only a few injuries resulted, the clash was clearly between inhabitants of the Sunni district of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the Alawite district of Jebel Mohsen. Like their co-religionists in Syria, the inhabitants of these districts have a history of clashes with each other. and Lebanon has no shortage of its own violent groups that may be drawn into a sectarian conflict in Syria; the Shia terrorist organisation Hezbollah, which currently sits in Lebanon's governing coalition and whose militias control much of the country, especially springs to mind. Hezbollah is notably already supporting the Assad regime, as is the Shia government of Iran. There is also a significant Alawi community in Turkey which is growing increasingly worried about the fate of its brethren in Syria. The recipe for a sectarian conflict fed by other regional players seems to be in place.
Conclusion
Overall, especially with the new funding from Gulf Arab states, it seems increasingly likely that sectarian conflict and terrorism will emerge in Syria, as native Syrian jihadi brigades form links with Iraqi jihadi fighters and as both the government and certain rebel leaders portray the conflict as one between sects of Islam. Syria may well become yet another country, like those discussed above, with a serious problem of sectarian jihadism.
Sunday, 18 March 2012
Featured News: American-born al Shabaab fighter claims in video that other jihadis want him dead
Abu Mansoor al-Amriki (also known as Omar Hamami) posted an undated video on Youtube on Saturday, claiming that he fears his life is in danger from other fighters in another faction of al Shabaab. Abu Mansoor has been seen as a key foreign leader of Somalia's al Shabaab, and his surprising release of such a video attests to the continuing divisions in al Shabaab, especially when it comes to the foreign jihadis fighting alongside them.
For its part, al Shabaab's press office has denied the validity and claims of the video.
If this video is indeed real, then the chances of al Shabaab fracturing apart under the increased military pressure it is facing may be higher than many had previously thought.
http://news.yahoo.com/us-extremist-somalia-fears-life-fellow-fighters-161500428.html;_ylt=Amz8LkxnECAXJ.UeLI_xwZpvaA8F;_ylu=X3oDMTNmbnZ0OTVpBG1pdAMEcGtnAzcyZDE5YzJiLWVlMDgtM2M3Yy1iYTAyLWJkMGVkNGIxY2MwNgRwb3MDMTAEc2VjA2xuX0FmcmljYV9nYWwEdmVyAzg0OGJkZDAwLTcwODctMTFlMS1hZDc3LWQ1NzUzMmY5NGUwMw--;_ylv=3
For its part, al Shabaab's press office has denied the validity and claims of the video.
If this video is indeed real, then the chances of al Shabaab fracturing apart under the increased military pressure it is facing may be higher than many had previously thought.
http://news.yahoo.com/us-extremist-somalia-fears-life-fellow-fighters-161500428.html;_ylt=Amz8LkxnECAXJ.UeLI_xwZpvaA8F;_ylu=X3oDMTNmbnZ0OTVpBG1pdAMEcGtnAzcyZDE5YzJiLWVlMDgtM2M3Yy1iYTAyLWJkMGVkNGIxY2MwNgRwb3MDMTAEc2VjA2xuX0FmcmljYV9nYWwEdmVyAzg0OGJkZDAwLTcwODctMTFlMS1hZDc3LWQ1NzUzMmY5NGUwMw--;_ylv=3
Thursday, 15 March 2012
Featured News: African Jihadi Bombs more Sophisticated and more Deadly in 2011
There's a reason so much of the Sharaabtoon has been buzzing about Africa so far this year. Now, the Pentagon's anti-IED (Improvised Explosive Device) has confirmed that al Qaeda-linked groups in their attacks in Somalia (al Shabaab), Nigeria (Boko Haram) and Kenya (probably al Shabaab again) are using more sophisticated devices to kill more people with each explosion.
Nigeria saw a nearly fourfold jump in the number of improvised explosive device incidents last year, while Kenya saw an 86 percent increase, according to the unit.
Read more:
http://news.yahoo.com/somalia-kenya-nigeria-bombings-deadlier-2011-095653687.html;_ylt=AiBjAZgWMsZqSyq5qf7e7c9vaA8F;_ylu=X3oDMTNldWgxdGNxBG1pdAMEcGtnA2QzYzFlZmRkLWUwZDUtMzliNi05YmU1LTU3NjU3MmQxNmIzMgRwb3MDMQRzZWMDbG5fQWZyaWNhX2dhbAR2ZXIDZDljMjAxMDAtNmU5OC0xMWUxLWJlNGItYmEzZjhiNWU0NzRk;_ylv=3
Nigeria saw a nearly fourfold jump in the number of improvised explosive device incidents last year, while Kenya saw an 86 percent increase, according to the unit.
Read more:
http://news.yahoo.com/somalia-kenya-nigeria-bombings-deadlier-2011-095653687.html;_ylt=AiBjAZgWMsZqSyq5qf7e7c9vaA8F;_ylu=X3oDMTNldWgxdGNxBG1pdAMEcGtnA2QzYzFlZmRkLWUwZDUtMzliNi05YmU1LTU3NjU3MmQxNmIzMgRwb3MDMQRzZWMDbG5fQWZyaWNhX2dhbAR2ZXIDZDljMjAxMDAtNmU5OC0xMWUxLWJlNGItYmEzZjhiNWU0NzRk;_ylv=3
Monday, 12 March 2012
The Decline, but not Fall, of al Qaeda
Unlike Jacob Marley in "A Christmas Carol", it would be wrong to begin by claiming al Qaeda is dead. Al Qaeda is most certainly not dead. The world's most famous violent jihadi organisation has certainly declined and lost the effective ability to conduct the kind of headline-grabbing attacks against targets in the West which made it famous, but it has responded to this by changing and adapting its strategies and tactics. Al Qaeda is moving towards a franchise model, merging and allying itself with local actors involved in local conflicts wherever it can around the globe. "Al Qaeda international", however, is badly damaged. So where is al Qaeda declining and where is it ascending?
South East Asia: in decline
Al Qaeda long sponsored the Jemaah Islamiyah (الجماعة الإسلامية) ("Islamic Congregation") terrorist organisation in South East Asia, and essentially treated it as its regional operator, lending funding and operational support in the early 2000's. It was this organisation which perpetrated the 2002 Bali nightclub bombings, and it was once an actor of considerable capabilities. However relentless security crackdowns by the Indonesian government have decimated its ranks and largely left Jemaah Islamiyah cut off from al Qaeda internationally. This is well illustrated by the almost farcical story of the frustrated attempts by Jemaah Islamiyah's master bomb maker to re-establish ties with jihadis in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2011. Even though he travelled to Abbotabad (Pakistan) during this time, it seems he had no idea Bin Laden was there, and he largely failed even to secure meetings with senior violent jihadis in either country, forced instead to resort to emailing years-old contacts he had never actually met in person. After a few frustrated months he was captured by Pakistani security forces.
None of this is to suggest that violent jihadism itself is defeated in Indonesia and the Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah is damaged but still dangerous, and many smaller jihadi networks with non connection to al Qaeda internationally are sprouting up and capable of carrying out attacks. However al Qaeda's links to violent jihadism in this region have declined to being negligible, and so in this area al Qaeda has experienced a definite decline -even a death of sorts, albeit a local one.
Afghanistan: in decline
Although NATO forces in Afghanistan continue to struggle against the Taliban insurgency there, they have largely succeeded in their mission of disrupting and destroying al Qaeda's networks and operations in the country. According to the Department of Defense, the last known killing of an al Qaeda fighter by Coalition forces was in April 2011, and the last capture of one was in May. This points essentially to a depletion of al Qaeda's forces in Afghanistan, and its cessation of existing as a separate organisation. Any al Qaeda fighters which remain in Afghanistan at this point have most likely been absorbed into the Taliban's forces and have stopped having any connections or contacts with al Qaeda's international leadership. Many more have been killed or fled. Here again al Qaeda seems to have slowly disappeared as force, although the Taliban insurgency has only grown.
Bin Laden: in decline long before his death
A retired Pakistani Brigadier General with access to the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate) agents who interrogated Bin Laden's wives has recently claimed that al Qaeda decided to retire Bin Laden back in 2003, as he was going mentally senile and had been degenerating into "fantasies" since late 2001. This seems to correspond with the will purportedly written by Bin Laden soon after 9/11 in which he urges his childrenot to pursue an education and peace in the West rather than carrying on jihad, and the awkward un-released video messages taped by Bin Laden which were also found. The allegation is that Ayman al-Zawahiri, now the leader of al Qaeda and long considered the brains behind the organisation, was the one who decided to sideline Bin Laden. al-Zawahiri may even have dispatched Bin Laden's older Saudi wife Khairia to Abbotabad in March 2011 (the first time she had seen Bin Laden since 2001) to act as bait for US intelligence, leading them to Bin Laden. In the end, the US found Bin Laden through a courier, but intercepted phonecalls from Khairia may have helped confirm that he really was in that compound in Abbotabad.
Much of this cannot be confirmed yet, but if true it seems that Bin Laden himself may well have declined faster than his international organisation did. His final killing at the hands of US forces may well have have been the death of a sidelined, senile old man rather than the terrorist mastermind he was in his prime.
Al Qaeda's leadership: in decline
If you were a member of the leadership of al Qaeda's international branch two years ago, chances are that right now you are either dead or on the run from drone strikes, complaining about how cash-strapped you are. If there really was a physical sharaabtoon for jihadis, you would be the sad, nervous-looking guy at the bar trying to drown his sorrows with the one drink he's been nursing for hours. Two-thirds of al Qaeda's senior figures at the time of 9/11 had been captured or killed as early as 2004, and the last year has seen US drone strikes regularly killing senior members, devastating the organisation's leadership. And off course there was the death of the man who was at least al Qaeda's figurehead, Bin Laden. The organisation now seems to be beset with internal divisions and rivalries as what is left of the leadership tries to re-assert itself, but with different individuals vying for control.
What this means is that al Qaeda's international organisation has extremely limited operational capacity for launching the sort of large-scale attacks it once did. For this reason, a new strategy seems to be emerging; one of merging al Qaeda with other local violent jihadi organisations, with both parties trying to draw legitimacy and support from the other.
Yemen: in the ascent
The multiple conflicts now raging in Yemen make the news in the West far less than those in Libya and Syria did or do, however it is only in Yemen that al Qaeda (so far) is playing a major role, and is growing stronger. With the deterioration of central authority throughout the country due to the year-long struggle to oust President Saleh (who stepped down persobally last month but whose regime remains largely in place), al Qaeda has been able to actually capture and hold territory in its own right in Yemen. Al Qaeda seized the southern towns of Jaar and Zinjibar in April and May 2011, and has fended off multiple government attempts to retake them. In February an al-Qaeda linked group killed at least 26 people with a suicide attack within hours of the new President being sworn in. Earlier in March, in a brazen cross-desert attack al Qaeda fighters killed nearly 200 government troops, subsequently beheading some of them and dumping their bodies in the desert near Zinjibar. Government troops across the country are said to be fearful of further al Qaeda attacks and suffering from intensely low morale. The soldiers killed are believed to have been poorly equipped (like much of the military), so there remains the possibility that the government could enjoy greater successes against al Qaeda if it were to deploy more of its better-trained and armed specialized anti-terrorist units to the front, and the US has enjoyed some successes with drone strikes in killing senior al Qaeda leaders in Yemen, particularly that of US-born Anwar al-Awlaki in September last year. However the Yemeni government also faces other tribal, religious and separatist insurgencies, and so its divided attention may continue to allow al Qaeda to flourish here.
Somalia: in the ascent
Al Shabaab may be having mixed fortunes as of late, facing several military setbacks at the hands of African Union troops, but al Qaeda's February merger with al Shabaab was an unquestionable boon for both organisations. Al Shabaab gets access to al Qaeda's name recognition, plus whatever foreign fighters and operational support it can still muster, and al Qaeda through al Shabaab can bolster its own claims to continued relevance and power in East Africa. This connection is especially useful as through it al Qaeda can facilitate links and connections between jihadis across the region, such as the "exchange programme" of fighters between Somalia and Yemen which has been observed recently. This Yemeni connection and the al Shabaab merger actually places al Qaeda in a position of strength and a position to grow in East Africa, at least verses some of its more dismally-performing regions.
North Africa and the Sahara: in the ascent
There's been a lot written in Sharaabtoon lately about jihadism in this region, and not all of it involves al Qaeda -at least, not yet. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is alive and active, and continues to perpetrate attacks on security services and kidnappings in the Sahara and North Africa, particularly in Algeria. The end of the Libyan civil war has caused the region to be flooded with the loot of Gaddafi's former arsenals, fuelling conflict and greatly easing the process of acquiring small arms and heavy weaponry for all, including violent jihadis. Already we see some evidence for AQIM attempting to escalate its attacks in the region, and local forces such as Boko Haram (which may already have limited al Qaeda links) may well attempt to integrate further with AQIM, al Qaeda international (such as it exists) or other al Qaeda-aligned organisations in the region (such as al Shabaab) in order to increase their ability to carry out complex and large-scale attacks. Al Qaeda has not yet grown strong in this region, but the potential for it do so is dangerously large.
South East Asia: in decline
Al Qaeda long sponsored the Jemaah Islamiyah (الجماعة الإسلامية) ("Islamic Congregation") terrorist organisation in South East Asia, and essentially treated it as its regional operator, lending funding and operational support in the early 2000's. It was this organisation which perpetrated the 2002 Bali nightclub bombings, and it was once an actor of considerable capabilities. However relentless security crackdowns by the Indonesian government have decimated its ranks and largely left Jemaah Islamiyah cut off from al Qaeda internationally. This is well illustrated by the almost farcical story of the frustrated attempts by Jemaah Islamiyah's master bomb maker to re-establish ties with jihadis in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2011. Even though he travelled to Abbotabad (Pakistan) during this time, it seems he had no idea Bin Laden was there, and he largely failed even to secure meetings with senior violent jihadis in either country, forced instead to resort to emailing years-old contacts he had never actually met in person. After a few frustrated months he was captured by Pakistani security forces.
None of this is to suggest that violent jihadism itself is defeated in Indonesia and the Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah is damaged but still dangerous, and many smaller jihadi networks with non connection to al Qaeda internationally are sprouting up and capable of carrying out attacks. However al Qaeda's links to violent jihadism in this region have declined to being negligible, and so in this area al Qaeda has experienced a definite decline -even a death of sorts, albeit a local one.
Afghanistan: in decline
Although NATO forces in Afghanistan continue to struggle against the Taliban insurgency there, they have largely succeeded in their mission of disrupting and destroying al Qaeda's networks and operations in the country. According to the Department of Defense, the last known killing of an al Qaeda fighter by Coalition forces was in April 2011, and the last capture of one was in May. This points essentially to a depletion of al Qaeda's forces in Afghanistan, and its cessation of existing as a separate organisation. Any al Qaeda fighters which remain in Afghanistan at this point have most likely been absorbed into the Taliban's forces and have stopped having any connections or contacts with al Qaeda's international leadership. Many more have been killed or fled. Here again al Qaeda seems to have slowly disappeared as force, although the Taliban insurgency has only grown.
Bin Laden: in decline long before his death
A retired Pakistani Brigadier General with access to the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate) agents who interrogated Bin Laden's wives has recently claimed that al Qaeda decided to retire Bin Laden back in 2003, as he was going mentally senile and had been degenerating into "fantasies" since late 2001. This seems to correspond with the will purportedly written by Bin Laden soon after 9/11 in which he urges his childrenot to pursue an education and peace in the West rather than carrying on jihad, and the awkward un-released video messages taped by Bin Laden which were also found. The allegation is that Ayman al-Zawahiri, now the leader of al Qaeda and long considered the brains behind the organisation, was the one who decided to sideline Bin Laden. al-Zawahiri may even have dispatched Bin Laden's older Saudi wife Khairia to Abbotabad in March 2011 (the first time she had seen Bin Laden since 2001) to act as bait for US intelligence, leading them to Bin Laden. In the end, the US found Bin Laden through a courier, but intercepted phonecalls from Khairia may have helped confirm that he really was in that compound in Abbotabad.
Much of this cannot be confirmed yet, but if true it seems that Bin Laden himself may well have declined faster than his international organisation did. His final killing at the hands of US forces may well have have been the death of a sidelined, senile old man rather than the terrorist mastermind he was in his prime.
Al Qaeda's leadership: in decline
If you were a member of the leadership of al Qaeda's international branch two years ago, chances are that right now you are either dead or on the run from drone strikes, complaining about how cash-strapped you are. If there really was a physical sharaabtoon for jihadis, you would be the sad, nervous-looking guy at the bar trying to drown his sorrows with the one drink he's been nursing for hours. Two-thirds of al Qaeda's senior figures at the time of 9/11 had been captured or killed as early as 2004, and the last year has seen US drone strikes regularly killing senior members, devastating the organisation's leadership. And off course there was the death of the man who was at least al Qaeda's figurehead, Bin Laden. The organisation now seems to be beset with internal divisions and rivalries as what is left of the leadership tries to re-assert itself, but with different individuals vying for control.
What this means is that al Qaeda's international organisation has extremely limited operational capacity for launching the sort of large-scale attacks it once did. For this reason, a new strategy seems to be emerging; one of merging al Qaeda with other local violent jihadi organisations, with both parties trying to draw legitimacy and support from the other.
Yemen: in the ascent
The multiple conflicts now raging in Yemen make the news in the West far less than those in Libya and Syria did or do, however it is only in Yemen that al Qaeda (so far) is playing a major role, and is growing stronger. With the deterioration of central authority throughout the country due to the year-long struggle to oust President Saleh (who stepped down persobally last month but whose regime remains largely in place), al Qaeda has been able to actually capture and hold territory in its own right in Yemen. Al Qaeda seized the southern towns of Jaar and Zinjibar in April and May 2011, and has fended off multiple government attempts to retake them. In February an al-Qaeda linked group killed at least 26 people with a suicide attack within hours of the new President being sworn in. Earlier in March, in a brazen cross-desert attack al Qaeda fighters killed nearly 200 government troops, subsequently beheading some of them and dumping their bodies in the desert near Zinjibar. Government troops across the country are said to be fearful of further al Qaeda attacks and suffering from intensely low morale. The soldiers killed are believed to have been poorly equipped (like much of the military), so there remains the possibility that the government could enjoy greater successes against al Qaeda if it were to deploy more of its better-trained and armed specialized anti-terrorist units to the front, and the US has enjoyed some successes with drone strikes in killing senior al Qaeda leaders in Yemen, particularly that of US-born Anwar al-Awlaki in September last year. However the Yemeni government also faces other tribal, religious and separatist insurgencies, and so its divided attention may continue to allow al Qaeda to flourish here.
Somalia: in the ascent
Al Shabaab may be having mixed fortunes as of late, facing several military setbacks at the hands of African Union troops, but al Qaeda's February merger with al Shabaab was an unquestionable boon for both organisations. Al Shabaab gets access to al Qaeda's name recognition, plus whatever foreign fighters and operational support it can still muster, and al Qaeda through al Shabaab can bolster its own claims to continued relevance and power in East Africa. This connection is especially useful as through it al Qaeda can facilitate links and connections between jihadis across the region, such as the "exchange programme" of fighters between Somalia and Yemen which has been observed recently. This Yemeni connection and the al Shabaab merger actually places al Qaeda in a position of strength and a position to grow in East Africa, at least verses some of its more dismally-performing regions.
North Africa and the Sahara: in the ascent
There's been a lot written in Sharaabtoon lately about jihadism in this region, and not all of it involves al Qaeda -at least, not yet. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is alive and active, and continues to perpetrate attacks on security services and kidnappings in the Sahara and North Africa, particularly in Algeria. The end of the Libyan civil war has caused the region to be flooded with the loot of Gaddafi's former arsenals, fuelling conflict and greatly easing the process of acquiring small arms and heavy weaponry for all, including violent jihadis. Already we see some evidence for AQIM attempting to escalate its attacks in the region, and local forces such as Boko Haram (which may already have limited al Qaeda links) may well attempt to integrate further with AQIM, al Qaeda international (such as it exists) or other al Qaeda-aligned organisations in the region (such as al Shabaab) in order to increase their ability to carry out complex and large-scale attacks. Al Qaeda has not yet grown strong in this region, but the potential for it do so is dangerously large.
Al Qaeda in Iraq: declined, but may rebound?
There are almost daily bombings and shootings in Iraq, usually targeted at security forces or of a sectarian nature (against Shia Muslims), many of them carried out by al Qaeda linked fighters, who in the past three months are estimated to have killed around 250 people in attacks. What should be remembered, however, is that this is actually a huge improvement for Iraq. Even with the US troop withdrawal there has been no return to the full-scale sectarian slaughter of 2006-2007 in which thousands of Iraqis died, and since 2008 al Qaeda has no longer controlled any towns or significant areas of territory, which it once did openly. Indeed, the old al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) organisation no longer exists as a separate entity, but instead joined with several other violent jihadi groups in late 2006 to form the Islamic State of Iraq (دولة العراق الإسلامية) organisation, under whose umbrella it now claims its attacks. The decline of both groups s closely linked to disenchantment with such violent jihadis' due to their relentless sectarian violence in the mid 2000's and their brutality even to their Sunni co-religionists, a resentment best known for leading to the "Anbar Awakening" of Sunni Arab tribes turning against al Qaeda. This alienation of most of the Iraqi population (which inn any case has a Shia majority) makes any return to the kind of power and control al Qaeda enjoyed in the mid-2000's unlikely, and its ranks are now thought to be largely filled by foreign fighters. In spite of this, the Islamic State of Iraq seems to have little connection to al Qaeda international.
Al Qaeda's real rebound potential in Iraq, however, comes from the dynamics of the conflict in neighbouring Syria. There, a largely Sunni insurgency is locked in bloody conflict with a regime dominated by Alawis (an offshoot of Shia Islam). Al Qaeda will use the narrative of a government of Shia "apostates" slaughtering Sunni Muslims to try to drive the sectarian conflict in Iraq, and by extension assert its own continued relevance and to entice recruits. Al Qaeda international has already declared its support for the anti-government rebels in Syria. If the Assad regime in Syria does fall, al Qaeda will be a major player and beneficiary in the ensuing chaos and (no doubt) sectarian reprisals.
Overall
Al Qaeda is not dead. Al Qaeda international has declined, and its regional organisations have essentially disappeared from some localities, but in other areas it is experiencing real growth and power, and has the potential to expand in others. Al Qaeda is unlikely to ever regain its lost power as an organisation which could seemingly strike anywhere in the world, and whatever growth it does see in the future will be along its adopted franchise model, and heavily tied up in local conflicts and with alliances (and mergers) with local jihadis.
Like Marley, even al Qaeda's ghost still seems to have the power to affect the world, even if it must primarily do so by working through others.
There are almost daily bombings and shootings in Iraq, usually targeted at security forces or of a sectarian nature (against Shia Muslims), many of them carried out by al Qaeda linked fighters, who in the past three months are estimated to have killed around 250 people in attacks. What should be remembered, however, is that this is actually a huge improvement for Iraq. Even with the US troop withdrawal there has been no return to the full-scale sectarian slaughter of 2006-2007 in which thousands of Iraqis died, and since 2008 al Qaeda has no longer controlled any towns or significant areas of territory, which it once did openly. Indeed, the old al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) organisation no longer exists as a separate entity, but instead joined with several other violent jihadi groups in late 2006 to form the Islamic State of Iraq (دولة العراق الإسلامية) organisation, under whose umbrella it now claims its attacks. The decline of both groups s closely linked to disenchantment with such violent jihadis' due to their relentless sectarian violence in the mid 2000's and their brutality even to their Sunni co-religionists, a resentment best known for leading to the "Anbar Awakening" of Sunni Arab tribes turning against al Qaeda. This alienation of most of the Iraqi population (which inn any case has a Shia majority) makes any return to the kind of power and control al Qaeda enjoyed in the mid-2000's unlikely, and its ranks are now thought to be largely filled by foreign fighters. In spite of this, the Islamic State of Iraq seems to have little connection to al Qaeda international.
Al Qaeda's real rebound potential in Iraq, however, comes from the dynamics of the conflict in neighbouring Syria. There, a largely Sunni insurgency is locked in bloody conflict with a regime dominated by Alawis (an offshoot of Shia Islam). Al Qaeda will use the narrative of a government of Shia "apostates" slaughtering Sunni Muslims to try to drive the sectarian conflict in Iraq, and by extension assert its own continued relevance and to entice recruits. Al Qaeda international has already declared its support for the anti-government rebels in Syria. If the Assad regime in Syria does fall, al Qaeda will be a major player and beneficiary in the ensuing chaos and (no doubt) sectarian reprisals.
Overall
Al Qaeda is not dead. Al Qaeda international has declined, and its regional organisations have essentially disappeared from some localities, but in other areas it is experiencing real growth and power, and has the potential to expand in others. Al Qaeda is unlikely to ever regain its lost power as an organisation which could seemingly strike anywhere in the world, and whatever growth it does see in the future will be along its adopted franchise model, and heavily tied up in local conflicts and with alliances (and mergers) with local jihadis.
Like Marley, even al Qaeda's ghost still seems to have the power to affect the world, even if it must primarily do so by working through others.
Featured News: al Shabaab bombings in Kenya?
The deadliest attack in Kenya in two years took place this weekend, as hand grenades were used to kill six people in Nairobi. The Kenyan Government has quickly blamed al Shabaab, but al Shabaab has denied responsibility.
If this really was an al Shabaab attack, it may serve as a tragic confirmation of Sharaabtoon's analysis earlier in February: al Shabaab may be seeking to widen its field of jihadi warfare.
Read more:
http://news.yahoo.com/kenya-arrests-four-over-deadly-grenade-attacks-073146371.html;_ylt=AobVXxzTcAKbteWVxNLe.W9vaA8F;_ylu=X3oDMTNlcmk4a25qBG1pdAMEcGtnAzA2NjE4ZjBhLWIwODctM2FiMC04MWVhLTEzNzk3ZTA1ZGQ1NARwb3MDMQRzZWMDbG5fQWZyaWNhX2dhbAR2ZXIDNzdhM2I2NmMtNmM2NS0xMWUxLWJmZmEtZjA1YTczOWE1ZDQ1;_ylv=3
If this really was an al Shabaab attack, it may serve as a tragic confirmation of Sharaabtoon's analysis earlier in February: al Shabaab may be seeking to widen its field of jihadi warfare.
Read more:
http://news.yahoo.com/kenya-arrests-four-over-deadly-grenade-attacks-073146371.html;_ylt=AobVXxzTcAKbteWVxNLe.W9vaA8F;_ylu=X3oDMTNlcmk4a25qBG1pdAMEcGtnAzA2NjE4ZjBhLWIwODctM2FiMC04MWVhLTEzNzk3ZTA1ZGQ1NARwb3MDMQRzZWMDbG5fQWZyaWNhX2dhbAR2ZXIDNzdhM2I2NmMtNmM2NS0xMWUxLWJmZmEtZjA1YTczOWE1ZDQ1;_ylv=3
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)